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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • July 26, 1968

    US Embassy Bonn Telegram 14922 to State Department, 'Eppler on NPT'

    Erhard Eppler, a Social Democratic member of the Bundestag, gave embassy staffers his perspective on the political status of the NPT. Highly critical of Kiesinger for his “hold-back tactics” on signing and ratification, Eppler believed that the longer the delay the more likely that the treaty “would become entangled in election campaign politics.”

  • August 22, 1968

    Rajya Sabha Q&A on Soviet Criticism of India for it's Refusal to Sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

    Transcript of questions and answers between members of the Rajya Sabha and Prime Minister, Shrimati Indira Gandhi, on the legitimacy of claims that the U.S.S.R hascriticised India for not signing the draft of nuclear non-proliferation treaty through its newspaper "Izvestia".

  • June 20, 1971

    Memorandum of analysis by Roberto Ducci, 'The international situation after the Lisbon Council and some provisions that should be undertaken'

    Roberto Ducci analyzes recent developments in US and Soviet foreign policies vis-à-vis Europe. He discusses the risk of US abandonment in Europe, and fragmentation of Western Europe in light of the ongoing MBFR negotiations, stating that USSR foreign policy is proving to be more capable than expected.

  • September 20, 1971

    Note to the Executive Management of Foreign Affairs on Euratom Verification Agreement

    This document includes council directives to the Commission for the negotiation of a Euratom verification agreement in accordance with Article III, 4, of the NPT.

  • November 29, 1972

    Letter by Italian Ambassador in Bonn, Mario Luciolli, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Giuseppe Medici

    A letter from Mario Luciolli, the Italian Ambassador to Bonn, to Foreign Minister Giuseppe Medici. Luciolli discusses problems of both conventional and nuclear defense in Western Europe, expressing concerns over the credibility of NATO's involvement on the continent and advocating for further European integration.

  • December 27, 1972

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs Telespresso (Circular), 'Ministerial session of the Atlantic Council, 7th-8th December 1972'

    Italian perspective on the NATO Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels that discussed the credibility of Western European defense. The document highlights the need for a unified and cohesive negotiation strategy among the allies.

  • May 23, 1974

    National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 202 on Nuclear Proliferation

    Following India’s nuclear weapon test, the US must reassess its nuclear non-proliferation policy and how best to deal with India in the future. The author of the memo determines that nuclear non-proliferation is still necessary and can be “effectively pursued.” The memo is followed by a series of documents outlining courses of action to help deter further proliferation.

  • June 24, 1974

    Under Secretary Sisco's Principals' and Regionals’ Staff Meeting

    Encourages interest in a close look at nuclear export policy were negotiations, pre-dating the Indian test, over nuclear reactor sales to Israel, Egypt, and Iran. Chairing the meeting in Kissinger’s absence, Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco expressed dismay that nuclear nonproliferation had lost high-level support during the Nixon administration.

  • July 07, 1974

    Memorandum of Conversation Energy; North Sea Oil; Foreign Assistance; Nuclear Non-Proliferation; CSCE; Trade Bill

    Near the end of a discussion with British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, Kissinger realized he needed to tackle the problem of nuclear exports and asked his aide, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, to arrange a staff meeting.

  • July 11, 1974

    Executive Secretary George S. Springsteen to Secretary of State Kissinger, “Analytical Staff Meeting,” enclosing “Discussion Paper on U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy"

    This report provided a comprehensive take on the problem of nuclear proliferation and the state of U.S. nonproliferation policy. Among the specific issues reviewed were the status of the NPT, export control issues, the problem of “peaceful nuclear explosions,” the implications of the Indian test, and long-term steps for controlling the proliferation of nuclear capabilities. Prepared by Jerome Kahan and Charles Van Doren, respectively with the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

  • July 31, 1974

    Memorandum to the Secretary of State from ACDA Director Fred Ikle and Policy Planning Staff Director Winston Lord, 'Analytical Staff Meeting on Non-Proliferation Strategy'

    To help Kissinger prepare for a follow-up discussion, ACDA and State Department officials prepared a "Non-Proliferation: Strategy and Action Program” to help guide policy. A key proposal was for “high level political approaches to key exporting countries to enlist their support for safeguarding transfers of nuclear materials.” While Washington had to approach a number of nuclear exporters, consultations with France “constitute the most crucial and urgent step to be taken.”

  • September 18, 1974

    Memorandum to the Secretary of State from Lord and Ikle, 'Consultations with the Soviets on Non-Proliferation Strategy'

    This memo consists of an analysis of an approach to the Soviets regarding multilateral nuclear safe guards, along with talking points which include greater supplier coordination and a suppliers' conference.

  • October 05, 1974

    Memorandum to the Secretary of State from 'Talks on Reactor Safeguards and Related Matters with the Soviets on October 15'

    Once Kissinger approved an approach, State Department officials prepared the substance of communications with Moscow, which included a basic five-point paper constituting proposed “undertakings” for a suppliers’ group. The proposed guidelines for nuclear exporters included no “peaceful nuclear explosives” for non-nuclear states, IAEA safeguards for nuclear supplies, and “special restraints” over exports of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies, including comprehensive safeguards and multinational plants.

  • October 22, 1974

    Memorandum from William H. Luers, Executive Secretariat, to Winston Lord and Fred Iklé

    Kissinger agreed that in his absence Acting Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll and ACDA Director Fred Iklé should meet with French Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet and that the British, Germans, and Canadians should receive copies of the five-point paper, and also be informed of the approaches to the French and the Soviets.

  • January 16, 1975

    Memorandum to the Deputy Secretary from Winston Lord, 'Next Steps for the Nuclear Suppliers’ Conference'

    Memo of suggested issues to be discussed at meeting regarding nuclear suppliers' conference, specifically what to say to other suppliers regarding recent bilateral talks between France and the U.S. and further instructions for the French-U.S. bilateral talks regarding France's participation in the nuclear suppliers' conference.

  • June 24, 1975

    Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) Commentary, 'A Disappointing Paper'

    Philip E. Everts expresses disappointment and criticism over the Dutch government's memorandum on disarmament and security.

  • July 24, 1975

    US National Security Council Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft from John Marcum

    A cover letter attached to National Security Council memorandum on disuading South Korea from purchasing a French-built reprocessing plant.

  • December 31, 1975

    Memorandum from George S. Springsteen, Executive Secretary, to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, 'Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines'

    This document comprises the instructions which the White House approved for the September 1975 suppliers’ meeting. At the November meeting, the suppliers completed negotiations on guidelines. Basic provisions included agreement to seek assurances by recipients of supplies not to produce nuclear explosive devices, physical security for installations and materials, transfer of trigger list items only under IAEA safeguards, restraint in transfer of sensitive technologies, facilities and materials, and the encouragement of supplier involvement in, and multinational controls over, sensitive installations. Appended to the guidelines was a two page “trigger list” based on the Zangger Committee’s list.

  • 1976

    Memorandum on the Problem of Disarmament and Security, Submitted to the Netherlands Parliament

    Memorandum giving an overview of Dutch policy balancing nuclear disarmament and security needs. It cites the need for a "reality check" and noting that the "current security system" of nuclear deterrence cannot be overhauled or improved on by sudden changes that activist groups like the Interchurch Peace Council propose. The memorandum stresses the importance of weighing the risks that come with abandoning the current security system and those involved with creating or joining an new security system.

  • January 27, 1976

    George Vest to the Secretary, 'Nuclear Suppliers Status Report'

    In this document regarding the final agreement, George Vest wrote Kissinger that it “served to close many of the loopholes and inadequacies of previous nuclear cooperation agreements between suppliers and recipients.” It also put the French and West Germans on record to restrict access to sensitive nuclear technologies. Nevertheless, as Vest noted, the guidelines would not prevent “indigenous” development of nuclear capabilities and “unsafeguarded developments” or the acquisition of sensitive technology.