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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • July 02, 1953

    Transcript of the CPSU CC Plenum Meetings Regarding Beria’s Views on the German Question

    Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Mologov express negative opinions about Beria’s proposals about the ‘German question,’ accusing him of sympathizing with the ‘imperialist’ side in his plan for a neutral Germany. Bulganin accuses Beria of threatening the positions of the current Ministers in the Presidium if they rejected his ‘bourgeois’ proposals.

  • July 04, 1953

    Telephonogram from Soviet High Commission Officials Miroshnichenko and Lun'kov to High Commisioner V. Semenov

    Miroshnichenko and Lun'kov consider it expedient to ease travel for commuters between east and west Berlin by improving public transport.

  • July 04, 1953

    Telephonogram from Miroshnichenko and Lun’kov to Soviet High Commissioner V. Semyonov Regarding Inter-zone Travel

    Telegram describing discontent of the German population living in East Berlin at the disruption caused by the restrictions imposed on intra-zones travel as a result of the events of 17 June 1953. The telegram recommends actions to be taken to improve the movement of people across the Berlin border.

  • July 04, 1953

    Memorandum from Vladimir Semyonov and Pavel Yudin to Vyacheslav Molotov Regarding Inter-Zonal Movement in Berlin

    SED CC Politburo requests to resume movement across the sector border between East and West Berlin. This report includes step-by-step instructions in how this could be implemented.

  • July 08, 1953

    Report from Maj.-Gen. Sergei Dengin to Vladimir Semyonov, 'On the Situation in the Soviet Sector of Berlin'

    Sergei Dengin states that a series of strikes are occurring in the Soviet Sector of Berlin, following the East German Uprising. It is reported that GDR inhabitants are generally dissatisfied with the under allocation of food products, steel, electricity, and other resources. Jendretzky has agreed to take measures to improve the supply of resources, strengthen government authority, and control the spread of provocative rumors.

  • July 10, 1953

    CIA Information Report, 'Berlin as of 5.00 p.m., 9 July 1953'

    This CIA report contains an assessment of the situation in East Berlin; while East Sector is relatively quiet, general unrest still exists with strong indications of upcoming workers strikes.

  • July 10, 1953

    CIA Special Supplement to the Current Intelligence Weekly

    This CIA report contains a chronological breakdown of the nature and extent of the riots and demonstrations in East Germany, and descriptions of the Soviet reaction, East German capabilities, East German government reaction, and the Soviet policy reaction. According to the report, at this point, the USSR has not yet revealed any long-term policy reaction to the German situation.

  • July 14, 1953

    Letter from President Eisenhower to Field Marshall Montgomery of Alamein

    In a personal letter to the Field Marshall regarding to his assumptions made in a memoranda, President Eisenhower presents an opposing view that the successful integration of West Germany into Western Europe would increase pressure within East Germany for reunification.

  • July 15, 1953

    Memorandum from S. Kruglov to G.M. Malenkov

    Kruglov reports on the arrest of organizers during the East German protests.

  • July 28, 1953

    Letter from James B. Conant to John Foster Dulles

    Conant reports the apparent success of a food distribution plan from West Berlin to the occupants of East Berlin. However, he informs Dulles of received complaints by British and French Allied High Commandants about unilateral action in Berlin, and the American lack of consultation of the Allied High Commission on these matters.

  • August 08, 1953

    Cable from James B. Conant to John Foster Dulles

    Conant suggests that while US policy towards East Germany should, on principle, encourage the “spirit of resistance” brought about by the East German Uprising, it is believed that Communist authorities will continue to use brutal tactics to restrain such resistance, and therefore US initiatives towards the situation should be restrained as to not provide East German authorities an opportunity for more brutal repressions of the population.

  • September 25, 1953

    Draft Instructions to Chuikov and Semyonov

    In March 1953, Moscow had declined Ulbricht’s request for tightening up the sector border in Berlin, then the major loophole in the SED leadership’s efforts to seal off East Germany. In the aftermath of the demonstrations and unrest in Berlin, the SED leadership apparently tried to reintroduce the idea of increased “border security” in Berlin. Eager to salvage whatever was left of its political position as a champion of German unity, Moscow again held such measures as politically “disadvantageous” and “unacceptable.” Certainly, the Kremlin was also aware of the continued widespread resentment among the Berlin and GDR population which made any more restrictive measures a risky undertaking. Instead, the Soviets urged the SED to increase its “fight against hostile elements” in West Berlin—an issue that would become more and more the focus of Soviet attitude on Berlin.

  • September 29, 1953

    Memorandum of Conversation between the Chinese Ambassador to the USSR and Gromyko

    International relations between the USSR, China, USA, and England; a proposal to have discussions among the different nations in regards to the solution for post-WWII Germany; mention of an attempt to lessen tension.

  • November 16, 1953

    Fomenting Unrest in the Communist World

    C.D. Jackson, now assistant to President Eisenhower, urges CIA director Allen Dulles to make contingency plans to exploit future unrest in the Communist world during a perceived “Winter of Discontent.”

  • 1954

    The POW Scandal in Korea

    According to A.B Carey, one of the lessons learned from fighting the Kremlin and its “communism” ideology is evidently seen amongst the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war. Both groups of POW not only disapprove of the communism but would also actively fight against it if they had the opportunity. Carey uses ten ideas which denounce the Kremlin as the one responsible for the lies and bellicosities during the Cold War. He also proceeds to demonstrate ways the free world can defeat this communist caucus.

  • January 19, 1954

    Central Intelligence Agency, NIE 12.4-54, Probable Developments in Eastern Germany Through 1955

    Estimating the current situation and probable developments in East Germany through 1955.

  • February 19, 1954

    Plan GELENA - Agent-Operational Measures on German Intelligence

    Detailed plan and timetable for the activities to expose intelligence operatives who have previously worked for Gestapo.

  • March 12, 1954

    Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Report from Károly Pásztor, Hungarian envoy to the DPRK, regarding a conversation he had with Soviet Ambassador Suzdalev. He discusses the difficulties which would be involved in achieving Korean unification.

  • June 16, 1954

    State Department Reservations about Free Europe Committee Policy

    State Department official Lampton Berry conveys to Thomas Braden reservations about FEC Special Policy Guidance No. 19 [available in the Hoover Archives] that emphasized weakened Soviet control in Eastern Europe.

  • September 10, 1954

    Letter, Preston Goodfellow to President Syngman Rhee

    In this letter, Goodfellow addresses Korean tungsten production and German attempts to buy it. He states Americans will not allow players “behind the Iron Curtain” to own or have the power to set the tungsten world price. He also briefly mentions American military assistance and the first Taiwan Crisis.