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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • October 24, 1962

    Letter from Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy

    Khrushchev expresses outrage at Kennedy’s establishment of quarantine in Cuba.

  • October 24, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA

    Dobrynin relays the results of a meeting with R. Kennedy during which R. Kennedy is outraged at the “deception” of the Soviet Union by putting long-range missiles in Cuba.

  • October 25, 1962

    Political Letter from Ambassador Max Troendle to Secretary General Pierre Micheli

    A political letter from Ambassador Max Troendle to Secretary General Pierre Micheli describing aspects of the Soviet position on the Cuban crisis and how "It seems that on Cuba, the Soviets want to avoid meeting the American challenge, that they want to negotiate, talk, and not to face a showdown."

  • October 26, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation, West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder and Soviet Ambassador Andrei Smirnov, Bonn

    A discussion between Federal Minister Schröder and Soviet Ambassador Smirnow [Smirnov] in which Smirnov presents to the minister a statement of the Soviet Government concerning the aggressive acts the United States had committed against the Republic of Cuba. In this statement the Soviet Government was explaining its view on the blockade the United States had imposed on Cuba. It also commented on the other aggressive steps President Kennedy intended to take against Cuba as announced on 22 October.

  • October 28, 1962

    Telegram from USSR Foreign Ministry to Soviet diplomats in Washington, Havana, and New York

    The US consul informed the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the procedures of the quarantine.

  • October 28, 1962

    Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 2 p.m., Sunday

    Campos discusses agreements that are being made between Kennedy and Khrushchev regarding the immediate dismantling of the missile bases in Cuba, international inspections of Cuba, and an abandonment of the demand for reciprocity in Turkey.

  • October 28, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 2 p.m., Sunday

    Campos discusses the brief alleviation in tensions between the United States and Soviet Union over the Cuban issue due to a temporary accord for a limited-diversion of the Soviet ships.

  • October 29, 1962

    Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 1:30 p.m., Monday

    Secretary of State Dean Rusk tells Brazilian officials about letters that have been sent between Kennedy and Khrushchev discussing missile bases in both Cuba and Turkey.

  • October 29, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 29 October 1962

    Jelen relays information on several recent diplomatic actions of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • October 29, 1962

    Record of Conversation between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and UN Secretary General U Thant

    Kuznetsov’s record of a conversation with U Thant discussing the dismantling of Russian weapons and the American quarantine.

  • October 31, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington, 31 October 1962

    Arthur Schlesinger, advisor to President Kennedy, confirms Drozniak's previous telegram report that " In [Schlesinger's] opinion, the assessment of the Soviet installation of the missiles in Cuba as the attempt to strengthen the [world] position of the USSR before a possible confrontation over Berlin, ended up prevailing within the US administration."

  • October 31, 1962

    Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to Cuba A. I. Alekseev

    Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko cables the Soviet Embassy in Havana that the Soviet leadership had decided to allow UNSG U Thant and his representatives to visit Soviet launchers sites in Cuba and verify that the launchers are being dismantled.

  • October 31, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'Views on Khrushchev's Compromise with the United States on Cuba'

    The Chinese Embassy shares their opinion on Khrushchev's reconciliation with Kennedy after the Cuban Missile Crisis. They believe: Khrushchev’s activities "amounted to a bowl of cold water, poured right over the Cuban people"; because of Khrushchev, those who sit on the fence have now leaned rightward; American imperialists will, under the banner of the UN, create troubles for Cuba; and Khrushchev exhausted his words to exculpate Kennedy, which invariably stemmed from the concern to arrange a Cuba deal as a starting point, with the ultimate goal to push for reconciliations to be reached on other questions.

  • November 01, 1962

    Coded telegram from Soviet official Georgy Zhukov

    Zhukov relays the message that John F. Kennedy sent, via Salinger, that the President needed proof that the weapons in Cuba were dismantled.

  • November 08, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 8 November 1962

    Jelen reports on the talks regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis, especially the issues coming from the Cuban side of the talks.

  • November 10, 1962

    Soviet Report on the Cuban Missile Crisis Based on Intelligence Materials

    Summary of intelligence sources reporting that the US had been preparing for an invasion of Cuba and Kennedy only used the installation of missiles as a pretext to carry out aggressive actions. The US carried out the blockade also to warn the Soviet Union against signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR and to strengthen the position of the Democratic Party before the election. According to the report, other capitalist countries agreed that it was only the flexible policy of the USSR that prevented the outbreak of war.

  • November 14, 1962

    West German Record of One-on-One Conversation between FRG Chancellor Adenauer and US President Kennedy, Washington

    F.R.G. Chancellor Adenauer and U.S. President Kennedy discuss the Cuban crisis and the sense they both have that the situation is not yet entirely resolved. "The President indicates that one never knows what’s going on in the Soviets’ heads. The Americans never thought that the Soviets would dare bring missiles to Cuba and the Soviets never thought that the Americans would react so decisively. Both sides had false ideas about each other…"

  • November 16, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 16 November 1962

    There is a belief within the US administration that Mikoyan was not successful in convincing Fidel Castro to adopt a Soviet point of view.

  • November 19, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation between Polish Leader Władysław Gomułka and British Journalist David Astor, 19 November 1962 (excerpt)

    Polish leader Władysław Gomułka and British journalist David Astor discuss the stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union in the situation of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • November 20, 1962

    Brazilian Foreign Ministry Memorandum, 'Question of Cuba'

    A memorandum on the Cuban Missile Crisis covering perspectives from the three major actors: U.S., Soviet Union and Cuba.