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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • September 08, 1982

    Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 91-2-82, 'Argentina's Nuclear Policies in Light of the Falklands Defeat'

    The document reports that Argentina did not have a military component in its nuclear program and evaluates Argentina’s capacity of developing a nuclear program with military purposes.

  • March 30, 1983

    CIA Report, 'New Information on South Africa’s Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation' (redacted)

    CIA report summaries new information on Israel-South African nuclear cooperation. According to the report, South Africa formerly launched its weapons program in 1973, and paused it in 1979 following the international discovery of the Kalahari nuclear test site. Military cooperation between South Africa and Israel is believed to be extensive, with continual contact between personnel and the large-scale sale of arms. Aside from the South African sale of depleted uranium to Israel in the mid-1970s, the CIA had no hard evidence of nuclear cooperation between the two.

  • October 03, 1983

    V. Chebrikov, 'On Measures to Improve Preventive Work Conducted by the State Security Service'

    Reports from the Committee for States Security (KGB) of the USSR discuss how agents should go about preventative work and educating workers on socialist ideology.

  • October 03, 1983

    V. Chebrikov, 'Order of the Chairman of the State Security Committee of the USSR, Moscow, regarding Measures To Improve The Preventive Work Conducted By The State Security Services'

  • October 03, 1983

    Letter of the Collegium of the KGB of the USSR, 'Regarding Measures to Improve the Preventive Work conducted by the State Security Services'

  • April, 1984

    Defense Intelligence Agency Report, 'Soviet Military and Other Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa'

    An overview of Soviet political, economic and military involvement in Africa. The document asserts that although Moscow continues its policy of taking an active and aggressive role in the affairs of Sub-Saharan Africa, much of the momentum it initially possessed has been lost. Moscow now finds itself holding onto the influence it maintains most notably in Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia.

  • September, 1985

    Intelligence Estimate, 'Argentina: Seeking Nuclear Independence'

    This estimate is an update of the1984 SNIE, and has more specific considerations on the Alfonsin government and its nuclear policies, capabilities and intentions.

  • September, 1985

    CIA Intelligence Assessment, 'Gorbachev's Economic Agenda: Promises, Potentials, and Pitfalls'

    An analysis of Gorbachev's new economic policies.

  • September 05, 1985

    Transcript of the SED Politburo Session held on 5 September 1989

    A transcript of an SED Politburo Session discussing Hungary's decision to open its western border and allow East German citizens to cross into Austria.

  • December, 1985

    Special National Intelligence Estimate SNIE 93-83, 'Brazil's Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints'

    This SNIE analyzes Brazilian nuclear politics in the light of the return of civilian rule in the country after 21 years of military rule. It demonstrates a profound knowledge of the military's involvement in the nuclear program.

  • September 08, 1986

    Memorandum by Director of Global Issues, 'President Sarney and Brazil´s Nuclear Policy'

    This is a CIA assessment of Brazilian nuclear politics a few weeks before President Sarney's visit to the U.S.

  • December 02, 1987

    Confidential Telegram from USINT Havana to Secretary of State George Shultz, 'Cuba Describes Geographic Position and Military Role of its Forces in Angola'

    Telegram from United States Interests Section in Havana to Secretary of State George Shultz describing the placement of Cuban forces in Angola and the justification that they are not taking part in active combat.

  • December 17, 1987

    Letter, President Reagan to Speaker of the House, Enclosing Presidential Determination

    Reagan informed Congress that he had “concluded that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device.”

  • January 29, 1988

    Confidential Telegram from USINT Havana to Secretary of State George Shultz,'The Military Situation in Angola -- Cubans Deny UNITA Seizure of Strategic Town'

    A telegram from United States Interests Section in Havana to Secretary of State Shultz describing Cuban reactions to reports that UNITA captured the strategic Angolan town of Cuito Cuanavale, capital city of Cuando Cubango. Cuban press call such claims false and lies of the racist South Africans.

  • March 18, 1988

    Confidential Telegram from USINT Havana to Secretary of State George Shultz, 'Cuban Armed Forces Ministry Communique on Cuban-Angolan Defense of Cuito Cuanavale'

    A Cuban Defense Ministry communiqué details the “heroic defense” by Cuban and Angolan troops of Cuito Cuanavale against a South African onslaught. The brunt of the fighting was done by local Angolan forces, which successfully managed to repel the South African invaders.

  • May 29, 1988

    Memorandum of Conversation, the President's First One-on-One Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev

    Reagan and Gorbachev's first conversation during Reagan's 1988 visit to Moscow.

  • June 20, 1988

    Anatoly Chernyaev, Notes from a Meeting of the Politburo

    Anatoly Chernyaev’s notes from the Politburo session on June 20, 1988, during which military spending, party membership, the progress of perestroika, and CPSU organizational leadership were discussed.

  • December, 1988

    CIA Intelligence Assessment, 'Gorbachev’s September Housecleaning: An Early Evaluation'

    An intelligence analysis from the CIA covering recent changes to the Soviet Union's state structure and leadership reorganization, legal reforms, economic resource allocation, foreign policy etc. under Gorbachev's more powerful position.

  • 1989

    Defense Intelligence Agency Briefing, 'The 1987-88 Combat in Southern Angola: Lessons Learned'

    Analysis of the military campaign waged in Southern Angola in 1987-88 as well as the lessons learned from this exchange. Document indicates that FAPLA failed to learn from its mistakes, while UNITA adapted much more effectively to the combat environment it faced in Angola. Although FAPLA managed to hold on to Cuito Cuanavale, its large losses led to a Cuban build-up in Southern Angola, which challenged the existing military balance in the region. This provided new impetus to peace negotiations and resulted in the December 1988 Accords among South Africa, Angola and Cuba.

  • February, 1989

    Cable from the US Embassy in Moscow to Secretary of State for General Scowcroft, 'The Soviet Union Over the Next Four Years'

    Predictions about the next four years in the Soviet Union's evolving political and cultural landscape, including that internal protests against perestroika will dominate the focus of Soviet leadership, that perestroika and its attendant backlash will in turn redistribute funds away from military spending, and that ultimately, these and other conflicts and pressures will promulgate the collapse of the Soviet Union.