SEARCH RESULTS
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January 12, 1972
Note about a Meeting of Foreign Minister Otto Winzer with the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi
Minutes of a meeting between East German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The two begin by discussing the national liberation of Bangladesh, which both countries express mutual support for. They then discuss India-Pakistan hostility, and blame Western countries for trying to keep the two states separate, and express hope for peace between India and Pakistan. Winzer then pushes for Indira Gandhi to normalize relations with East Germany. Gandhi gives a non-committal response, and the report concludes by speculating that Indira Gandhi has not yet decided to normalize relations, noting that some of her advisors will wait on the opinions of the FRG before moving on GDR.
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January 14, 1972
State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Note, 'India to Go Nuclear?'
The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) evaluates the available intelligence on India’s nuclear intentions. There were varying reports that India would test a device that month, sometime in 1972, or that the government was undertaking a program to test a “peaceful nuclear explosive.” According to INR, India had the capability to produce some 20-30 weapons, and it could easily test a device in an underground site, such as an abandoned mine, that would be hard to discover. Because the U.S. government had given a “relatively modest priority to... relevant intelligence collection activities” a “concerted effort by India to conceal such preparations... may well succeed.” What would motivate India to test, the analysts opined, were domestic political pressures and concerns about China and Pakistan.
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January 15, 1972
Note on Soviet proposals for European security at the Prague Conference of the Consultative Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact
A note detailing the presentation of a Soviet proposal for European security at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee. The note explains in detail the Soviet proposal.
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January 21, 1972
US Embassy Airgram A-20 to State Department, 'India’s Nuclear Intentions'
In response to the State Department's request, the U.S. Embassy in India identified a number of reasons that made it unlikely that India would a test a nuclear device in the coming weeks, but saw “straws” suggesting an underground test “sometime in future.” For example, the Government of India had publicly acknowledged ongoing work on the problem of safe underground testing. Moreover, India might have an interest in making its nuclear capabilities known to “enemies.” Whatever the Indians decided, external pressure would have no impact on a highly nationalist state and society: “we see nothing US or international community can presently do to influence GOI policy directions in atomic field.”
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January 25, 1972
A Ten-Point Policy of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam Toward Soldiers and Personnel in the Government of South Vietnam
The Provisional Revolutionary Government outlined its policy toward soldiers and personnel in the government of South Vietnam. To counter the Vietnamization policy, the Provisional Revolutionary Government urged people enlisted in the army, police, security, administration, etc. to abandon their posts or cooperate with the revolutionaries and promised to grant them amnesty.
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February 01, 1972
Cryptogram No 1144 from Polish Embassy in Bucharest, Romania Strengthening Relations with the Soviet Union
The Polish Embassy in Romania reports on signs that Romania is serious about improving relations with the Soviet Union, including signing agreements to join Comecon and put the Romanian army under joint command of the Warsaw Pact.
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February 02, 1972
Clarification of Two Pivotal Points in the Seven-Point Declaration of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam
The Provisional Revolutionary Government's clarified two points in the Seven-point Declaration: First, the US had to set a definite date to withdraw unconditionally all of their forces in South Vietnam. That would also be the date when all POWs and detained civilians (including the captured American pilots in North Vietnam) would be released. Second, Nguyen Van THieu (President of South Vietnam) had to step down immediately. The government of South Vietnam had to stop the pacification policy, disband the concentration camps, release people detained for political reasons, etc.