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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • October 23, 1962

    Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 23 October 1962

    The letter discusses a speech made by Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Cuban Minister of Industry, in which he addressed the Young Communists' Union. He emphasized the need to improve the solidarity among the communists and the necessity of work (trabajo is mentioned in the speech six times) to improve the country. Boissevain notes that while the Young Communists were motivated to harvest coffee berries, almost all of them are on guard duty.

  • October 23, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 23 October 1962

    In a conversation with Charles Bartlett (a journalist who had befriended President Kennedy), Drozniak learns more of the Cuban Crisis situation and of US-USSR relations, including that the steps taken to address the crisis (the quarentine of Cuba) were implemented by Kennedy in the atmosphere of great pressure from the public opinion.

  • October 23, 1962

    Soviet Marshal Andrei Grechko, Commander of the Warsaw Pact, telegram to Hungarian Minister of Defense Lajos Czinege

    Major Golovány writes to Hungarian Minister of Defense Lajos Zzineage and proposes the Hungarian military prepare for combat readiness in response to the President Kennedy’s increasing provocation towards Cuba.

  • October 23, 1962

    Telegram from TROSTNIK (Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (General Isa Pliev)

    Malinovsky instructs Pliev to establish a two-way radio connection.

  • October 23, 1962

    Soviet Report on the Atmosphere in the US following Kennedy's Announcement

    Report on the tense atmosphere in Washington following Kennedy's October 22 announcement. Intelligence from newspaper reports are also summarized.

  • October 23, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry

    Alekseev transmits that Cuba’s army has mobilized and the subsequent affect on Cuba’s economy because of Kennedy’s recent speech. Cuba waits for the Soviet Union’s opinion on the recent events.

  • October 23, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet delegate to the UN Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry

    Zorin relays the decision to veto the US draft resolution to the UN. Zorin argues that US aggressions against Cuba can merely be regarded as a provocation pushing the world to the verge of nuclear war. He says the Soviet government would introduce a draft resolution that includes a condemnation of the US aggressions, the immediate cessation of the US blockade and infractions of maritime freedom, and an immediate end to intervention in the domestic affairs of Cuba. It would also propose US government to negotiate with Cuba directly.

  • October 23, 1962

    Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 7 p.m. Tuesday

    A report of the meeting between OAS officials and the descisions that were made regarding the Cuban crisis. Secretary Martin puts forward that, soon, there will be fully disseminated, to convince Latin American public opinion of the gravity of the threat, photographs of the remote-controlled missiles in Cuba.

  • October 23, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos)

    A report on Secretary of State Dean Rusk's discussion of the severity of the American reaction to the installation of remote-controlled missiles of medium and intermediate range in Cuba by the Soviet Union.

  • October 23, 1962

    Telegram from Swiss Ambassador in Washington Lindt regarding briefing by Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler

    Before a briefing of the neutral ambassadors by US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, William Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, asks the Swiss diplomat to meet with him. After Tyler expressed thanks on behalf of the USA for what Switzerland has done, and will yet do in the future, for the American interests in Cuba, he said that he wished to inform the Swiss official more extensively than Rusk would be able to do in front of the assembled group of ambassadors. They mostly discuss Soviet missile deployed in Cuba.

  • October 23, 1962

    Ciphered Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev

    A report on Alekseev's 23 October 1962 conversation with Fidel Castro, together with two members of the Cuban leadership, the day after the public crisis began. Presented with official Soviet statements on the crisis, Castro reviews the situation and confidently vows defiance to the US "aggression," which he claimed was doomed to failure.

  • October 23, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry

    Zorin relays the events of the UN Security Council meeting, transmitting the speeches made by the US and Cuban delegates. US delegate Stevenson tried to justify US actions against Cuba and proposed the American draft resolution. Cuban delegate Inchaustegui demanded the immediate recall of the US measures. Zorin says although some Africa and Asian countries realized the illegality of US actions, however, they were not determined to take any concrete steps. Zorin also sends the proposed draft of a new resolution.

  • October 23, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation, Federal Republic of Germany Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Dean Acheson, Special Envoy of US President Kennedy, Bonn, West Germany

    A conversation between Federal Chancellor Adenauer with the Special Adviser of the U.S. President, Acheson. They discuss plans to destabilize the Cuban regime by domestic unrest, how the missile bases in Cuba should be destroyed, Russian soldiers stationed in Cuba and the lasting impact of the Bay of Pigs landing.

  • October 23, 1962

    Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 60

    Protocol 60 details the first meeting of the Communist Party during the crisis. As Khrushchev is awaiting the announcement by President Kennedy of the discovery of missiles in Cuba, he and some of his colleagues briefly considered using tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a US airborne assault. But, at the suggestion of Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky, the Kremlin postponed its consideration of a nuclear response pending details of Kennedy’s speech.The Kremlin wasted no time in taking steps to reduce the risks of confrontation. It ordered some ships that were still in the Mediterranean to turn around. The Aleksandrovsk, the ship carrying the nuclear warheads for the IRBMs (the R-14s), was ordered to keep sailing, however, because it was close enough to Cuban shores to dock before the blockade went into effect.

  • October 23, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA

    Dobrynin sends a report on the general mood of Washington DC, by way of media and observation, regarding Kennedy’s establishment of a quarantine around Cuba.

  • October 24, 1962

    Cable from Japanese Embassy in Moscow to Tokyo

    A cable from the Foreign Minister Ohira to the Charges d'affaires ad interim Shigemitsu regarding the situation in Moscow over the Cuban blockade. The cable gives an overall report of the atmosphere in Moscow by describing the people and press gathered around the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

  • October 24, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'Report of a Conversation with Cuban Interior Minister'

    The Cuban Interior Minister is telling the Chinese embassy officials about U.S. combat readiness and active troop deployments to Cuba/Guantanamo.

  • October 24, 1962

    Cable no. 319 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Vladimir Pavlíček)

    This cable sent to Prague confirms the decision by President John F. Kennedy to blockade Cuba, based on talks between Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa and Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev. Despite no orders for the American warships to stop Soviet ships, Alekseev was preparing in anticipation for "dangerous provocations." Cuba canceled all PanAm flights, while at the same time allowing Czech and Soviet flights to proceed.

  • October 24, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 5:15 p.m., Wednesday

    A telegram from Campos informing the Secretary of State that President Kennedy is suggesting the postponement of his visit to Brazil in light of the international tension.

  • October 24, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 5 p.m., Wednesday

    The Brazilian Embassy in Cuba describes that the situation has become difficult as the supply of foodstuffs and other articles for members of this Embassy and for the asylum-seekers has become difficult to obtain.