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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • January 11, 1972

    Telegram from Romanian Ambassador in Moscow to George Macovescu

    The ambassador informs Macovescu that he has seen the Deputy Foreign Minister and has answered the questions asked in the previous telegram.

  • January 12, 1972

    Note about a Meeting of Foreign Minister Otto Winzer with the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi

    Minutes of a meeting between East German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The two begin by discussing the national liberation of Bangladesh, which both countries express mutual support for. They then discuss India-Pakistan hostility, and blame Western countries for trying to keep the two states separate, and express hope for peace between India and Pakistan. Winzer then pushes for Indira Gandhi to normalize relations with East Germany. Gandhi gives a non-committal response, and the report concludes by speculating that Indira Gandhi has not yet decided to normalize relations, noting that some of her advisors will wait on the opinions of the FRG before moving on GDR.

  • January 13, 1972

    Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

    Updates on the intensification of military tension, Park Chung Hee's commitment to war preparations through heavy and chemical industries, hypothesis on Japan's view on the Korean question, and Park's support of Red Cross talks.

  • January 14, 1972

    State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Note, 'India to Go Nuclear?'

    The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) evaluates the available intelligence on India’s nuclear intentions. There were varying reports that India would test a device that month, sometime in 1972, or that the government was undertaking a program to test a “peaceful nuclear explosive.” According to INR, India had the capability to produce some 20-30 weapons, and it could easily test a device in an underground site, such as an abandoned mine, that would be hard to discover. Because the U.S. government had given a “relatively modest priority to... relevant intelligence collection activities” a “concerted effort by India to conceal such preparations... may well succeed.” What would motivate India to test, the analysts opined, were domestic political pressures and concerns about China and Pakistan.

  • January 15, 1972

    Report by Etre Sándor, 'Nixon's visit to Beijing and the Korean issue'

    A report produced by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding President Park Chung Hee’s comments on US President Nixon’s negotiations with China.

  • January 15, 1972

    Note on Soviet proposals for European security at the Prague Conference of the Consultative Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact

    A note detailing the presentation of a Soviet proposal for European security at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee. The note explains in detail the Soviet proposal.

  • January 16, 1972

    Note from the Visit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Delegation in the USSR

    These notes highlight some foreign relation issues facing Poland, China, and the Soviet Union. Current opinions and practices are mentioned, as well as previous actions.

  • January 20, 1972

    Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in Poland to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    The Embassy of Hungary in Poland reports on the Korean reunification question, the status of relations between North and South Vietnam, and America's involvement in Vietnam.

  • January 20, 1972

    Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

    Updates concerning Park Chung Hee's New Years speech on peaceful unification, Red Cross negotiations, and ROK refusal of dual admission of the Koreas into the UN, and the 14th preliminary North-South Red Cross negotiations.

  • January 21, 1972

    US Embassy Airgram A-20 to State Department, 'India’s Nuclear Intentions'

    In response to the State Department's request, the U.S. Embassy in India identified a number of reasons that made it unlikely that India would a test a nuclear device in the coming weeks, but saw “straws” suggesting an underground test “sometime in future.” For example, the Government of India had publicly acknowledged ongoing work on the problem of safe underground testing. Moreover, India might have an interest in making its nuclear capabilities known to “enemies.” Whatever the Indians decided, external pressure would have no impact on a highly nationalist state and society: “we see nothing US or international community can presently do to influence GOI policy directions in atomic field.”

  • January 22, 1972

    Secret Telegram from Moscow to Warsaw, No. 848

    This document from the Soviets to Polish Comrades issues a warning about Zhou Enlai's anti-Sovietism and his advance in the Chinese government. It also addresses border issues between China and the Soviet Union.

  • January 25, 1972

    A Ten-Point Policy of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam Toward Soldiers and Personnel in the Government of South Vietnam

    The Provisional Revolutionary Government outlined its policy toward soldiers and personnel in the government of South Vietnam. To counter the Vietnamization policy, the Provisional Revolutionary Government urged people enlisted in the army, police, security, administration, etc. to abandon their posts or cooperate with the revolutionaries and promised to grant them amnesty.

  • January 27, 1972

    Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

    Update concerning the defense of Seoul, 15th preliminary Red Cross negotiations, and Japan's apparent establishment of links with North Korea and its emissary to North Korea for personal and economic exchanges.

  • January 28, 1972

    KGB Request to not Supply the Other Socialist Countries with Received Operative Equipment

  • January 29, 1972

    Preliminary Conference between Delegates of North and South Korea

    This conversation focuses on the delegate of the North suggesting that both parties should carry letters of confidence to prove both of their legitimacy, but the delegate of the South believes this is unnecessary

  • February 01, 1972

    Cryptogram No 1144 from Polish Embassy in Bucharest, Romania Strengthening Relations with the Soviet Union

    The Polish Embassy in Romania reports on signs that Romania is serious about improving relations with the Soviet Union, including signing agreements to join Comecon and put the Romanian army under joint command of the Warsaw Pact.

  • February 02, 1972

    Clarification of Two Pivotal Points in the Seven-Point Declaration of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam

    The Provisional Revolutionary Government's clarified two points in the Seven-point Declaration: First, the US had to set a definite date to withdraw unconditionally all of their forces in South Vietnam. That would also be the date when all POWs and detained civilians (including the captured American pilots in North Vietnam) would be released. Second, Nguyen Van THieu (President of South Vietnam) had to step down immediately. The government of South Vietnam had to stop the pacification policy, disband the concentration camps, release people detained for political reasons, etc.

  • February 02, 1972

    Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

    Update concerning ROK outline on Korean question, Japan-DPRK 5-year trade agreement, 16th preliminary Red Cross negotiation, and North Korean leader Kim Byong Sik's statement in Time magazine.

  • February 03, 1972

    Telegram from S. Shahabuddin, Charge d’Affaires, Caracas

    Recommendation that India become a Permanent Observer at the Organization of American States.

  • February 04, 1972

    Report by Dr. Pataki János, 'The visit of Korean councilor Ahn Gi-son'

    A report from Dr.Pataki Janos on the visit of North Korean councilor Ahn Gi-Son, and their discussion of North Korea’s views on various UN issues.