Search in
ADD SEARCH FILTER CANCEL SEARCH FILTER

Digital Archive International History Declassified

SEARCH RESULTS

  • May 28, 1983

    CC CPSU on Withdrawal from Strategic Arms Reduction Negotiations (1)

    The CC CPSU announces that it is breaking off negotiations with the US and NATO on Strategic Arms Reduction.

  • May 28, 1983

    CC CPSU on Withdrawal from Strategic Arms Reduction Negotiations (2)

    The CC CPSU announces that it is breaking off negotiations with the US and NATO on Strategic Arms Reduction.

  • May 31, 1983

    Meeting Minutes of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, Regarding Western Plans for Deployment of New Nuclear Weapons in Europe

    Politburo discussion, presided over by Andropov, on how to respond to the Western decision to deploy new nuclear weapons in Europe.

  • August 04, 1983

    Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    The Bulgarian Embassy in North Korea urges the DPRK to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. North Korea won't commit, citing presence of US nuclear weapons in South Korea

  • August 24, 1984

    Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984

    Memorandum summarizing consultations between the Stasi and KGB over RYAN (Raketno-Yadernoe Napadenie, or “nuclear weapon attack”), an intelligence program initiated by the KGB to collect indicators of a potential nuclear first-strike by the US. The KGB had developed a new system for the early detection of war preparations for a first-strike attack, which should provide evidence of such preparations on the basis of “objective” indicators that would be hard to manipulate.

  • November 26, 1984

    Committee for State Security (KGB), 'Indicators to Recognize Adversarial Preparations for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

    A catalog of indicators of NATO preparation for nuclear war that were monitored by Warsaw Pact intelligence services under Project RYaN. The activity is divided into the following areas: political and military, activities of intelligence services, civil defense, and economic.

  • February 15, 1985

    Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Order Number 1/85

    This order from the Ministry of State Security describes the tasks of the MfS units concerning efforts to uncover intentions of aggression and surprise military activities by western states and their allies, especially a surprise nuclear missile attack against the USSR.

  • June 10, 1985

    Speech, East German Minister of State Security Mielke, 'At the Enlarged Collegium Meeting on 7 June 1985 about Further Preparation of the XI SED Party Congress'

    This speech by East German Minister of State Security Mielke is about technological, intellectual, and ideological preparations for war by the west and how to uncover and organize indicators of a potential attack.

  • May 06, 1986

    Ministry of State Security (Stasi), 'Report on Development and Achieved State of Work Regarding Early Recognition of Adversarial Attack and Surprise Intentions (Complex RYAN)'

    This report by Ministry of State Security describes developments and achievements toward early recognition of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR (Complex RYAN).

  • August, 1986

    Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

    This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in August 1986 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

  • September, 1986

    Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

    This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in September 1986 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

  • October, 1986

    Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

    This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in October 1986 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

  • October 11, 1986

    Soviet-American High Level Meeting, Reykjavik, 11-12 October 1986, Record of Conversations in the Working Group on Military Issues

    Record of conversation between US official, Paul Nitze, and USSR Chief of General Staff Sergey Akhromeev. The two discuss the minutiae of nuclear disarmament, particularly the relative disarmament value of each part of the triad (nuclear-equipped bombers/ICBMs/submarine-launched missiles).

  • November 10, 1986

    Letter, East German Minister of State Security Mielke to KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov

    This letter, from East German Minister of State Security Mielke to KGB Chairman Chebrikov, requests a consultation on the development and continuation of Complex RYAN, especially on furthering collaboration between the MfS and KGB.

  • December, 1986

    Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

    This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in December 1986 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

  • December 08, 1986

    Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee Resolution, on the Expiration of the Soviet Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

    Draft resolution with instructions for announcing the expiration of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing on 1 January 1987.

  • December 08, 1986

    Proposal on the Expiration of the Unilaterial Soviet Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

    Proposal to resume Soviet nuclear testing following the expiration of the USSR's unilateral moratorium on nuclear detonations on 1 January 1987. The US government continued nuclear testing throughout 1986 and did not join the Soviet moratorium. Proposes to announce the resumption of testing in December 1986 following the first American test explosion in 1987.

  • December 24, 1986

    Letter, KGB Chairman Chebrikov to East German Minister for State Security Mielke

    This letter by KGB Chairman Chebrikov responds to an earlier letter sent by East German Minister for State Security Mielke. In it, Chebrikov agrees to the proposed meeting between the MfS and the KGB on the subject of a sudden nuclear missile attack on the states of the socialist community.

  • January, 1987

    Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

    This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in January 1987 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

  • January 20, 1987

    Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Plan for Consultations with the Delegation of the KGB

    This document is a plan for the consultations to take place in Berlin between the Stasi and the KBG. It includes objectives and proposed theses on the subject of early recognition of a sudden nuclear missile attack by the adversary.