In this conversation, ACDA director Foster met with Ambassador Knappstein for an extended discussion of the NPT. Topics included the treaty’s compatibility with a future European federation, consultations by the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, the definition of a nuclear weapon, and the prohibition of national control over “peaceful nuclear explosives.”

Information about the recent U.S.-West German discussions had leaked to the press and in this conversation, Vorontsov “wanted to know what we had told the Germans with respect to participation in a European nuclear force.” Bunn told him that the “Germans were concerned that nothing in the treaty stand in the way of steps which might ultimately produce a United States of Europe.”

This note to the Council of Ministers details the jurisdiction and consequences stemming from the American request that an Article III be included into the NPT.

These notes from the Euratom Commission to the Council of Ministers discuss the inclusion of an agreement on nonproliferation and between the United States and the Soviet Union and the impact of oversight.

As an assurance to the Germans and other NATO allies, ACDA and the State Department drew up a memorandum on the interpretation of the NPT draft treaty. The key point was that the treaty “deals only with what is prohibited, not what is permitted.”

This note from the Euratom Commision details the possible construction of an isotope separation plant in the European Community.

This interview with M. Margulies describes the Euratom Treaty as a tangible manifestation of a desire for peace.

In this report and after criticism over the NPT in West Germany, ACDA official G. William Moser looked into the chronology of U.S.-West German interactions. Noting that Washington had “stood foursquare with [the FRG] on the question of maintaining the MLF option under a non-proliferation treaty,” he highlighted a decision made by Rusk on 18 October 1966 to defer consultations with Bonn until he was sure that the Soviets were “serious” about the new Article I language. He concluded that Washington may need to explain Rusk's rationale.

This paper analyzes the safeguard systems in the Euratom Treaty and the IAEA Statute. The study concludes that Euratom has tighter and more complex control of the materials for which it is responsible, but the methods used in the two systems are comparable and compatible.

To try to strengthen West German confidence, ACDA director William C. Foster met with Chancellor Kiesinger, who expressed concern about the danger of “erosion” and “uncertainty” in U.S.-West German relations and the need for more time for consultations. Kiesinger’s “own idea was that it would have been better …to have discussed all aspects of non-proliferation ‘behind locked doors’ before any intention of signing the treaty had become public.”

Lord Chalfont described the international agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as a new phase in negotiations on disarmament.

The treaty creating the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone (LANFZ) was signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico, on 14 February 1967. Taking a close look at key provisions, INR found that the entry into force provisions included loopholes which “unenthusiastic” states could use so the treaty did not cover their territory.

Summary of the United States-South Africa Atomic Energy Bilateral. South Africa's sale of source material to France was the subject of some disagreement between the two parties, with the Americans worried that sale of this material would be in violation of the non-proliferation treaty.

In this Airgram, the U.S. embassy in Bonn sent a translation of Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin's tough statement on the NPT at a press conference in London. Kosygin stated (of West Germany) "whether she wants this or not, such a document should be signed, because we will not allow the Federal Republic of Germany to possess nuclear weapons."

During this conversation, Director Foster briefed Vice President Humphrey about the progress of the NPT. Foster said that he was willing to meet Germany’s concerns about such issues as protecting its civil nuclear industry and a future European federation. Moreover, noting that Washington had to discuss the NPT with other countries that could “otherwise go nuclear,” Foster worried that a long delay caused by consultations could “jeopardize the chance of the rest of the world getting signed up.”

This project served as a response to questions asked by the Committee of Permanent Representatives to the Council. It discusses the compatibility of the NPT project and the Euratom Treaty as well as modifications.

During his meeting with French president de Gaulle, Vice President Humphrey said that Washington knew the “French position” of opposition to the NPT, but wanted to know what de Gaulle thought the “German attitude” should be.

In this conversation, Director Foster and Norwegian Ambassador Gunneng discussed the state of the NPT negotiations and the U.S. consultations with West Germany. Foster made comments about Italy and West Germany being inflexible, and Gunneng stated that it would cost the country "a great deal internationally" if they continued to block progress.

A message from the Bonn embassy highlighted an issue that had been raised by West German diplomats and which Ambassador McGhee correctly believed represented thinking at the top: Chancellor Kiesinger’s objection to an NPT “of unlimited duration.”

This document detailed West German suggestions which Washington incorporated into the NPT draft.The cover memorandum reviewed the sources of West German discontent with the NPT.