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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • September 09, 1950

    National Security Council Report, NSC 81/1, "United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea"

    The National Security Council reports to President Truman on possible US courses of action in resposne to the North Korean invasion of South Korea.

  • September 20, 1950

    Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Ni Zhiliang

    China approves of Kim Il Sung's idea of fighting a protracted war, and gives advice on military strategies that will make a protracted war possible.

  • September 23, 1950

    CPSU Politburo Decision to Adopt the Attached Draft Response

    Telegram telling Vyshinsky to inform Lancaster that Malik consented to a meeting with the assistant Ahesona or one of the American ambassadors, as suggested by Lancaster. Malik should listen to the State Department official and if it's evident that the Americans are taking a step forward towards a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, tell him that Malik should ponder the issues mentioned in the conversation.

  • September 26, 1950

    Ciphered Telegram from Matveyev (Zakharov) to Feng Xi (Stalin)

    Telegram from Zakharov to Stalin detailing the dire situation for the North Koreans following the Incheon landing.

  • September 27, 1950

    Telegram from Matveyev (Razuvayev V.N.) to Stalin

    Matveyev describes the state of the Korean People’s Army, particularly the severe status of troops in Seoul and Busan after having encountered American air and ground forces. Matveyev also reports on a meeting between several Soviet and Korean foreign ministers in which Kim Il Sung assumed the tasks of both Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Defense Minister and ordered the deployment of troops northward. Matveyev also outlines the steps he plans to take as a Soviet envoy in aiding the desperate Korean army.

  • September 27, 1950

    Telegram from Feng Xi (Stalin) to Matveyev (Razuvayev V.N.) and T.F. Shtykov

    Stalin blames the recent success of the UN forces in Seoul on the inefficiency of the KPA’s Frontline Command and Soviet military advisors, as well erroneous use of tank tactics and overall combat strategy. Stalin provides a detailed list instructing military advisors, and especially Vasilyev, how to delpoy and manage Korean troops around Seoul.

  • September 29, 1950

    Telegram from Shtykov to Gromyko and Stalin

    Shtykov gives an insider’s report of a meeting with Kim Il Sung and Pak Heon-yeong, in which they discussed the current desperate state of the KPA, possible advancement of the US forces over the 38th parallel and the extent of the enemy’s knowledge of Soviet Union deliveries to North Korea. Kim asks for advice concerning the appeal for military aid that the Political Council of the Worker’s Party of Korea plans to send to Stalin. Shytkov comments on the nervousness and desperation of the Korean officials.

  • September 29, 1950

    Ciphered Telegram from DPRK leader Kim Il Sung and South Korean Communist Leader Pak Heon-yeong to Stalin (via Shtykov)

    Telegram from Kim Il Sung and Pak Heon-yeong telling Stalin of the losses they have incurred following American air and ground attacks in South Korea and of their general lack of supplies and trained personnel.

  • September 30, 1950

    Memorandum from Gromyko to Stalin, 30 September 1950, with draft cable from Gromyko to Shtykov

    A message from Gromyko to Stalin relaying the assessment of Shtykov that it would be prudent for the Soviet Union to withdraw some nonessential embassy personnel and specialists from North Korea. Gromyko advises that withdrawals should be considered only in consultation with North Korea and the appropriate Soviet ministeries.

  • September 30, 1950

    Ciphered Telegram, Shtykov to Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Instantsia (Stalin)

    Telegram from Shtykov to Gromyko and Stalin reporting the dire circumstances into which the North Koreans had fallen in the wake of the Incheon landings. Mentioned is a correspondence between the North Koreans and Mao which hinted at possible Chinese aid.

  • September 30, 1950

    Cable No. 600308, Shtykov to Stalin, transmitting Letter from Kim Il Sung and Pak Heon-Yeong

    Telegram from Kim Il Sung and Pak Heon-yeong telling Stalin of the losses they have incurred following American air and ground attacks in South Korea and of their general lack of supplies and trained personnel.

  • October 01, 1950

    Ciphered Telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai (via Roshchin)

    Telegram from Stalin to Mao and Zhou Enlai asking that they consider moving 5-6 divisions of Chinese volunteers to the China-DPRK border in order to give the North Koreans cover under which to reorganize their troops. Stalin explicitly states that he will not mention this idea to the North Koreans.

  • October 01, 1950

    Ciphered Telegram No. 75352, Feng Xi [Stalin] to Shtraus [Shtykov] and Mayveyev [Zakharov]

    Stalin cables his chief political and military representatives in Pyongyang in response to messages relating the increasingly dire situation in Korea as North Korean forces were driven back across the 38th parallel. Stalin demands that they establish defenses along the 38th parallel to prevent further American advance and even go on the offensive by organizing “guerrilla warfare” in the south behind enemy lines.

  • October 02, 1950

    Cable, from Chan-Fu to Matveev

    Cable stating that orders to retreat by any means possible (in groups, or individually) must be given out immediately to the remaining soldiers and commanders in the South.

  • October 03, 1950

    Transcript of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and K.M. Panikkar

    Zhou Enlai talks with K.M. Panikkar about a letter from Jawaharlal Nehru asking about the North Korea issue and U.S. involvement on the Korean peninsula. Zhou expresses that if American soldiers cross the 38th parallel, then China will take charge of the issue. Zhou also communicates the desire from the Chinese side for the peaceful settlement of the Korea issuen through the UN, which will first require foreign armed forces to exit the Korean peninsula.

  • October 05, 1950

    Cable, Zhou Enlai to Ni Zhiliang

    Zhou Enlai gives instructions to pay attention to the northern advance of the South Korean army and the retreat of the North Korean army, and to collect information on the 12th Division's occupation of Wonju. He also notes Pak Il U's return to North Korea.

  • October 07, 1950

    Ciphered Telegram No. 25348, Roshchin to Filippov [Stalin]

    Ambassador Roshchin passes a message from Mao to Stalin regarding the Chinese deployment of troops to Korea.

  • November 02, 1950

    Ciphered telegram, S.E. Zakharov, Soviet Military Representative in Beijing, to Feng Xi (Stalin)

    Telegram to Stalin reporting on the status--operational readiness and losses incurred--of North Korean air forces.

  • November 09, 1950

    CC Politburo Decision with Approved Message from Gromyko to Roshchin with Message for Zhou Enlai

    Telegram from Gromyko to Zhou Enlai advising the latter to turn down the invitation for China to participate in the UN Security Council. It also explains the circumstances under which the invitation was obtained.

  • November 28, 1950

    Letter from General MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea

    General MacArthur reports from Tokyo on developments in Korea, stating that the Chinese military support to North Korea was increasing.