Search in
ADD SEARCH FILTER CANCEL SEARCH FILTER

Digital Archive International History Declassified

SEARCH RESULTS

  • May 28, 1983

    CC CPSU on Withdrawal from Strategic Arms Reduction Negotiations (1)

    The CC CPSU announces that it is breaking off negotiations with the US and NATO on Strategic Arms Reduction.

  • May 28, 1983

    CC CPSU on Withdrawal from Strategic Arms Reduction Negotiations (2)

    The CC CPSU announces that it is breaking off negotiations with the US and NATO on Strategic Arms Reduction.

  • October, 1983

    Memorandum comparing the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces and the Anglo – French forces capable of reaching the Soviet Union.

    A comparison between the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces and the Anglo – French system capable of reaching the Soviet Union. The memo uses data to demonstrate that the Soviet INF outnumbered by far NATO nuclear forces.

  • 1986

    Peace Through Non-Alignment: The case for British withdrawal from NATO

    Pamphlet arguing for British withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It examines the origins of NATO, its role in U.S. foreign policy, its nuclear strategies, and its effect on British politics and national security.

  • February 17, 1986

    Washington, DC to Department of External Affairs (Canada), 'Alliance Problems Over INF'

    In a flurry of cables from February 1986, Canadian assessments focused on a chronic issue within NATO: in consultation within the alliance. The Special Consultative Group was used as a forum to “air views of allies,” hold briefings on the current state of negotiations, and to share a new negotiating position right before it was tabled. Canadian officials also warned of disagreement to come between the Europeans and the Americans over the “zero option,” the longstanding proposal to reduce both US and Soviet INF to zero.

  • February 19, 1986

    Brussels–NATO (BNATO) to Department of External Affairs (Canada), 'Alliance Problems Over INF'

    In a flurry of cables from February 1986, Canadian assessments focused on a chronic issue within NATO: consultation within the alliance. As this dispatch from Brussels concluded, paraphrasing Winston Churchill, “NATO nuclear collective consultation is the worst form, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

  • February 27, 1986

    Brussels to Department of External Affairs (Canada), 'Zero Option and the Europeans'

    Canadian officials warned of disagreement to come between the Europeans and the Americans over the “zero option,” the longstanding proposal to reduce both US and Soviet INF to zero. This dispatch from Brussels reported “substantial unhappiness” amongst the Europeans that the United States and the Soviet Union would discuss disarmament “even if neither of them believed in it.” Nuclear deterrence had prevented war in Europe for the preceding four decades, and US-Soviet discussions of disarmament only made it even more difficult to convince public opinion of deterrence’s continued importance

  • October 31, 1987

    MAE Cable on INF Treaty Phasing Problem

    Report on NATO Washington meeting on INF negotiations. The report addresses the US position concerning phasing, the issues raised by the other delegations as well as problems related to burden sharing.

  • December 08, 1987

    MAE cable on intended use of Euromissile Bases

    Note by ambassador to NATO Fulci on US request for secrecy concerning the intended use of euromissile bases after INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty. 

  • April 14, 1988

    Lecture by Sergei Akhromeyev, 'The Current State of Soviet Military Doctrine'

    This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the Polish General Staff about Soviet military doctrine in early 1988. The document defines what the Soviets meant by military doctrine, differentiating between the doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by stressing the former’s wider range objectives, especially concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, it identifies contemporary issues facing Soviet doctrine and analyzes topics such as nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and refutes the idea that nuclear weapons should be used in a counter-offensive operation. It stresses the importance of defense, negating offensive military preparedness in lieu of purely defensive Warsaw Pact capabilities (albeit altogether sufficient to successfully deter a NATO attack from the West). It also discusses the results of the March 2-3 1988 NATO talks and concludes that the West is not willing to stop the arms race and is increasing its offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact’s response should include increased military research, better vigilance to capture signals of a possible attack and more tactical and technical training for the military command. It asserts that even though a war is less likely than in the past, quoting Gorbachev, “the nature of capitalism itself can be the cause of war.”

  • April, 1989

    Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

    This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in April 1989 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.