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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • October 29, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 29 October 1962

    Jelen relays information on several recent diplomatic actions of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • October 29, 1962

    Record of Conversation between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and UN Secretary General U Thant

    Kuznetsov’s record of a conversation with U Thant discussing the dismantling of Russian weapons and the American quarantine.

  • October 31, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington, 31 October 1962

    Arthur Schlesinger, advisor to President Kennedy, confirms Drozniak's previous telegram report that " In [Schlesinger's] opinion, the assessment of the Soviet installation of the missiles in Cuba as the attempt to strengthen the [world] position of the USSR before a possible confrontation over Berlin, ended up prevailing within the US administration."

  • October 31, 1962

    Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to Cuba A. I. Alekseev

    Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko cables the Soviet Embassy in Havana that the Soviet leadership had decided to allow UNSG U Thant and his representatives to visit Soviet launchers sites in Cuba and verify that the launchers are being dismantled.

  • October 31, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'Views on Khrushchev's Compromise with the United States on Cuba'

    The Chinese Embassy shares their opinion on Khrushchev's reconciliation with Kennedy after the Cuban Missile Crisis. They believe: Khrushchev’s activities "amounted to a bowl of cold water, poured right over the Cuban people"; because of Khrushchev, those who sit on the fence have now leaned rightward; American imperialists will, under the banner of the UN, create troubles for Cuba; and Khrushchev exhausted his words to exculpate Kennedy, which invariably stemmed from the concern to arrange a Cuba deal as a starting point, with the ultimate goal to push for reconciliations to be reached on other questions.

  • November 01, 1962

    Coded telegram from Soviet official Georgy Zhukov

    Zhukov relays the message that John F. Kennedy sent, via Salinger, that the President needed proof that the weapons in Cuba were dismantled.

  • November 08, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 8 November 1962

    Jelen reports on the talks regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis, especially the issues coming from the Cuban side of the talks.

  • November 10, 1962

    Soviet Report on the Cuban Missile Crisis Based on Intelligence Materials

    Summary of intelligence sources reporting that the US had been preparing for an invasion of Cuba and Kennedy only used the installation of missiles as a pretext to carry out aggressive actions. The US carried out the blockade also to warn the Soviet Union against signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR and to strengthen the position of the Democratic Party before the election. According to the report, other capitalist countries agreed that it was only the flexible policy of the USSR that prevented the outbreak of war.

  • November 14, 1962

    West German Record of One-on-One Conversation between FRG Chancellor Adenauer and US President Kennedy, Washington

    F.R.G. Chancellor Adenauer and U.S. President Kennedy discuss the Cuban crisis and the sense they both have that the situation is not yet entirely resolved. "The President indicates that one never knows what’s going on in the Soviets’ heads. The Americans never thought that the Soviets would dare bring missiles to Cuba and the Soviets never thought that the Americans would react so decisively. Both sides had false ideas about each other…"

  • November 16, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 16 November 1962

    There is a belief within the US administration that Mikoyan was not successful in convincing Fidel Castro to adopt a Soviet point of view.

  • November 19, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation between Polish Leader Władysław Gomułka and British Journalist David Astor, 19 November 1962 (excerpt)

    Polish leader Władysław Gomułka and British journalist David Astor discuss the stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union in the situation of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • November 20, 1962

    Brazilian Foreign Ministry Memorandum, 'Question of Cuba'

    A memorandum on the Cuban Missile Crisis covering perspectives from the three major actors: U.S., Soviet Union and Cuba.

  • November 27, 1962

    Secretary of State to the President, 'Agreement on Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons,' with Enclosures and Cover Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy

    In this proposed agreement, Secretary of State Rusk asked the White House for authorization to approach the Soviets. Rusk had two central goals in mind: to determine if the Soviets would state whether its allies, such as China, would agree to a nonproliferation agreement and to give Moscow a “somewhat more precise indication of what we have in mind concerning the obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons.”

  • November 30, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 30 November 1962

    Drozniak reports on a conversation he had with Mikoyan about some diplomatic actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis between the Soviet Union, the United States and Cuba.

  • December 02, 1962

    Confidential Memo from Cuban Mission to the United Nations Concerning Anastas Mikoyan’s Conversations with US President John F. Kennedy (and Secretary of State Dean Rusk), with cover note from Cuban President Dorticos to Foreign Minister Roa

    A report from the Cuban Mission to the UN concerning a conversation with Anastas Mikoyan and US President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The three are mostly focused on discussing US-Latin American diplomatic relations, and concerns over American military presence in Latin America, specifically the US fly-overs. Kennedy continues to reiterate the US's position on 'no US invasion of Cuba.'

  • December 03, 1962

    Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 71

    Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”

  • December 05, 1962

    Hungarian Legation in Washington (Radványi), Report on Mikoyan’s Visit to Washington

    Hungarian Chargé d’Affaires János Radványi reports on Anastas Mikoyan’s visit to Washington, DC. After a brief description of Mikoyan’s Washington itinerary, the report is divided into three sections: Mikoyan’s impressions of his meetings with American officials, meetings in Cuba with Cuban officials, and meetings about different socialist countries (e.g. China, Hungary). Primary subjects discussed include the presence of missiles in Cuba, nuclear proliferation and Latin America as a nuclear free region, missile bases, and the Berlin issue.

  • January 24, 1963

    Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on Soviet-Cuban Conflicts

    Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba János Beck reports on post-Cuban-Missile-Crisis conflict between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Beck highlights Cuba’s tendency to act independent of socialist country opinion. He also mentions the negative influence of nationalism on the Cuban government, which has a direct influence on Soviet-Cuban relations. The Soviets believe Cubans do not understand that Soviet negotiations with the US secured Cuba from a future US invasion. The Cuban Missile Crisis also is evidence that neither the US or Soviet Union want to start a nuclear war.

  • February, 1963

    Soviet Memorandum on the Polish Peace Initiative on Vietnam

    Soviet memorandum on the meeting between US Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith and Polish officials Michalowski and Rapacki. Describes the meeting as a sign of US weariness of involvement in Southeast Asia. Asserts that a neutralized Vietnam could be useful to the socialist countries as well.

  • April 04, 1963

    Research Memorandum RSB-47 from Thomas Hughes to the Secretary, 'Signs of Kremlin Decision to Improve Its Strategic Posture'

    INR analysts pointed to events during mid-February 1963 which suggested that the Soviet leadership was taking steps to spend a greater share of the gross national product on military resources.