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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • March 10, 1967

    Note on Meeting of the Non-Aligned Group at the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament

    Disagreement between representatives of Mexico and the UAR on the non-aligned group developing a common position.

  • March 17, 1967

    Research Memorandum RAR-8 from George C. Denney, Jr., to the Secretary, 'The Latin American Nuclear Free Zone: Pluses and Minuses'

    The treaty creating the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone (LANFZ) was signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico, on 14 February 1967. Taking a close look at key provisions, INR found that the entry into force provisions included loopholes which “unenthusiastic” states could use so the treaty did not cover their territory.

  • June 13, 1967

    Telegram from Ambassador Trivedi, 'Non-Aligned Meeting'

    Different points of Mexico and Brazil on the denuclearization treaty of Latin America

  • July 04, 1967

    A Report from the Mexican Embassy in Havana, 4 July 1967

    A visit of Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin from 26-30 June 1967 prompts this report from the Mexican Embassy in Havanna to the Secretary of Foreign Relations in Mexico City. They discuss: the position assumed by the Cuban Government and Communist Party in relation to Latin America, the Middle East and Vietnam, the internal administration of Cuba and the political operation in Cuba.

  • November 07, 1967

    25th Meeting of Non-Aligned Group with Discussion on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

    Mexican and Brazilian representatives disagree on if peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) are allowed by the Latin American treaty.

  • November 17, 1967

    Operation MANUEL: Origins, Development and Aims

    Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.

  • November 28, 1978

    Information on the Developments in Nicaragua

    Report which outlines the activity of leftist opposition movements in Nicaragua in their attempt to overthrow the rule of Somoza. The text gives an account of the support which various leftist opposition organizations have received from neighboring countries. According to the information, the following groups have overtly expressed discontent with the ruling regime: The Democratic Union for Liberation, the “Group of Twelve,” the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement, and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Those movements have been supported politically, financially, and in some instances with military aid, by the governments of Venezuela, Mexico, Panama, Costa Rica, and Cuba. The text suggests that two factors have contributed to the escalating tension in Nicaragua – the internal struggle against the regime combined with pressures from outside, coming mainly from the USA, to keep the regime in place.

  • November 27, 1981

    Telegram No.: MEX/104/1/81, Secretary Haig’s Visit to Mexico (November 23-24)

    The US ratified additional protocol I to the Treaty of Tlateloco for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

  • July 11, 1983

    Information from the Bulgarian Communist Party Regarding the Visit of the Delegation of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) to Bulgaria

    Information summarizing the objectives of a visit of the FSLN delegation, headed by Baiardo Arse [name is spelled phonetically], to Bulgaria. The visit, which took place from 28 June to July 3 1983, aimed at exchanging information and ideas on ways to reform FSLN, in order to transform the Front into an avant-garde Marxist-Leninist party. The document describes the political and economic pressure exerted by the Reagan administration on a number of Central and Latin American countries, in order to decrease the support for the Front and other leftist revolutionary movements. According to the information FSLN responded to these measures by consolidating and strengthening its army, and national militia; maintaining transparency and political pluralism; strengthening the cooperative and state economic sector, and redirecting trade to new markets, mainly in the socialist community.

  • June, 2007

    An Illegal Trainer (KGB history of agent "Halef"). Folder 60. The Chekist Anthology.

    Describes training techniques used by the KGB in logistical preparation of their operatives for assignments abroad. This article focuses on the employment history of the KGB agent codenamed “Halef.” Between 1955 and 1967, Halef was stationed in Hong Kong and Tokyo. In 1967, due to his insignificant feedback and a weak performance as a field operative, Halef was transferred back as a trainer. As a trainer, Halef traveled extensively. While in the United States, the KGB developed a fictitious identity for Halef – a so-called legend-biography – in case his activity aroused suspicion and he were detained by authorities. In the United States, France and Mexico, Halef’s objectives included developing and testing means of communication with the KGB, which could be used to inform the KGB of an operative’s arrival to and departure from a country, request a meeting, or announce an emergency. In addition to assessing the existing signal language used among operatives, the KGB also instructed Halef to collect the data necessary to set up new surveillance locations in a number of countries. In 1977, Halef was performing assignments in Pakistan and Burma. In 1978, he and his wife were engaged in assignments throughout the USSR. From the USSR, they were relocated to the GDR and then to Bulgaria, where they boarded a cruise ship going from Varny to Suhumi to survey the ports of the Black Sea basin. Traveling through Odessa, Halef photographed military vessels and observed the procedures of the border patrol and customs officers.