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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • February 27, 1967

    Note by the Euratom Commission, 'Construction of an Eventual Isotopic Separation Plant'

    This note from the Euratom Commision details the possible construction of an isotope separation plant in the European Community.

  • February 28, 1967

    Interview with M. Margulies, German member of the Commission by Karl H. Schwarz, 'The Euratom Treaty Bursts'

    This interview with M. Margulies describes the Euratom Treaty as a tangible manifestation of a desire for peace.

  • February 28, 1967

    Telegram from Ambassador Trivedi on Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament

    Discussion of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

  • March 01, 1967

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.76.075, TOP SECRET, March 1, 1967

    N. Popa discusses the alleged decisions by the United States and South Korea to bomb the North Korean coast after the sinking of a South Korean boat. Although the true intentions of such plan is not clear, North Korea signaled its unwillingness to confront with the two countries.

  • March 01, 1967

    Research Memorandum REU-13 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Reasons for West German Opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty'

    By the late winter/early spring of 1967, controversy over the NPT was hurting US-West German relations, placing them at perhaps their lowest point during the Cold War. While this report suggested that West Germany would ultimately sign the Treaty, despite objections, only weeks later the INR issued another report wondering whether Bonn was trying to wreck the NPT.

  • March 01, 1967

    Gottfried William Moser, ACDA/Bureau of International Relations, 'Consultations with the FRG'

    In this report and after criticism over the NPT in West Germany, ACDA official G. William Moser looked into the chronology of U.S.-West German interactions. Noting that Washington had “stood foursquare with [the FRG] on the question of maintaining the MLF option under a non-proliferation treaty,” he highlighted a decision made by Rusk on 18 October 1966 to defer consultations with Bonn until he was sure that the Soviets were “serious” about the new Article I language. He concluded that Washington may need to explain Rusk's rationale.

  • March 02, 1967

    Study on the Comparison between IAEA and Euratom Safeguards by the Department of Safeguards

    This paper analyzes the safeguard systems in the Euratom Treaty and the IAEA Statute. The study concludes that Euratom has tighter and more complex control of the materials for which it is responsible, but the methods used in the two systems are comparable and compatible.

  • March 03, 1967

    Research Memorandum REU-14 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'How Major NATO Countries View the Prospect of an ABM Deployment'

    Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

  • March 07, 1967

    Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Record of Conversation with Secretary and Member of the Politboro of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolivia, Jorge Kolle, Prague

    PCB Politburo member Jorge Kolle Cueto asks on 7 March 1967 to inform the Czechoslovak Communist Party, "on behalf of the CC of the Bolivian CP," regarding "the situation in Bolivia… and his recent meeting with Fidel Castro." After four pages of discussion regarding the depressing internal political situation under 1964 coup leader, General René Barrientos, Kolle announced that "the party must necessarily prepare for the possibility of armed struggle in order to participate in the attempt to overthrow the current regime together with other leftist forces."

  • March 07, 1967

    The DPRK Attitude Toward the So-called 'Cultural Revolution' in China

    The Soviet Embassy reports on the deterioration of Chinese-North Korean relations as a result of the Cultural Revolution in China.

  • March 09, 1967

    Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    A report on a meeting between Kim Il Sung and the Cuban Ambassador in which the North Koreans criticize China, report on North Korea's relations with Cuba and Yugoslavia, and comment on nuclear nonproliferation.

  • March 10, 1967

    US Embassy Bonn Telegram 10500 to State Department, 'Ambassador Foster’s Meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger'

    To try to strengthen West German confidence, ACDA director William C. Foster met with Chancellor Kiesinger, who expressed concern about the danger of “erosion” and “uncertainty” in U.S.-West German relations and the need for more time for consultations. Kiesinger’s “own idea was that it would have been better …to have discussed all aspects of non-proliferation ‘behind locked doors’ before any intention of signing the treaty had become public.”

  • March 10, 1967

    Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    A Hungarian report on the state of the Korean People's Army and the South Korean Army.

  • March 10, 1967

    Note on Meeting of the Non-Aligned Group at the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament

    Disagreement between representatives of Mexico and the UAR on the non-aligned group developing a common position.

  • March 13, 1967

    Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    The Hungarian Ambassador reports on Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow to request a nuclear power plant.

  • March 13, 1967

    Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, 'Guidelines on Svetlana (Stalin) Defection'

    A CIA officer provides guidance to AMCOMLIB on minimal RL coverage of Svetlana’s defection and avoidance of immediate commentaries on the issue to minimize Soviet perceptions that the US is publicly exploiting the defection.

  • March 14, 1967

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.76.091, TOP SECRET, March 14, 1967

    A record of conversation with the head of the External Relations Section of the 'Rodong Sinmun' discussing North Korea's reunification policy.

  • March 15, 1967

    Report from Bulgarian Representative in Budapest on Meeting with a Hungarian Counterintelligence Chief

  • March 15, 1967

    Memorandum by the Euratom Commission on the Visit of Lord Chalfont on 9 March 1967

    Lord Chalfont described the international agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as a new phase in negotiations on disarmament.

  • March 15, 1967

    Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceaușescu and Soltan V.H. Sanandaji, Iran’s New Ambassador to Romania, Bucharest

    Ambassador Sanandaji explained to Ceaușescu in March 1967 that the economic growth of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union would require increasing oil imports that could be met by Iran's growing crude production. The question was how this oil would reach the European market and how it would be distributed within the socialist bloc.