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  • March 25, 1974

    Report, National Security Council Under Secretaries’ Committee, 'Action Plan for Implementing NSDM 235'

    An interagency NSC sub-committee was exploring the problem of safeguards for sensitive nuclear exports. The problem was that an existing group, the Zangger Committee based on NPT membership, did not have a broad enough membership or scope to manage the problem and that France did not belong to the Zanggger Committee.. Under Secretaries Committee proposed “talks with other suppliers of technology and equipment in the reprocessing and enrichment fields on desirable new constraints or guidelines that should be followed.”

  • April 01, 1974

    From Donald R. Cotter, Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy, to Major General Wickham, 'Nuclear Safety Talks with France'

    Cotter briefs Wickham on recent talks with the French, noting that they have centered mostly on nuclear safety issues. He briefly outlines what he will soon write to Baron, and notes that the French mainly want further operational assistance.

  • April 02, 1974

    Memorandum, Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira, Information for the President of Brazil, 'Uranium Enrichment'

    Confidential report identifying major trends regarding uranium supply. The document assesses US capacity to supply nuclear fuel after 1980, and describes European initiatives to manage the fuel cycle. The document underscores the convenience of defining guidelines, which “might ensure Brazilian leadership in Latin America” (p.105); then, it outlines the difficulties inherent to the establishment of a bilateral agreement with the US (taking into account the Brazilian position vis-à-vis the NPT), and suggests Europe (most notably West Germany) as a potential partner. The document recommends the establishment of a confidential working group formed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Mines and Energy in order to set up a strategy that would allow for the establishment of a nuclear cooperation agreement with the partner country, at the time still undefined.

  • April 02, 1974

    Conversation with Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary, Leader and Deputy Leader of the Delegation of the National United Front and the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia

    Mao talks with with Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, and Prince Sihanouk. They discuss the civil war in Cambodia, the leading political figures in that country, and China's revolutionary experience.

  • April 04, 1974

    Report of Meeting with the Soviet Diplomat (Summary)

    Secretary Kim of the South Korean Embassy in Australia meets with the Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Australia to discuss China, North Korea, the U.S. naval force, and the possibility of trade and cultural exchange between the Soviet Union and South Korea.

  • April 17, 1974

    Report of the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) Meeting of Wednesday, 10 April in Keistraat 9, Utrecht

    This documents provides a report of the meeting of the council, giving a clear view internal structures, relations and tensions within the IKV, specifically those between the local branches and the national umbrella organization, between the IKV and the churches and those between the main participants within the council.

  • April 22, 1974

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.180

    Heo Dam seeks to replace the armistice with a peace treaty and establish direct contact with the United States to remove American troops from the peninsula.

  • April 30, 1974

    Report, 'NATO Conference on intelligence (AHIWG) for the review of the documents MC 161/73 and 255/73 (Bruxelles, 25th March-5th April)'

    Report from NATO's Intelligence Conference (AHIWG) where member states reviewed and updated two key intelligence documents: "Strength and Capabilities of the Soviet bloc" (MC 161/73) and "Warsaw Pact Penetration and Military Presence in the Middle East, North Africa and adjacent areas" (MC 255/73).

  • May 03, 1974

    Report by CSMD on Europe's Nine Autonomous Nuclear Force

    Report by CSMD on prospective configuration of Europe's Nine autonomous nuclear force. Includes discussion of NATO burden-sharing, comparison of US and European nuclear forces and costs. Annexes: A: French Military Balance 1972; B: French nuclear forces; C: Military Budget 1972; D: European Community nuclear forces.

  • May 04, 1974

    Letter from Le Duan to Military Region 6

    Letter from Le Duan to Military Region 6 providing guidance on its operations and urgent tasks in the two years 1974-1975.

  • May 08, 1974

    Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 78.028

    The Romanian representative in Washington note the delivery of the North Korean message to the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. The telegram notes that the US State Department does not wish this kind of communication between Pyongyang and Washington to be permanent.

  • May 13, 1974

    Letter from Government of North Korea

    Letter from The Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the U.S. Senate formally proposing that talks be held for the conclusion of a peace agreement between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States of America.

  • May 14, 1974

    Note by CSMM on NPN (Nuclear-Powered Ship)

    Analysis by CSMM on the proposal by adm. G. Polano to employ the the NPN come centrale elettrica di emergenza.

  • May 18, 1974

    US Embassy India Cable 6598 to State Department, 'India’s Nuclear Explosion: Why Now?'

    Having written off an early test, the day that it took place the Embassy scrambled to come up with an explanation. Deputy Chief of Mission David Schneider signed off on the telegram because Moynihan was in London. While the Embassy had no insight on the decision-making, it saw domestic politics and “psychological” explanations for the test: the need to offset domestic “gloom” and the need for India to “be taken seriously.” According to the telegram, “the decision will appeal to nationalist feeling and will be widely welcomed by the Indian populace.”

  • May 18, 1974

    State Department cable 104613 to Consulate, Jerusalem, 'India Nuclear Explosion'

    The day of the test, State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) rushed to update Kissinger. INR provided background on what had happened, how the United States and Canada had inadvertently helped India produce plutonium for the test device, earlier U.S. and Canadian demarches against “peaceful nuclear explosions,” and India’s capabilities to produce and deliver nuclear weapons. The report did not state whether India had made a decision to produce weapons, but it forecast that two large unsafeguarded reactors under construction could eventually “produce enough plutonium for 50-70 nuclear weapons.”

  • May 21, 1974

    Hungarian Embassy in the DPRK, Telegram, 21 May 1974. Subject: DPRK-Pakistani relations.

    The telegram concerns the establishment of relations between North Korea and Pakistan. The beginning of trade is discussed, with North Korea shipping chemicals and machinery in exchange for Pakistani raw materials such as cotton. The possibility of arms trade is also discussed.

  • May 21, 1974

    Kolonel J.F.J. van Rensburg to Hugo Biermann, Chief of the Defense Force, 'Operasie waardering van die RSA se Moontlike Aktiewe Militêre Betrokkenheid in Mosambiek'

  • May 21, 1974

    Report from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to President Ernesto Geisel, 'Subject: The Indian nuclear test'

    This is a note from the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Antonio Azeredo da Silveira, to Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel, regarding India’s nuclear test in 1974. It indicates the main consequences of the Indian test to both the world and Brazil, and suggests that Argentina has the necessary incentives to follow India’s path.

  • May 23, 1974

    Telegram No. 113, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Five days after India's first nuclear test, the Hungarian Embassy in New Delhi reports that Indian foreign policy experts speculate that the test could lead to closer Indian-Soviet relations.

  • May 23, 1974

    Telegram No. 118, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Five days after India's 1974 nuclear test, the Hungarian Embassy in New Delhi reports that the Indian government was grateful that the socialist countries had not confronted India on its nuclear explosion.