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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • November 08, 1950

    Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Chai Junwu

    Zhou Enlai gives instructions on advising Kim Il Sung to remain optimistic and publicize the Chinese People's volunteer Army's involvement in the Korean War, stating that the opposing side is not prepared for a protracted war and thus is prone to panic.

  • November 09, 1950

    CC Politburo Decision with Approved Message from Gromyko to Roshchin with Message for Zhou Enlai

    Telegram from Gromyko to Zhou Enlai advising the latter to turn down the invitation for China to participate in the UN Security Council. It also explains the circumstances under which the invitation was obtained.

  • November 12, 1950

    Cable, Zhou Enlai to Chai Junwu

    Zhou Enlai instructs Chai Junwu to ask Kim Il Sung to change the wording of his statement at the Central Committee of the Motherland's United Front meeting, and also to ask whether Chai can accompany Kim in his visit to Peng Dehuai.

  • November 29, 1950

    Telegram from Shtykov to the USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

    Telegram from the Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK to the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR about Sino-Korean talks about the trip of chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK to China.

  • December 03, 1950

    Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Wu Xiuquan and Qiao Guanhua

    Zhou Enlai gives instructions on how the Chinese side should respond when confronted with questions of whether China should back down in regards to the North Korean issue and the Taiwan issue. In particular, he emphasizes that the Chinese side should focus on blaming American imperialism for the invasions of North Korea and Taiwan and maintaining that China's involvement in these issues is essential.

  • December 08, 1950

    Draft Agreement by the Party Central Committee on Establishing a Sino-North Korea Joint Headquarters

    The agreement establishes a Joint Headquarters between the Chinese and North Korean sides that will command the North Korean People's Army, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, and all guerrilla forces, and details the leadership and specific powers and operations of the Joint Headquarters.

  • December 12, 1950

    Report from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong

    Zhou Enlai sends detailed reports to Mao Zedong on new recruits from the Northeast; the replenishment of military supplies; the distribution of Soviet infantry weapons; the repair of railways and transportation; the condition of airports in North Korea; the use of artillery and tank units; and the stationing of command posts.

  • January 27, 1951

    Telegram from Mao Zedong to I.V. Stalin, Conveying the 19 January 1951 Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong regarding Meetings with Kim Il Sung

    The telegram from Peng Dehuai discusses the results of a meeting with Kim Il Sung, including Kim Il Sung’s belief that the Korean People’s Army cannot defeat the Americans alone, the defense of the Korea's coast, the re-staffing of five corps, and preparations for soldiers to carry out work in the newly liberated areas.

  • January 29, 1951

    Telegram from Mao Zedong to I.V. Stalin, conveying 28 January 1951 telegram from Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai

    A forward to Stalin of a message sent earlier by Mao to Peng Dehuai. It outlines operational plans for the PLA and KPA in and around Seoul and talks about the need to gain an advantageous military position with negotiations in mind.

  • June 05, 1951

    Ciphered Telegram No. 20448, Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin]

    Mao asks Stalin to receive Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung in Moscow so that they may discuss military operations in Korea.

  • June 07, 1951

    Ciphered Telegram No. 3446, Filippov [Stalin] to Krasovsky, for Cde. Mao Zedong

    Telegram from Stalin telling Mao that he is ready to receive Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung.

  • June 13, 1951

    Ciphered Telegram No. 3557, Filippov [Stalin] to Roshchin

    Telegram from Stalin to Mao summarizing his discussions with Kim Il Sung and Gao Gang on the issues of military advisors, air force training and assistance, and the implications of a potential armistice.

  • June 30, 1951

    Ciphered Telegram No. 21340 from Beijing, Mao Zedong to Cde. Filippov [Stalin]

    Telegram from Mao to Stalin advising on the manner in which he believes armistice negotiations should be carried out.

  • June 30, 1951

    Ciphered Telegram No. 21334 from Beijing, Mao Zedong to Cde. Filippov [Stalin]

    Telegram from Mao to Stalin confirming that the PLA will enact the reorganizations proposed by Stalin. Mao also talks about several considerations regarding the American proposal for armistice negotiations.

  • June 30, 1951

    Ciphered Telegram No. 3917, Filippov [Stalin] to Krasovsky, for Cde. Mao Zedong

    Telegram from Stalin to Mao advising how to reply to the American request for armistice negotiations.

  • July 02, 1951

    Ciphered Telegram No. 101529, Filippov [Stalin] to Cde. Razuvaev

    Message from Stalin that the Koreans must talk with the Chinese about armistice negotiations.

  • July 03, 1951

    Ciphered Telegram No. 2950, Filippov [Stalin] to Krasovsky, for Cde. Mao Zedong

    Stalin sends his advice on peace negotiations to Mao, as requested by Mao’s telegram of the same day.

  • July 03, 1951

    Ciphered Telegram No. 21412, Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin]

    The included telegram from Mao to Peng, Gao, and Kim gives Mao’s military instructions for the upcoming peace negotiations.

  • July 03, 1951

    Ciphered Telegram No. 21404, Mao Zedong to Cde. Filippov [Stalin]

    Kim Il Sung’s message to Mao Zedong communicates Kim’s requirements for a peace proposal.

  • July 03, 1951

    Ciphered Telegram No. 21405, Mao Zedong to Cde. Filippov [Stalin]

    Mao Zedong writes Stalin on the Chinese position for a ceasefire in the Korean War which the Chinese side will propose at an upcoming meeting with the UN negotiators. Mao asks Stalin for his opinion on the Chinese position.