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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • November 17, 1950

    Ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai via Zakharov

    Stalin's affirmative response to Zhou Enlai's request of 16 November for automobiles.

  • November 17, 1950

    Telegram from Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai

    Mao Zedong informs Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang that Stalin has approved of a single central command led by the Chinese, and that they are now waiting to see how Kim Il Sung will respond.

  • November 20, 1950

    Telegram from Stalin to Kim Il Sung, via Shtykov

    Stalin agrees to train North Korean pilots, but in China, not in the Soviet Union, as Kim Il Sung previously suggested.

  • November 21, 1950

    On the Operational Status of the People's Army of Korea on 14 November 1950

    Report on amount of armies, infantry divisions, infantry brigades, tank divisions, marine brigades, infantry regiments, tank regiments, and army officers in Manchuria and North Korea, and the amount left behind enemy lines.

  • November 28, 1950

    Letter from General MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea

    General MacArthur reports from Tokyo on developments in Korea, stating that the Chinese military support to North Korea was increasing.

  • November 29, 1950

    Telegram from Shtykov to the USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

    Telegram from the Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK to the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR about Sino-Korean talks about the trip of chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK to China.

  • December 01, 1950

    Ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

    Congratulatory telegram from Stalin to Mao for Chinese operational successes against U.S. forces.

  • December 03, 1950

    Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Wu Xiuquan and Qiao Guanhua

    Zhou Enlai gives instructions on how the Chinese side should respond when confronted with questions of whether China should back down in regards to the North Korean issue and the Taiwan issue. In particular, he emphasizes that the Chinese side should focus on blaming American imperialism for the invasions of North Korea and Taiwan and maintaining that China's involvement in these issues is essential.

  • December 05, 1950

    VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved orders to Vyshinsky in New York and Roshchin in Beijing with message for Zhou Enlai

    Memorandums from the VKP(b) CC to Vyshinsky and Roshchin regarding the Soviet and PRC stances on discussions in the UN General Assembly and Security Council on the Chinese intervention in Korea.

  • December 07, 1950

    Ciphered telegram, Gromyko to Roshchin Transmitting Message from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai

    Message from Stalin to Zhou Enlai agreeing with Chinese conditions for a ceasefire and advising that the Chinese limit negotiations on a ceasefire until Seoul is liberated.

  • December 07, 1950

    Ciphered telegram from Roshchin conveying message from Zhou Enlai to Soviet Government

    A telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Moscow, informing the Soviet leadership of the terms under which the Chinese will consider an armistice on the Korean Peninsula.

  • December 08, 1950

    Letter from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and Chen Yun

    Zhou Enlai reports on Soviet replies to telegrams from the Chinese side.

  • December 08, 1950

    Telegram from the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to Wu Xiuquan and Qiao Guanhua

    The CCP Central Committee gives instructions to the Chinese representatives to the UN on how to reply to confrontation over the Korean issue. The Chinese representatives are to express willingness to end military action as well as desire to know the UN and the U.S.'s positions on the conditions for an armistice.

  • December 08, 1950

    Draft Agreement by the Party Central Committee on Establishing a Sino-North Korea Joint Headquarters

    The agreement establishes a Joint Headquarters between the Chinese and North Korean sides that will command the North Korean People's Army, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, and all guerrilla forces, and details the leadership and specific powers and operations of the Joint Headquarters.

  • December 09, 1950

    Letter from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong

    Zhou Enlai reports to Mao Zedong on his talk with Zakharov about their strategic intentions and plans to cross the 38th parallel. Zakharov insists that one army should be moved to the Wonsan area to cover the southward-advancing flank, despite Zhou's disagreement with this move.

  • December 09, 1950

    Letter, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong

    Zhou Enlai asks for Mao Zedong's instructions on whether to attack Seoul in January or postpone the attack until March, and gives details on the benefits of postponing the attack.

  • December 12, 1950

    Report from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong

    Zhou Enlai sends detailed reports to Mao Zedong on new recruits from the Northeast; the replenishment of military supplies; the distribution of Soviet infantry weapons; the repair of railways and transportation; the condition of airports in North Korea; the use of artillery and tank units; and the stationing of command posts.

  • December 13, 1950

    Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Wu Xiuquan and Qiao Guanhua

    Zhou Enlai expresses that China is the most interested in the opinion of the U.S. and the UN regarding the conditions for an armistice on the Korean peninsula, and makes clear that the 38th parallel is no longer in existence.

  • December 16, 1950

    Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Wu Xiuquan and Qiao Guanhua

    Zhou Enlai advises the Chinese UN representatives on how to explain and respond to representatives from other countries regarding the Korea issue and the proposed armistice.

  • January 05, 1951

    Ciphered Telegram from Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin] Relaying a Letter from Peng Dehuai

    Peng Dehuai informs Stalin of what was happening on the front lines, and the status of the their armies and the opposing ones.