Search in
ADD SEARCH FILTER CANCEL SEARCH FILTER

Digital Archive International History Declassified

SEARCH RESULTS

  • November, 1985

    Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Research Paper, 'Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Personnel and Organizations'

    This heavily excised report on the “well-educated committed cadre” that managed the Pakistani nuclear program demonstrates how the CIA protects its intelligence on Pakistani nuclear activities. This is the same version of the report that can be found on the Agency’s FOIA Web page; the recent version includes no new information. Details on Khan Research Laboratories and the gas centrifuge program are entirely withheld, but some information is made available on the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission and the Directorate of Nuclear Fuels and Materials. The latter includes details on the status and purpose of major projects, for example, the Kundian Nuclear Complex, also known as the Chasma Reprocessing Plant, which was not completed until 1990. For the purposes of producing plutonium for weapons, the Pakistanis were interested in a heavy water moderated reactor of the NRX (National Research Experimental) type that Canada built at Chalk River. In 1985, the Pakistanis started that project in earnest, with construction beginning in 1987 of what became known as Khushab Chemical Plant II.

  • November, 1985

    Brazil-Argentina Foz do Iguaçu Joint Declaration on Regional Nuclear Policy

    President Alfonsín of Argentina and President Sarney of Brazil declare their commitment to peaceful nuclear energy cooperation and mutual guarantees.

  • November 05, 1985

    Note from the International Olympic Committee President to the DPRK’s National Olympic Committee

    Note from IOC President Samaranch to North Korea's Olympic Committee regarding an upcoming meeting.

  • November 05, 1985

    Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the General Director, 'IEPG (European Independent Planning Group) and CNAD (Conference of Nationals Directors of Armaments) of NATO'

    Analysis about the state of transatlantic relations with a focus on transatlantic dialogue and technology transfer. The document strongly criticizes a hegemonic approach of the US administration in its relationship with Europe.

  • November 08, 1985

    Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations, 'Information for the Meeting on Nuclear Issues with Argentine Authorities'

    Information for a meeting between José Sarney and Raul Alfonsín and as a guide to the joint declaration on the peaceful character of nuclear programs and for the creation of a working group to promote cooperation between the two countries. Itamaraty recognized Argentina’s achievements in the nuclear realm. The last two paragraphs suggests the rejection of a possible Argentine proposal to create a system of mutual inspections.

  • November 08, 1985

    Cover letter from South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha to US Secretary of State George Shultz

    Letter from South African Foreign Minister R. F. "Pik" Botha to U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz contesting American arguments against supporting UNITA.

  • November 12, 1985

    Letter from South African President P.W. Botha to UK Prime Minister Thatcher

    Letter from South African State President to Margaret Thatcher, thanking her for her support at the meeting of Commonwealth heads, but stating South Africa's objection to the intervention by foreign delegations. He argues that this would give South Africa an ultimatum and disrupt the ongoing internal negotiations.

  • November 15, 1985

    Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Fidel Castro and Mikhail Gorbachev

    Mikhail Gorbachev was the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

  • November 17, 1985

    Letter from UK Prime Minister Thatcher to South African President P.W. Botha

    Letter from Margaret Thatcher to South African State President P.W. Botha, expressing her disappointment and anxiety over South Africa's refusal to cooperate with the Commonwealth group. Encourages South Africa not to publicize their refusal, and notes quite plainly that British assistance will be lost if South Africa continues down this path.

  • November 19, 1985

    Memorandum of Conversation, 'Reagan-Gorbachev Meetings in Geneva'

    Department of State summary of Gorbachev and Reagan's discussions.

  • November 22, 1985

    Embassy Bonn Telegram 35237 to Department of State, 'Export of Uranium Enrichment to Pakistan'

    In response to the State Department's request, the Foreign Office found that the equipment had not been delivered and German firms had been informed that an export license needed to be granted.

  • November 26, 1985

    Hungarian Embassy in Ethiopia, Ciphered Telegram, 26 November 1985. Subject: Ethiopian-DPRK relations.

    The strong relations between North Korea and Ethiopia is discussed. The Soviet economic advisors have been subsumed by Koreans, as a test of how much influence North Korea holds over Ethiopia.

  • November 27, 1985

    Hungarian Embassy in Ethiopia, Ciphered Telegram, 27 November 1985. Subject: Ethiopia’s relations with the DPRK.

    North Korean-Ethiopian relations are further discussed. The increasingly obvious sway North Korea holds over the country in its attempt to aid industrialization is not expected to bode well with the Soviet Union.

  • November 27, 1985

    Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Fidel Castro and Mikhail Gorbachev

    Mikhail Gorbachev was the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

  • December, 1985

    Special National Intelligence Estimate SNIE 93-83, 'Brazil's Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints'

    This SNIE analyzes Brazilian nuclear politics in the light of the return of civilian rule in the country after 21 years of military rule. It demonstrates a profound knowledge of the military's involvement in the nuclear program.

  • December, 1985

    Memorandum to Holders of Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 93-83, 'Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints'

    The SNIEs from 1983 and the 1985 update emphasize Brazil’s quest for technological-industrial autonomy which in nuclear terms meant developing an indigenous program to master the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In seeking those objectives, Brazil did not want to face any constraints, and its leaders were unresponsive to US or other pressures for safeguards on nuclear facilities. According to the 1985 report the prominent role of the military in nuclear activities, “the direction of Brazil’s nuclear r&d,” and the CNEN president’s “reputation of favoring a nuclear option” posed a “danger to US interests in Brazil.”

  • December 07, 1985

    Defense Intelligence Agency cable to [excised location], 'Pakistan-China: Nuclear Weapons Production and Testing'

    A State Department telegram discussing the possible Chinese-Pakistani nuclear assistance and reports that Pakistan had acquired a nuclear weapon in October of 1985.

  • December 09, 1985

    Letter by Minister of Foreign Affairs Andreotti to West German Minister of Foreign Affaris Genscher

    Foreign Minister of Italy, Giulio Andreotti wishes to exchange views with his German counterpart Genscher about the research phase of the SDI project, to try and find common ground before continuing talks with the United States on the subject of industrial cooperation in SDI research.

  • December 12, 1985

    Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'FNI negotiations - Assessments of the American negotiator, Ambassador Glitman'

    A brief report by US Ambassador Glitman regarding the INF negotiations with the USSR. There is an increased willingness to negotiate, and the parties have come closer in some aspects, but major differences still persist.

  • December 12, 1985

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'East-West relations'

    This document analyzes East-West relations following the December 1985 meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Geneva. It discusses the new and more open foreign policy line of the Soviet Union, and underlines the important role of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy under the complex circumstances.