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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • November 11, 1974

    Telegram from the Romanian Embassy in Tunis, to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 074.388, November 11, 1974, Secret

    Romanian embassy in Tunis reporting that Henry Kissinger and Yasir Arafat did not meet due to a disagreement between the PLO and the United States about how official or secret the meeting would be.

  • November 19, 1974

    Telegram from the Romanian Embassy in Vienna, to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 076945, November 19, 1974

    Telegram saying that Henry Kissinger and Yasir Arafat are preparing to meet.

  • 1975

    Meeting Transcript, Kissinger and Brezhnev Discuss Angola in Moscow

    Kissinger questions Brezhnev about Cuban involvement in Angola and asks if the Cubans will withdraw if the South Africans do. Brezhnev gives no definitive answers.

  • March 04, 1975

    US Department of State Cable, ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles

    American officials in Washington, D.C., conclude that South Korea is in the initial stages of developing a nuclear weapons program.

  • April 09, 1975

    Memorandum from George S. Vest, Bureau of European Affairs, to Secretary of State, 'French Foreign Minister's Response on Nuclear Suppliers Meeting'

    This memo includes a response from the French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues regarding the nuclear suppliers' meeting. The French said that they will participate based on certain conditions. The memo also includes the U.S.'s reactions to these various conditions, which the U.S. believes it can fulfill.

  • April 19, 1975

    State Department telegram 90533 to US Embassy Paris, 'Exploratory Meeting of Nuclear Suppliers'

    Kissinger met with the French ambassador and provided the necessary assurances. Agreements would be based on consensus, decisions would not be retroactive, and the suppliers meetings would be “informal and confidential.” This arrangement assured that the suppliers’ group would operate on a lowest-common-denominator basis, but there was no choice because French participation was vital.

  • June 14, 1975

    Memorandum from Thomas O. Enders to the Secretary, 'Draft Letter to Sauvagnargues'

    This memorandum describes Henry Kissinger's response to French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues who requested a 27 member group to meet on issues similar to the previous nuclear suppliers' group meeting. Kissinger lists the complications that could arise from this and suggests not doing so. Document also includes another letter from Kissinger to Sauvagnargues regarding the important of nuclear export issues, as well as Kissinger's advisers suggestions to not send the letters to France just yet.

  • June 23, 1975

    National Security Decision Memorandum 299, 'Cooperation with France'

    Directive from President Ford expanding nuclear safety cooperation with France to include assistance with improving the safety of underground testing. This would involve only information sharing, and "no French nuclear explosive devices of any type may be accepted for test by the US."

  • June 27, 1975

    US National Security Council Meeting Minutes on Angola

    President Ford is briefed on the situation in Angola and requests possible options that the US could pursue to be made ready.

  • July 08, 1975

    US National Security Council Memorandum, Approach to South Korea on Reprocessing

    South Korea's nuclear plans have reached a point where the U.S. State Department believes that the Embassy in Seoul must "approach the Koreans directly."

  • July 11, 1975

    Draft US Department of State Cable on Approach to South Korea on French Reprocessing Plant

    A follow up report for Henry Kissinger on the state of U.S. policy toward South Korea's purchase of a French reprocessing plant.

  • August 01, 1975

    Memorandum of Conversation, 'Economic Policy/Cyprus; French Nuclear Programs; Energy'

    Transcript of a conversation between President Ford, Henry Kissinger, and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. The conversation opens with a discussion of economic policy and the embargo on northern Cyprus following the 1974 Turkish invasion. Giscard then asks about the slow progress of US technical assistance to the French nuclear program. Lastly they discuss energy and oil prices.

  • September 23, 1975

    Memorandum from George S. Vest to Secretary of State, 'September 16-17 Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting'

    The September 1975 meeting of the suppliers’ group brought out a conflict over a decisive issue, whether supplying countries should require recipient countries to place all nuclear facilities under safeguards or require them only for the technology and supplies at issue in the contract (“project safeguards”). The Canadians strongly supported the former, “full scope safeguards” (their terminology, which caught on), which the French saw as “tantamount to imposing NPT obligations” --a reference to the Treaty’s Article III--which they would not accept.

  • October 15, 1975

    Memorandum of Conversation, 'Visit of Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger to Canada; Luncheon at 24 Sussex Drive'

    This memo contains a transcription of the conversation that took place when Secretary Kissinger and his wife visited Canada and had lunch with Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau, along with many other officials.

  • October 21, 1975

    Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong and Henry A. Kissinger

    U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met Chairman Mao at his residence in Peking. The two argued about the importance of U.S.-Chinese relations in American politics. Mao repeats that the United States' concerns order America, the Soviet Union, Europe, Japan, and lastly China. Kissinger responds that the Soviet Union, as a superpower, is frequently dealt with, but in strategy China is a priority. Throughout the conversation, Mao continues to point out his old age and failing health. The leaders also discuss European unity, Japanese hegemony, German reunification, and the New York Times.

  • October 23, 1975

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 059.298

    Pope discusses DPRK representatives' attempt to establish contacts with Henry Kissinger via China as Heo Dam is scheduled to meet Henry Kissinger after the latter's visit to Beijing.

  • November 27, 1975

    Cable, Henry Kissinger, 'Angola: SAG Requests USG Provide FNLA/UNITA with Military Equipment'

    Response to a request made by the South African Defense Forces Chief of Staff to supply UNITA/FNLA. The US believes that UNITA/FNLA are receiving sufficient support to meet their defensive needs.

  • December 02, 1975

    Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong and Gerald R. Ford

    President Ford and Secretary Kissinger met with Chairman Mao and spoke about Chinese-U.S. relations, Japanese-U.S. relations, Chinese foreign relations with Japan and Western countries, NATO, the Sinai Agreement, and Soviet attempts to expand influence in Africa.

  • December 03, 1975

    Memorandum of Conversation with Chinese Delegation led by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping

    Chinese delegation visits the White House and discusses Angola. The Chinese emphasize that South Africa must exit the conflict if there is to be any chance of rallying other African states to oppose Neto.

  • December 31, 1975

    Memorandum from George S. Springsteen, Executive Secretary, to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, 'Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines'

    This document comprises the instructions which the White House approved for the September 1975 suppliers’ meeting. At the November meeting, the suppliers completed negotiations on guidelines. Basic provisions included agreement to seek assurances by recipients of supplies not to produce nuclear explosive devices, physical security for installations and materials, transfer of trigger list items only under IAEA safeguards, restraint in transfer of sensitive technologies, facilities and materials, and the encouragement of supplier involvement in, and multinational controls over, sensitive installations. Appended to the guidelines was a two page “trigger list” based on the Zangger Committee’s list.