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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • April 14, 1975

    GDR Ambassador Pyongyang to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Berlin

    Excerpt from East German ambassador's message which mentions the increasing profile of Kim Il Sung's first wife and her oldest son, Kim Jong Il, in North Korean propaganda.

  • April 14, 1975

    Cable from Le Duan to Tam Thanh [Hoang Van Thai], Bay Cuong [Pham Hung], and Tuan [Van Tien Dung]

    Cable from Le Duan carrying the Politburo's approval of battle plans for the liberation campaign in Saigon, now dubbed the "Ho Chi Minh Campaign."

  • April 18, 1975

    Anti-Reactionary Forces Study and Implement a Directive from the Party Secretariat on Policy toward Enemy Troops who Surrender and Enemy Prisoners of War

    Directive from the Secretariat’s with directions on categorizing enemies who are surrendered into four separate categories: mutineers, soldiers who returned to the revolution, prisoners of war, and enemy remnants who turned themselves in.

  • April 18, 1975

    Party Secretariat Directive No. 218-CT/TW

    Directive by the Party Secretariat containing policy towards enemy soldiers who are captured or surrender during the liberation.

  • April 19, 1975

    Party Secretariat Directive No. 219-CT/TW

    Directive from the Party Secretariat with policy towards captured South Vietnamese soldiers and government officials and policy on combating counter-revolutionaries and maintaining security in newly liberated areas.

  • April 20, 1975

    Cable to Brother Sau [Le Duc Tho] and Brother Bay Cuong [Pham Hung] (at the B2 Front)

    Cable from Le Duc Tho discussing educational and administrative tasks regarding discipline in the newly liberated zones and captured materials for units in the focal-point battlefield.

  • April 22, 1975

    Cable No. 10/TT.75, KBN [COSVN] Party Current Affairs Committee Circular

    Cable from the COSVN Party Current Affairs Committee discussing President Thieu's resignation and plans to quickly secure Saigon both militarily and politically.

  • April 25, 1975

    Cable No. 481/TV from TVKBN [COSVN Party Current Affairs Committee] to Sau Dan [Vo Van Kiet] and Nam Xuan [Unknown]

    Cable from COSVN with order to the Saigon-Gia Dinh unit to secure control of the government at the grassroots level, following Thieu's fall.

  • April 26, 1975

    Record regarding Kim Il Sung's visit in Beijing (18-26 April 1975)

    Kim Il Sung visited in Beijing and discussed the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. Although China promised a diplomatic offensive on the behalf of the DPRK, it also warned against the outbreak of a war.

  • April 27, 1975

    Central Military Party Committee Directive No. 113/QUTW

    Directive from the Central Military Party Committee on preparation of units to be entering and administering the City of Saigon-Gia Dinh.

  • April 28, 1975

    Cable from the COSVN Party Current Affairs Committee on Duong Van Minh’s Inauguration as President of the Saigon Puppet Government

    Cable from the COSVN Party Current Affairs Committee discussing response tactics to Duong Van Minh's inauguration as President of the Saigon government.

  • April 28, 1975

    Cable No. 505/TV from KBN [COSVN] Party Current Affairs Committee to P.10, Sau Dan [Vo Van Kiet], All Region Party Committees, B.76, N.50, and All Sections and Branches

    Cable from COSVN discussing Duong Van Minh's rise to President and plans of response in preparation for total victory.

  • April 29, 1975

    On the Visit of a DPRK Party and Government Delegation Headed by Kim Il Sung to the PR China from 18 to 26 April 1975

    Report of the visit by DPRK officials to the PRC. This summary addresses the PRC’s and the DPRK’s relations with each other and their individual policies towards South Korea, it examines the issue of reunification and touches on the Sino-Soviet competition.

  • May 01, 1975

    Party Secretariat Cable No. 601

    Cable from the Party Secretariat discussing the question of a tripartite government and calling for a mass movement in the revolutionary spirit.

  • May 01, 1975

    Hungarian Embassy in the DPRK, Report, 1 May 1975. Subject: Visit of a Laotian delegation in the DPRK.

    The Hungarian Embassy in the DPRK provides an overview of relations between Pyongyang and Vientiane and summarizes a recent visit of a Lao delegation to North Korea.

  • May, 1975

    South Korean Telegrams on Visit to China by North Korean Leader Kim Il Sung

    The South Korean Ambassadors to Germany and the United States report to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Kim Il Sung's visit to Communist China and the prospects of Kim's visit to the Soviet Union. A telegram from the Ambasasdor to Japan also provides a perspective on DPRK-China relations and developments in China.

  • May, 1975

    Itinerary of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's Visit to France from 12 to 17 May 1975

    Itinerary for the visit of Deng Xiaoping, Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China, to France. Deng's visit includes meetings with Prime Minister Jacques Chirac and Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues, as well as visits to a farm outside Paris and the Phenix nuclear reactor in Marcoule.

  • May 06, 1975

    Summarized Evaluation of Kim Il Sung's Visit to the PR China (18 to 26 April 1975)

    A report on the visit of Kim Il Sung to the PRC, describing Kim Il Sung’s reception and the topics discussed. These include the two countries position on the Soviet Union, the role of the “Third World” and Korean reunification.

  • May 09, 1975

    Telegram from New York to Bucharest, No. 052.467

    While the UN looks for ways to dismantle the UN headquarters in South Korea while preserving the armistice, the telegram notes that the North Koreans are attempting to bypass the UN as a whole and come to an understanding with the United States directly.

  • May 10, 1975

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 059.156

    At a recent state visit of the DPRK delegation to the PRC, both countries look at the developments in Indochina as positive and as predicted changes to the Korean Peninsula. Beijing agrees to increase trade and economic cooperation with North Korea while promising to keep distance from Seoul.