Meeting between US, Cuban and Angolan officials about the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola.

Meeting between US, Cuban and Angolan officials about the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola.

Meeting between US, Cuban and Angolan officials about the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola.

Jorge Risquet, who was code-named Alvaro, was Castro’s point man for Angola; Alejandro was Fidel Castro’s code name.

Politburo meeting centered on Comecon and the importance of maintaining fruitful trade relationships with other socialist nations.

A Cuban Defense Ministry communiqué details the “heroic defense” by Cuban and Angolan troops of Cuito Cuanavale against a South African onslaught. The brunt of the fighting was done by local Angolan forces, which successfully managed to repel the South African invaders.

Jorge Risquet was Castro’s point man for Angola; Alejandro was Fidel Castro’s code name.

Notes from a meeting of the Politburo regarding Nina Andreeva, a Soviet scientist and political activist who accused Gorbachev of not being true communists and abandoning the Soviet system in her essay " I Cannot Forsake My Principles."

This file contains transcripts of meeting minutes taken from three tapes, dated 24 March 1988. The tapes include discussions of the Armed Forces General Command with Saddam Hussein and other officials.

Comrade Dedo, Poland's ambassador in North Korea, reports that Sino-DPRK relations are cooling because of Beijing's increasing trade with South Korea.

Anatoly Adamishin was Soviet deputy foreign minister for Africa.

Gorbachev explains to Natta about issues with the Soviet withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, including disagreements with the United States on the plans for the coalition government.

Notes from telephone conversation between Gorbachev and Castro regarding advocating communist ideology through policy initiatives, and about Gorbachev's impending visit to Cuba.

Najibullah and Gorbachev discuss the situation in Afghanistan, the politics of the new government, plans for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and the Geneva Accords signed in 1988 to facilitate it.

This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the Polish General Staff about Soviet military doctrine in early 1988. The document defines what the Soviets meant by military doctrine, differentiating between the doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by stressing the former’s wider range objectives, especially concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, it identifies contemporary issues facing Soviet doctrine and analyzes topics such as nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and refutes the idea that nuclear weapons should be used in a counter-offensive operation. It stresses the importance of defense, negating offensive military preparedness in lieu of purely defensive Warsaw Pact capabilities (albeit altogether sufficient to successfully deter a NATO attack from the West). It also discusses the results of the March 2-3 1988 NATO talks and concludes that the West is not willing to stop the arms race and is increasing its offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact’s response should include increased military research, better vigilance to capture signals of a possible attack and more tactical and technical training for the military command. It asserts that even though a war is less likely than in the past, quoting Gorbachev, “the nature of capitalism itself can be the cause of war.”

Fidel Castro’s instructions for the Cuban delegation to the 3-4 May 1988 London meeting of the delegations of Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the United States to discuss the future of Angola and Namibia.

Fidel Castro’s instructions for the Cuban delegation to the 3-4 May 1988 London meeting of the delegations of Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the United States to discuss the future of Angola and Namibia.

Shevardnadze and other Soviet officials propose to create a memorial to Polish officers murdered during the Katyn massacre as well as "Soviet POWs who took part in the exhumation work," and to allow Polish citizens to visit the memorial in Smolensk Oblast’.