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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • May 31, 1973

    Letters between Shail Upadhya and C.V. Narasimhan

    Upadhya sends Narasimhan a report on DPRK's admission to WHO and ROK's reaction to it.

  • June 04, 1973

    Minutes of Conversation between the Shah and Nicolae Ceaușescu, Bucharest

    Describes conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu and the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi about the influence of events in the Middle East on the rest of Europe because of oil. The Shah suggests detente as a world policy.

  • June 05, 1973

    Letters between Shail Upadhya and C.V. Narasimhan

    Upadhya sends Narasimhan a report on ROK stance on the UN.

  • June 05, 1973

    Discussion between Zhou Enlai, Le Duan, Pham Van Dong and Le Thanh Nghi

    The role of China and Vietnam in the Cambodian revolution; also a discussion on the current situation in South Vietnam.

  • June 06, 1973

    Discussion between Zhou Enlai, Le Duan, Pham Van Dong and Le Thanh Nghi

    Le Duan asks Zhou Enlai for Chinese help in building industry and infrastructure, as per a previous agreement between China and Vietnam.

  • June 06, 1973

    Telex from Ambassador Pauls, Beijing, to Foreign Office

    Ambassador Pauls reports a conversation with Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua about the possibility of a Soviet attack on China and Chinese "Second strike capability."

  • June 07, 1973

    Telegram from Washington, DC, No.084.504, Urgent, SECRET

    Romanian official in the US warns Bucharest that relaying the letter from the DPRK to US public officials in the manner requested by Pyongyang may damage Romanian relations with the US. The official recommends a more normal procedure recommended to him by US officials and suggests convincing the North Koreans to follow a different method of sending its message to US congress.

  • June 07, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 061.224

    Popa notes the rift between the two Koreas since the North-South joint declaration in 1972 as Seoul considers North Korea's attempts to join organizations where South Korea is already a member as a means to undermine its authority.

  • June 15, 1973

    Excerpts from a record of a meeting between Soviet journalist, Victor Louis, and General Director of the Prime Minister’s Office, Mordechai Gazit

    Record of a meeting between Mordechai Gazit (MG), General Director of the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, and Victor Louis (VL), a Soviet journalist. The meeting was held the week before a summit meeting between Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev. The two discussed the immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union and the low state of Israeli-Soviet relations.

  • June 16, 1973

    Telegram to Pyongyang from First Directorate, SECRET, No. 01/08463, Flash

    Romanian officials relay the message from UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim regarding permanent observers from the DPRK to the UN. The telegram notes that Waldheim will offer his support to the North Korean observers and that obtaining visas to the US will not be difficult.

  • June 16, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.238, Urgent, SECRET

    Romanian officials report on the third session of the North-South Coordination Committee (NSCC) in Seoul. Due to differences in each side's ideas on cross-border cooperation and the organization of NSCC, the meeting ended without notable accomplishments. Both sides blame each other for espousing two separate Koreas.

  • June 19, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang , No.061.240, Urgent, SECRET

    The North Koreans follow Romanian advice and allow the submission of their letter to Congress through the US State Department.

  • June 25, 1973

    Telegram from Beijing, No.059.658, Urgent, SECRET

    Romanian official comments on statements made by Premier Zhou Enlai that appeared on China's Renmin Ribao. The official notes that Zhou does not condition Sino-American relations on US withdrawal from South Korea, Taiwan and South Vietnam. In fact, the official comments how Taiwan is overlooked and withdrawal of US troops from Korea is characterized as a request from Kim Il Sung.

  • June 26, 1973

    Telegram from Washington, DC, No.084.605, Urgent, SECRET

    Romanian officials in Washington report that they submitted the letter from the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly, intended for the US congress, to the US State Department. The US official in contact with the Romanians described North Korea's attitudes towards the joint accession of the two Koreas to the UN as unrealistic.

  • June 26, 1973

    Letters between Ahmet H. Ozbudun and C.V. Narasimhan

    Ozbudun sends Narasimhan a report on UNCURK's visit with the president and ROK government's posture on the Korean Question.

  • June 27, 1973

    Memorandum from Richard T. Kennedy to William G. Hyland, 'Jobert Meeting: US-French Nuclear Cooperation'

    Kennedy sends Hyland a review of the current status and future prospects of French aid as drafted by Denis Clift, as well as a summary of Dr. Foster’s most recent meeting with the French where they discussed new areas of cooperation. It also discusses the advantages if the French were to implement a missile warning system, and how French assistance might be a useful bargaining tool for the U.S. especially when it comes to improving French-European relations.

  • June 27, 1973

    Telegram by Ambassador Pignatti to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'US-USSR Agreement on the prevention of nuclear war'

    The document describes initial reactions to the signing of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War in Washington. The new agreement raises concerns over the bipolar focus of US-USSR relations, NATO's traditional strategy, and poses questions related to autonomous European defense.

  • June 27, 1973

    Telegram by Ambassador in Brussels Pignatti to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Soviet-American agreement on preventing nuclear war'

    Summarizes the first comments from Min. Foreign Affairs on the agreement Soviet-American for the Prevention of Nuclear War. It is said that the philosophy of this agreement appears to have contradictions with regard to the classic strategy of NATO and diminish the credibility of the latter. Conceptions NATO military will have to be updated in light of recent agreements and ongoing trends around the Russian-American bipolarity. Just because you are at a "secondary" compared to the two supergrandi, Europeans should take the opportunity arising from this new trend to seriously address the issue of their defense. The prospect more desirable at this stage is an acceleration of proesso European unification, including the appearance of its "independent" defense.

  • June 29, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.253, Urgent, SECRET

    North Korean officials blame pressure from Japan and the US as reasons why South Korean representatives are not receptive to the North's proposals in the North-South Coordination Committee meetings. The official believes that Seoul is attempting to slow down negotiations with Pyongyang because South Korea is unstable. Pyongyang worries that Seoul's plan for joint accession to the US will enshrine the division on the peninsula.

  • June 30, 1973

    COSVN Party Current Affairs Committee Guidance on Stepping up Struggle Activities Demanding that the U.S. and the Puppets Implement our Post-Paris Agreement Proposals

    Upon submitting a Post-Paris Agreement proposal at the negotiating table with the U.S. and the DRV, the COSVN Party Current Affairs Committee issues an announcement that requests all levels of command and all branches to launch another struggle phase focusing on three urgent issues: ceasefire; exchange of detained civilian personnel; and guaranteeing the right to freedom and democracy.