Search in

Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • July 12, 1972

    Zhou Enlai’s Talk with Le Duc Tho, Special Adviser at the Paris Talks, in Beijing

    Excerpt in which Zhou Enlai recounts his and Mao Zedong’s trip to China in 1945

  • July 12, 1972

    Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in North Vietnam to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    The Hungarian Embassy in North Vietnam reports on North Vietnam's dissatisfaction with the agreements between the North Koreans and the South Koreans.

  • July 12, 1972

    Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Le Duc Tho

    Zhou Enlai advises Le Duc Tho on negotiations with the US, particularly the issue of Nguyen Van Thieu.

  • July 13, 1972

    Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    The Hungarian Foreign Ministry summarizes the change of the positions of North and South Korea on the unification of the Korean Peninsula, Soviet-Korean relations, and the involvement of China and the United States on the Korean Peninsula.

  • July 14, 1972

    Record of discussion and text of coordination plan on operative technology from the summer of 1972 through 1974, reached by the Committee of State Security (KGB) of the USSR and the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior

    The KGB and head representative of operative technical services for the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior agreed to a plan to continue the exchange of scientific-technical information and samples of operative technology and to convene meetings of specialists on these topics. The text of the coordination plan of summer 1972 - 1974 follows, and categories governed by it include technical documents, photographs, criminology, confidential documents, radio electronics and photo optics.

  • July 14, 1972

    Hungarian Embassy in Guinea, Telegram, 14 July 1972. Subject: Guinean reactions to the joint declaration of the two Koreas

    The short telegram concerns the Guinean reactions by North and South Korean declarations. The North Koreans visited the Guinea ambassador to inform him on the status of inter-Korean negotiations but the details were kept secret.

  • July 18, 1972

    Nuclear Planning Group, 11th meeting at the level of Ministers of Defense (Copenhagen, May 18th-19th 1972)

    Document sent from Minister of Defense Tanassi to Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti. Topics discussed: comparison of strategic forces (NATO and USSR), studies on potential use of nuclear arms by member states, and the problems of internal consultation within NATO.

  • July 20, 1972

    Services of a Driver

  • July 20, 1972

    Note on Information from DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Ri Man-seok, on 17 July 1972 between 16:40 and 18:00 hours in the Foreign Ministry

  • July 21, 1972

    Report from Kádas István, 'Information from Ambassador Pak Gyeong-sun [Pak Kyong-sun]'

    A report by Kadas Istvan on the conversation on submitting the Korean reunification issue to UN General Assembly and a visit made by a North Korean delegation to the Netherlands.

  • July 26, 1972

    US Embassy India Cable 9293 to State Department, 'Indian Nuclear Intentions'

    The Embassy acknowledged that India had the “technical know-how and possibly materials to develop [a] simple nuclear device within period of months after GOI decision to do so.” Nevertheless, it saw no evidence that a decision had been made to test a device. Moreover, capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons were limited, with no plans in sight to “develop [a] missile launch system.”

  • July 27, 1972

    Record of the First Meeting between Takeiri Yoshikatsu and Zhou Enlai

    Zhou Enlai met with Takeiri Yoshikatsu and he mentioned the international status of Taiwan while claiming that "the realization of relations between Japan and China is the desire of all citizens."

  • July 28, 1972

    Record of the Second Meeting between Takeiri Yoshikatsu and Zhou Enlai

    During a conversation with Takeiri, Zhou Enlai questioned the news from Tokyo Shimbun which emphasized that the state of war between Japan and China had ended. In addition, he mentioned the international status of Taiwan and the Vietnam War.

  • July 29, 1972

    Zhou Enlai's Remarks about the Lin Biao Issue

    Zhou Enlai made statements on the Lin Biao Issue and responses of foreign representatives from the United States, Japan and the Soviet Union. In addition, he delves into modern Chinese History after the Anti-Japanese War.

  • July 29, 1972

    Record of the Third Meeting between Takeiri Yoshikatsu and Zhou Enlai

    During a conversation with Takeiri, Zhou Enlai reviewed the main points of their opinions from the first and second rounds of dialogue.

  • August 02, 1972

    Letter, Ahmet H. Ozbudun to C.V. Narasimhan, "Ramifications of the New Korean Item"

    Ozbudun sends a letter to Narasimhan regarding the ramification of the new Korean item, the so-called "Algerian item."

  • August 02, 1972

    Note from State Secretary Freiherr von Braun, 'Meeting of MP Dr. Schröder with Mr. Foreign Minister in Hinterthal on July 30, 1972'

    Trip report on Dr. Gerhard Schröder's visit to China and an agreement signed by the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister expressing interest in normalizing relations with West Germany.

  • August 03, 1972

    Special National Intelligence Estimate SNIE 31-72, 'Indian Nuclear Developments and their Likely Implications'

    Prepared as part of the NSSM 156 policy review, this Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) concluded that the chances of India making a decision to test were “roughly even,” but the post-mortem analysis [see "Why now?," 18 May 1974] argued that based on its own findings, the conclusion ought to have been 60-40 in favor of a decision to test. In its analysis of the pros and cons of testing, the SNIE found that the “strongest factors impelling India to set off a test are: the belief that it would build up [its] international prestige; demonstrate India's importance as an Asian power; overawe its immediate South Asian neighbors; and bring enhanced popularity and public support to the regime which achieved it.” The drafters further noted that a test would be “extremely popular at home, where national pride is riding high” and that supporters of a test believed that it would make the world see India as “one of the world’s principal powers.” The arguments against a test included adverse reactions from foreign governments that provided economic assistance, but the estimate noted that foreign reactions were “becoming less important” to India.

  • August 07, 1972

    Ambassador Pauls, Washington, to Foreign Office, 'German China Policy'

    A message from West German Ambassador Pauls about German-Chinese relations and the possible problems it could pose for the German-American relationship.

  • August 08, 1972

    A letter from the North Korean embassy, attached to 'Visit of the Korean ambassador'

    A letter from the North Korean embassy to the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attached to the report by Barity Miklos