Molotov and Bohlen discussed the US government's recent proposal to the Delegation of the United Nations.

A follow-up conversation after the one on the 28th of May. The two discuss the talks that were taking place in Panmunjom, and Bohlen mentions the American men with Soviet wives currently residing in the Soviet Union. Molotov is unaware of this situation.

President Syngman Rhee strongly opposed the peace talks between the United Nations, the North Korea People’s Army, and the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army. Rhee proposed that he would accept this armistice only if the United States signed a Mutual Defense Pact and to continue to build the ROK forces after the war.

John W. Staggers writes to Syngman Rhee about truce negotiations for the Korean War and issues he raised regarding Korean prisoners.

The Polish Embassy addresses the ROK and Syngman Rhee's position on the truce talks as well as the arrival of the Polish medical team in North Korea.

After acknowledging Syngman Rhee's solitary role in blocking the passage of the armistice agreement, Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung draft a response to General Clark.

About the draft response to Clark's letter from the 29th of June.The decision instructs Malenkov and Molotov to answer the Chinese comrades, and inform them of the Soviet Union's agreement their assessment and the measures proposed on the issue of peace talks in Korea, in connection with the Clark's letter.

Molotov writes to the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing discussing the Korean War armistice.

NSC 157/1 analyzes the situation following the armistice in Korea and the problem of Korea's division in half. The report analyzes the North Korea/Communist, US, and South Korean positions regarding reunification. Although a unified Korea allied militarily with the US is not seen as a possibility, the report concludes that it might still be possible to achieve "a unified, neutralized Korea under a substantially unchanged ROK [South Korea]."

The Polish Embassy provides details the political and economic situation in the DPRK and China's economic assistance to North Korea.

Decision to charge Molotov with answering our Korean friends on the issue, taking into account the exchange of views at the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee.

Molotov's response to questions on the representation of the Sino-Korean side in the armistice talks, and possible issues.

The CPSU CC recommends that Kim Il Sung should not take part in the signing of the armistice agreement in Panmunjom, Korea.

Malenkov writes Kim Il Sung about Soviet satisfaction concerning the signing of the armistice.

Eisenhower informs Rhee that US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles will be visiting Korea shortly.

Rhee thanks Eisenhower for US appropriations for South Korea and congratulates him on the Korean War armistice.

General Clark tries to convince President Rhee to attend the armistice signing, emphasizing that Kim Il Sung will not be present. Ambassador Briggs then reports that President Eisenhower has approved $200 million in aid for Korean rehabilitation.

Kim Il Sung thanks the Soviet government and people for their support and aid throughout the Korean War.

Telegram from Kuznetsov to MID regarding his meeting with Mao on 28 July 1953, during which Mao talked about the steps which had led to and now, had to be taken following the signing of the armistice.

The Polish Embassy reports on the domestic situation in North Korea, including industry, agriculture, the economy, and education.