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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • October 23, 1962

    Telegram from Swiss Foreign Ministry to Swiss Embassy in Havana (Stadelhofer)

    A telegram from the Swiss Foreign Ministry in Berne to the Swiss Embassy in Havana that describes the difficult and complex diplomatic situation presented by the Cuban crisis.

  • October 23, 1962

    Soviet Report on American Secrecy Efforts

    Report on US secrecy prior to President Kennedy's October 22 speech announcing the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba and the start of a US blockade. Also describes press conference by Robert McNamara.

  • October 23, 1962

    Message from Mexican President Adolfo López Mateos to Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos

    A message from Mexican President Adolfo López Mateos to Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos. President Mateos expresses his concern with the possibility of weapons of aggression existing in Cuba. President Mateos hopes Cuba has not yet acquired these weapons, but that if it in fact has, he says that Mexico hopes "those bases are not used in any form whatsoever and the offensive weapons are withdrawn from Cuban territory."

  • October 23, 1962

    Soviet Report on the Atmosphere in the US following Kennedy's Announcement

    Report on the tense atmosphere in Washington following Kennedy's October 22 announcement. Intelligence from newspaper reports are also summarized.

  • October 23, 1962

    Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Mexican Foreign Ministry official and Mexican Ambassador to Brazil

    The Brazilian and Mexican diplomats to Cuba weigh in on their respective governments' opinions on the Cuban crisis and increasing U.S.-Cuban tensions.

  • October 23, 1962

    Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 7 p.m. Tuesday

    A report of the meeting between OAS officials and the descisions that were made regarding the Cuban crisis. Secretary Martin puts forward that, soon, there will be fully disseminated, to convince Latin American public opinion of the gravity of the threat, photographs of the remote-controlled missiles in Cuba.

  • October 23, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos)

    A report on Secretary of State Dean Rusk's discussion of the severity of the American reaction to the installation of remote-controlled missiles of medium and intermediate range in Cuba by the Soviet Union.

  • October 23, 1962

    Telegram from Swiss Ambassador in Washington Lindt regarding briefing by Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler

    Before a briefing of the neutral ambassadors by US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, William Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, asks the Swiss diplomat to meet with him. After Tyler expressed thanks on behalf of the USA for what Switzerland has done, and will yet do in the future, for the American interests in Cuba, he said that he wished to inform the Swiss official more extensively than Rusk would be able to do in front of the assembled group of ambassadors. They mostly discuss Soviet missile deployed in Cuba.

  • October 23, 1962

    Ciphered Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev

    A report on Alekseev's 23 October 1962 conversation with Fidel Castro, together with two members of the Cuban leadership, the day after the public crisis began. Presented with official Soviet statements on the crisis, Castro reviews the situation and confidently vows defiance to the US "aggression," which he claimed was doomed to failure.

  • October 23, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation, Federal Republic of Germany Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Dean Acheson, Special Envoy of US President Kennedy, Bonn, West Germany

    A conversation between Federal Chancellor Adenauer with the Special Adviser of the U.S. President, Acheson. They discuss plans to destabilize the Cuban regime by domestic unrest, how the missile bases in Cuba should be destroyed, Russian soldiers stationed in Cuba and the lasting impact of the Bay of Pigs landing.

  • October 23, 1962

    Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 60

    Protocol 60 details the first meeting of the Communist Party during the crisis. As Khrushchev is awaiting the announcement by President Kennedy of the discovery of missiles in Cuba, he and some of his colleagues briefly considered using tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a US airborne assault. But, at the suggestion of Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky, the Kremlin postponed its consideration of a nuclear response pending details of Kennedy’s speech.The Kremlin wasted no time in taking steps to reduce the risks of confrontation. It ordered some ships that were still in the Mediterranean to turn around. The Aleksandrovsk, the ship carrying the nuclear warheads for the IRBMs (the R-14s), was ordered to keep sailing, however, because it was close enough to Cuban shores to dock before the blockade went into effect.

  • October 23, 1962

    Record of Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) Central Committee Politburo Meeting

    A meeting between the Politburo members of the East German Central Committee (CC GDR) concerning US imperialist actions against Cuba, meaning the economic sanctions and blockade. The GDR Politburo members express their strong support of Cuba.

  • October 24, 1962

    Report to the CPSU Central Committee from Department of Agitation and Propaganda

    The Department of Agitation and Propaganda asks permission to increase the amount of radio broadcasts from Moscow to Cuba as a means to preempt the 24-hour broadcasts of the US.

  • October 24, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'Report of a Conversation with Cuban Interior Minister'

    The Cuban Interior Minister is telling the Chinese embassy officials about U.S. combat readiness and active troop deployments to Cuba/Guantanamo.

  • October 24, 1962

    Message from Mexican Embassy, Washington (Antonio Carrillo Flores)

    The Mexican government recognizes that as the OAS session was ending Secretary Rusk took care to thank our country [Mexico] for its attitude.

  • October 24, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation between Mexican Foreign Ministry Official and Chilean Diplomat, Mexico City

    The Chilean Chargé d’Affaires visited with the Second Undersecretary of Mexico [Pablo] Campos Ortiz to say that Chile had instructions from their government to communicate to the Mexican officials, first, that Chile would vote in the OAS, in favor of the draft resolution presented by the United States; and second, that Chile would vote, in the UN Security Council, in favor of the United States’ Resolution.

  • October 24, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 5:15 p.m., Wednesday

    A telegram from Campos informing the Secretary of State that President Kennedy is suggesting the postponement of his visit to Brazil in light of the international tension.

  • October 24, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 5 p.m., Wednesday

    The Brazilian Embassy in Cuba describes that the situation has become difficult as the supply of foodstuffs and other articles for members of this Embassy and for the asylum-seekers has become difficult to obtain.

  • October 24, 1962

    Telegram from Brazilian Delegation to the OAS, Washington, 9:30 p.m., Wednesday

    A telegram from the Delegation of Brazil at the Organization of American States in Washington, DC describing the actions that were taken and one the votes that was cast at the most recent meeting of the Council.

  • October 24, 1962

    Cable from Israeli Foreign Ministry (Arad) to Israeli Embassy, Washington

    A cable on the conversation between Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and US Ambassador to Israel Walworth Barbour devoted to the crisis in Cuba. The cable says "The PM told Barbour that with regard to the Cuban Crisis we [Israel] had nothing better to do than pray." and that "The PM replied that Israel is trying to maintain peace."