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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • April 21, 1962

    Record of Chairman Liu Shaoqi’s Conversation with Korean Ambassador to China Han Ik-su

    During a courtesy call with the new North Korean ambassador, Liu Shaoqi offers his views on Sino-Korean and Sino-Indian relations.

  • June 27, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation between First Vice Premier Hysni Kapo and Albanian Labor Party Politburo Member Ramiz Alia with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai

  • July 21, 1962

    Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 21 July 1962

  • September 05, 1962

    Pakistani Ambassador Raza Pays Formal Visit to Chinese Premier Zhou

    Zhou Enlai and Pakistani Ambassador Raza discuss Chinese and Pakistani relations with India, especially Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's positions on Kashmir, Sino-Indian border disputes, and Sino-Indian interactions on Taiwan and Tibet.

  • October 10, 1962

    Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with "Comrade E"

    Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with the charge d'affairs of the Chinese Embassy in India, Comrade E Cheng-Cheng, referred to as "Comrade E." in the document. In the conversation, the Chinese official gave Beijing's version of the building Sino-Indian border confrontation, blaming India for attacking Chinese posts along the border, and asserting that India had "gone too far" to resume normal relations with the PRC. Ten days later, China launched a broad attack on Indian positions along the disputed frontier.

  • October 11, 1962

    Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 58

    Protocol 58 provides insight into what was occupying the mind of Khrushchev at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The theme of the meeting was centered around the Sino-Indian conflict, questions surrounding the McMahon line, and the future of Tibet. With the focus on China and India, it is reasonable to assume that the crisis caught Khrushchev by surprise.

  • October 12, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation between Chinese Ambassador to Cuba Shen Jian and Member of the Cuban Integrated Revolutionary Organizations Emilio Aragonés

    Shen Jian and Emilio Aragonés discussed the Sino-Indian border disputes, in which both questioned the attitude of the USSR toward India. The other talking points include the attitude of the socialist world toward Yugoslavia and the revolutionary movements in Latin America.

  • October 14, 1962

    Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 59

    Protocol 59 further details the focus of the Soviet Union just before the Cuban Missile Crisis. Khrushchev was so confident that his plan with Cuba would go unhindered that he spent his efforts on resolving the Sino-Indian border conflict, thinking the matter with missiles was done.

  • October 20, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, 'Minutes of the Conversation Between the Chinese Ambassador Ding Guoyu and Pakistan’s Foreign Affairs Secretary on the Sino-Indian Border Clash'

    The two discussed Pakistan's view toward the Sino-Indian conflict. Pakistan sympathized with China and thought that India "deserved to be taught a lesson". Islamabad regarded Nehru as a liar who was ostensibly neutral, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist but in fact signed secret treaties with the US. Both Chinese and Pakistani representatives agreed to strive to resolve peacefully the border issue between Beijing and Islamabad.

  • October 22, 1962

    Soviet Memorandum on the Sino-Indian Border Issue

    The Soviet Union outlines its stance toward the ongoing Sino-Indian border war, including its policy of selling arms to India.

  • October 22, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation between Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu and Soviet Ambassador Stepan Chervonenko

    Stepan Chervonenko and Zhang Hanfu discuss the ongoing border dispute between India and China, and Chervonenko presents a Soviet memorandum outlining the USSR's stance toward the war.

  • October 24, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation between Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu and Chargé d’Affaires Counselor from the Embassy of North Korea in China Jeong Pung-gye

    Zhang informed Jeong Pung-gye of the details of the fighting along the Sino-Indian border as well as expressed support for Cuba regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • October 25, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Memorandum from the Soviet Union on the Sino-Indian Border Dispute and the Sale of Aircrafts to India'

    The Chinese Foreign Ministry informed all of its embassies and Charge d’Affaires about the Soviet Memorandum on the Sino-Indian Dispute and emphasized the necessity to make clear that India was the invader, not China.

  • October 26, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Explanation to Burma about the Line of Actual Control'

    The Chinese Foreign Ministry claims that India is "reoccupying" territories and has crossed the Line of Actual Control.

  • October 26, 1962

    Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad

    Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad. The encounter took place a day after the Soviet leadership had dramatically modified its policy on the Sino-Indian dispute (in an October 25 article in Pravda), suddenly taking a pro-China position, evidently due to the danger of global war breaking out as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, then peaking. While taking pains to welcome the Pravda article as helpful in correcting misunderstandings among Indian Communists, the CPI leader acknowledged that the party secretariat had concluded that "this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India," pushing the Indian Government toward the West, and he pleaded with the Soviets to influence China to resolve the border dispute "without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself."

  • October 27, 1962

    The Editorial Department of Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], 'More on Nehru's Philosophy in the Light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question'

  • October 28, 1962

    Letter from Premier Zhou Enlai to His Excellency Ne Win

    Zhou Enlai writes to Ne Win in order to clarify China's positions on the Line of Actual Control and the Sino-Indian border dispute.

  • October 31, 1962

    Cable from Li Jusheng, 'Report on Handing over the Letter of the Premier to Sukarno'

    Li Jusheng reported to the Chinese Foreign Ministry on his conversation with Indonesian Assistant to First Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs Su-wei-duo. The exchange concerned efforts from Indonesia and Egypt to find an acceptable solution to the Sino-Indian conflict, several points from the Chinese proposal that was unclear to Indonesia, a remarkable absence of demands for the Western and Central sectors in Nehru's letter to Nasser, and the importance of not letting this dispute hinder the preparation for the next Asian-African Conference

  • November 02, 1962

    Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Union, Information on the report delivered by Maj. Boris Gelibusiji from the defense department of the Soviet Union in the Moscow Engineering and Physics College

    Further information from the Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Union on the report delivered by Maj. Boris Gelibusiji from the Defense Department of the Soviet Union in the Moscow Engineering and Physics College, describing comments he made on the Sino-Indian border conflict and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • November 02, 1962

    Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru

    Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru regarding border disputes with China. Approaching the Soviet envoy at a social gathering, the Indian official relayed an oral message to Khrushchev from Indian Prime Minister Nehru (whom he described as "exceptionally busy, very tired"), giving his analysis of the underlying motives behind China's actions in the border dispute. The Indian leader assessed that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai--with whom Nehru had cooperated in championing the rise of the non-aligned movement only a few years earlier--opposed the current militant policy toward India, but that leftist dogmatists-sectarians within the Chinese leadership, such as Liu Shaoqi, supported it. They did so, Nehru reportedly maintained, not because of the border dispute, but to strike a blow against the general phenomenon of neutrality in order to discredit Moscow's line of peaceful coexistence and competition with the West, and avoiding general nuclear war. In fact, Nehru was said to declare, the Chinese threatened to embroil the entire world in war, and had divided the globe into two new camps: not East and West, but "one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against."