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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • June, 1975

    Briefing Paper, 'The Nuclear Suppliers Conference'

    The U.S. delegation agreed to develop a policy paper that would take into account French and other views so as to reach agreement on the most “stringent” safeguards possible. A central but divisive issue was whether safeguards should apply to the entire nuclear fuel cycle (later known as “full-scope” safeguards). Another issue was whether multinational auspices for reprocessing and enrichment plants should be mandatory or a matter of discretion by a supplier country. This document specifically addresses the concerns of West Germany.

  • June, 1975

    Briefing Paper prepared for the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, 'Status Summary of Nuclear Suppliers Conference and Relevant Bilateral Discussion'

    This document summarizes the nuclear suppliers' meeting on June 18-19. Topics covered included whether safeguards should apply to the entire nuclear fuel cycle (later known as “full-scope” safeguards). Another issue was whether multinational auspices for reprocessing and enrichment plants should be mandatory or a matter of discretion by a supplier country. On these matters and others, the French position was central.

  • June 14, 1975

    Memorandum from Thomas O. Enders to the Secretary, 'Draft Letter to Sauvagnargues'

    This memorandum describes Henry Kissinger's response to French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues who requested a 27 member group to meet on issues similar to the previous nuclear suppliers' group meeting. Kissinger lists the complications that could arise from this and suggests not doing so. Document also includes another letter from Kissinger to Sauvagnargues regarding the important of nuclear export issues, as well as Kissinger's advisers suggestions to not send the letters to France just yet.

  • June 19, 1975

    U.S. Embassy London telegram 9376 to State Department, 'Nuclear Export Policy: Bilaterals with FRG'

    The U.S. delegation agreed to develop a policy paper that would take into account French and other views so as to reach agreement on the most “stringent” safeguards possible. A central but divisive issue was whether safeguards should apply to the entire nuclear fuel cycle (later known as “full-scope” safeguards). Another issue was whether multinational auspices for reprocessing and enrichment plants should be mandatory or a matter of discretion by a supplier country.

  • July 21, 1975

    Telegram from Berlin to Bucharest, No. 018.998

    Comments regarding the recent US declaration on the use of nuclear arms in case of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Most communist countries agree that the two Koreas show little interest in generating armed conflict on the peninsula. The DPRK reiterates its plans for a peaceful unification of Korea.

  • September 15, 1975

    U.S. Embassy London telegram 14177 to State Department, 'French-U.S. Consultations on Nuclear Suppliers Meeting'

    Telegram illuminates the U.S. –French dialogue over safeguards and other provisions in the nuclear suppliers’ guidance. Arguing that full-scope safeguards was “alien to [their] philosophy,” the French suggested that a “traditional interpretation of the contamination principle (i.e., requiring safeguards on any materials produced in exported facilities),” would make it possible to achieve “the practical equivalent” of the Canadian proposal.

  • September 23, 1975

    Memorandum from George S. Vest to Secretary of State, 'September 16-17 Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting'

    The September 1975 meeting of the suppliers’ group brought out a conflict over a decisive issue, whether supplying countries should require recipient countries to place all nuclear facilities under safeguards or require them only for the technology and supplies at issue in the contract (“project safeguards”). The Canadians strongly supported the former, “full scope safeguards” (their terminology, which caught on), which the French saw as “tantamount to imposing NPT obligations” --a reference to the Treaty’s Article III--which they would not accept.

  • October 10, 1975

    George Vest to Mr. Sonnenfeldt, 'British Comprehensive Safeguards Initiative re Suppliers Conference'

    This document describes the differing views regarding safeguards. The Canadians strongly supported the former, “full scope safeguards” (their terminology, which caught on), which the French saw as “tantamount to imposing NPT obligations”--a reference to the Treaty’s Article III--which they would not accept. Arguing that full-scope safeguards was “alien to [their] philosophy,” the French suggested that a “traditional interpretation of the contamination principle (i.e., requiring safeguards on any materials produced in exported facilities),” would make it possible to achieve “the practical equivalent” of the Canadian proposal.

  • October 15, 1975

    Briefing Paper, 'Nuclear Suppliers Conference,' Secretary's Trip to Ottawa

    This document describes Canada's position on safeguards as well as the United State's position and how the U.S. will respond to Canada. The Canadians strongly supported the former, “full scope safeguards," and although Washington had included the substance of full-scope safeguards in the original five-point paper but Kissinger would not go against the French and risk the hard-won understanding that had brought them into the group.

  • December 31, 1975

    Memorandum from George S. Springsteen, Executive Secretary, to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, 'Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines'

    This document comprises the instructions which the White House approved for the September 1975 suppliers’ meeting. At the November meeting, the suppliers completed negotiations on guidelines. Basic provisions included agreement to seek assurances by recipients of supplies not to produce nuclear explosive devices, physical security for installations and materials, transfer of trigger list items only under IAEA safeguards, restraint in transfer of sensitive technologies, facilities and materials, and the encouragement of supplier involvement in, and multinational controls over, sensitive installations. Appended to the guidelines was a two page “trigger list” based on the Zangger Committee’s list.

  • January 27, 1976

    George Vest to the Secretary, 'Nuclear Suppliers Status Report'

    In this document regarding the final agreement, George Vest wrote Kissinger that it “served to close many of the loopholes and inadequacies of previous nuclear cooperation agreements between suppliers and recipients.” It also put the French and West Germans on record to restrict access to sensitive nuclear technologies. Nevertheless, as Vest noted, the guidelines would not prevent “indigenous” development of nuclear capabilities and “unsafeguarded developments” or the acquisition of sensitive technology.

  • March 06, 1976

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.046

    The Embassy of Romania in Pyongyang summarizes remarks made by Ri Jong-mok, the North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister, on the military and security situation on the Korean Peninsula.

  • June 11, 1976

    George Vest to the Secretary of State, 'London Nuclear Suppliers Meeting'

    This document provides an overview of the London Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting which included the addition of the five newest countries to the original seven. Most old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a “long term and stable regime of restraint” on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.

  • August 06, 1976

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.190

    The Embassy of Romania in Pyongyang summarizes and analyzes the “declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea government,” a report prepared by Jeon Myeong-su, DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister.

  • November 12, 1976

    London Embassy telegram 18324 to State Department, 'London Nuclear Suppliers’ Meeting, November 11 – 12'

    This telegram describes what the nuclear suppliers' countries accomplished during their November 11-12 meeting. Continued discussions of safeguards and enlarging the group, and agreed that they would wait on publishing results until after their next meeting, which was scheduled to be the following March in London.

  • March 26, 1977

    From the Journal of  A. F. Dobrynin, Record of Conversation with US Secretary of State C. Vance

    Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin met with US Secretary of State Vance and requested that he pass on a letter to President Carter from Brezhnev. The letter addressed finding a realistic approach to nuclear disarmament and the previous agreement in Vladivostok.

  • June, 1981

    Secretary's Talking Points: US-China Relations

    This is a document containing talking points for Secretary of State Alexander Haig's meeting with Deng Xiaoping. Topics addressed in the document include: Chinese exportation of uranium and heavy water to South Africa and Argentina; the intention to suspend the prohibition of arm sales to China; greater nuclear and security cooperation; the increase in Chinese arm sales to countries dependent on the Soviet Union; and the desire to open a new consulate in Shenyang.

  • January 14, 1983

    Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Brief Note, 'Issues to Discuss with the Leadership of the KGB of the USSR'

    This brief note written by the Ministry of State Security includes a number of questions for the leadership of the KGB in the USSR, such as whether other elements, like military doctrine or emergency responses, should be examined as possible options for starting a war.

  • January 31, 1983

    Information on the Results of the Second Round of Soviet-American Negotations on the Limitation and Reduction of Strategic Armaments

    Report on negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to reduce the number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers used by each side.

  • May 28, 1983

    CC CPSU on Withdrawal from Strategic Arms Reduction Negotiations (1)

    The CC CPSU announces that it is breaking off negotiations with the US and NATO on Strategic Arms Reduction.