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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • February 10, 1967

    Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Nekunam to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan, Concerning Eighth US Army Logistical Support to UNCURK

    Principal Secretary Ali Nekunam reports to Chef de Cabinet C.V. Narasimhan on the Eight US Army's extension of logistical support to UNCURK and enclosed a letter from Deputy Chief of Staff Allan G. Pixton to Political Affairs Officer Bedrich Syrovy which details the extension.

  • February 10, 1967

    Notes by the Euratom Commission to the Council of Ministers

    These notes from the Euratom Commission to the Council of Ministers discuss the inclusion of an agreement on nonproliferation and between the United States and the Soviet Union and the impact of oversight.

  • February 16, 1967

    The Visit of the [Syrian] Ba’ath in the USSR, Political Report No. 3

    The document records the state of play in Syrian-Soviet relations prior to the Six-Day War. According to the author of the report negotiations between the Syrian Ba’ath delegation and Soviet authorities, which took place in Moscow during January 1967, were tense and uneasy because the Soviets were displeased by the provocative and aggressive Syrian policy toward Israel.

  • February 16, 1967

    Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Nekunam to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

    Principal Secretary Ali Nekunam writes to Chef de Cabinet C.V. Narasimhan and encloses his notes and UNCURK documents concerning the Republic of Korea's international, national, and economic developments during 31 January - 13 February 1967.

  • February 16, 1967

    Telegram from the Indian Embassy in Mexico on Latin American Denuclearization Treaty

    This telegram comprehensively evaluates the Latin American Denuclearization Treaty

  • February 18, 1967

    The Keys to the Embassy in Tunisia

  • February 22, 1967

    US Department of State, Oral Note, 'Interpretations Regarding Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Formulations'

    As an assurance to the Germans and other NATO allies, ACDA and the State Department drew up a memorandum on the interpretation of the NPT draft treaty. The key point was that the treaty “deals only with what is prohibited, not what is permitted.”

  • February 23, 1967

    Letter, UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan to UNCURK Principal Secretary Nekunam, Concerning Support to UNCURK

    Chef de Cabinet C.V. Narasimhan responds to Principal Secretary Ali Nekunam's letter informing him about the continuation of the Eighth U.S. Army's logistical support to UNCURK.

  • February 27, 1967

    Note by the Euratom Commission, 'Construction of an Eventual Isotopic Separation Plant'

    This note from the Euratom Commision details the possible construction of an isotope separation plant in the European Community.

  • February 28, 1967

    Interview with M. Margulies, German member of the Commission by Karl H. Schwarz, 'The Euratom Treaty Bursts'

    This interview with M. Margulies describes the Euratom Treaty as a tangible manifestation of a desire for peace.

  • February 28, 1967

    Telegram from Ambassador Trivedi on Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament

    Discussion of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

  • March 01, 1967

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.76.075, TOP SECRET, March 1, 1967

    N. Popa discusses the alleged decisions by the United States and South Korea to bomb the North Korean coast after the sinking of a South Korean boat. Although the true intentions of such plan is not clear, North Korea signaled its unwillingness to confront with the two countries.

  • March 01, 1967

    Research Memorandum REU-13 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Reasons for West German Opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty'

    By the late winter/early spring of 1967, controversy over the NPT was hurting US-West German relations, placing them at perhaps their lowest point during the Cold War. While this report suggested that West Germany would ultimately sign the Treaty, despite objections, only weeks later the INR issued another report wondering whether Bonn was trying to wreck the NPT.

  • March 01, 1967

    Gottfried William Moser, ACDA/Bureau of International Relations, 'Consultations with the FRG'

    In this report and after criticism over the NPT in West Germany, ACDA official G. William Moser looked into the chronology of U.S.-West German interactions. Noting that Washington had “stood foursquare with [the FRG] on the question of maintaining the MLF option under a non-proliferation treaty,” he highlighted a decision made by Rusk on 18 October 1966 to defer consultations with Bonn until he was sure that the Soviets were “serious” about the new Article I language. He concluded that Washington may need to explain Rusk's rationale.

  • March 02, 1967

    Study on the Comparison between IAEA and Euratom Safeguards by the Department of Safeguards

    This paper analyzes the safeguard systems in the Euratom Treaty and the IAEA Statute. The study concludes that Euratom has tighter and more complex control of the materials for which it is responsible, but the methods used in the two systems are comparable and compatible.

  • March 03, 1967

    Research Memorandum REU-14 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'How Major NATO Countries View the Prospect of an ABM Deployment'

    Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

  • March 07, 1967

    Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Record of Conversation with Secretary and Member of the Politboro of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolivia, Jorge Kolle, Prague

    PCB Politburo member Jorge Kolle Cueto asks on 7 March 1967 to inform the Czechoslovak Communist Party, "on behalf of the CC of the Bolivian CP," regarding "the situation in Bolivia… and his recent meeting with Fidel Castro." After four pages of discussion regarding the depressing internal political situation under 1964 coup leader, General René Barrientos, Kolle announced that "the party must necessarily prepare for the possibility of armed struggle in order to participate in the attempt to overthrow the current regime together with other leftist forces."

  • March 07, 1967

    The DPRK Attitude Toward the So-called 'Cultural Revolution' in China

    The Soviet Embassy reports on the deterioration of Chinese-North Korean relations as a result of the Cultural Revolution in China.

  • March 09, 1967

    Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    A report on a meeting between Kim Il Sung and the Cuban Ambassador in which the North Koreans criticize China, report on North Korea's relations with Cuba and Yugoslavia, and comment on nuclear nonproliferation.

  • March 10, 1967

    US Embassy Bonn Telegram 10500 to State Department, 'Ambassador Foster’s Meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger'

    To try to strengthen West German confidence, ACDA director William C. Foster met with Chancellor Kiesinger, who expressed concern about the danger of “erosion” and “uncertainty” in U.S.-West German relations and the need for more time for consultations. Kiesinger’s “own idea was that it would have been better …to have discussed all aspects of non-proliferation ‘behind locked doors’ before any intention of signing the treaty had become public.”