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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • June 09, 1981

    Telegram from Washington Embassay to Foreign Office, Subject: administration response

    Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who maintained close ties with the Israeli diplomats, told the Israeli ambassador in a phone conversation on 9 June 1981 that Israel’s action in Baghdad caused a serious complication for the U.S., reiterating that “President Reagan thinks the same”.

  • June 10, 1981

    Letter from Israeli General Rafael Eitan to South African Minister Magnus Malan on Israeli Airstrike on Iraqi Nuclear Reactor

    Chief of Staff of Israel Defense Forces, General Rafael Eitan writes to South African Minister of Defence Magnus Malan shortly after Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. In this candid letter, Eitan states that Israel’s “iron determination” would not “allow these crazy Arabs to possess nuclear weapons," adding that "anyone who tries to say that the nuclear reactor in Iraq was only for research purposes is wicked, cynical and oil, not human blood, flows in his veins."

  • June 10, 1981

    Telegram from Washington embassy to Foreign Office

    The Israeli embassy in Washington learned from Haig as well as from another contact that Secretary of Defense Weinberger supports a tough approach to Israel, including a a UNSC resolution that would demand Israel to open the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona for inspection and a call for Israel to join the NPT.

  • June 10, 1981

    Telegram from Washington embassy to Foreign Office, Subject: Evron-Haig

    The Israeli embassy in Washington learned from Haig as well as from another contact that Secretary of Defense Weinberger supports a tough approach to Israel, including a UNSC resolution that would demand Israel to open the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona for inspection and a call for Israel to join the NPT.

  • June 11, 1981

    Memorandum for Richard V. Allen from Robert M Kimmitt, Subject: Israeli Strike -- Legal Aspects

    This NSC memo examines some of the legal aspects of the raid. It states that the administration should determine “[W]hether a substantial violation has occurred”, as this would reflect on the delivery of Israel’s F-16 jets.

  • June 11, 1981

    Cable from Embassy Baghdad to Foreign Ministry in Delhi on United States-West Asia relations

    Indian diplomats speculated at the time that the suspension of the delivery of the F-16 jets was potentially a U.S. gesture of goodwill toward Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, aimed at appeasing him and keeping the embryonic peace process with Israel alive.

  • June 11, 1981

    Memo from Eugene Rostow to National Security Council meeting, Subject: Additional comment on NSC discussion paper: Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Cooperation

    ACDA Director-Designate Eugene Rostow explains his pro-Israel stance, and argues that Israel should be given an exemption from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.

  • June 11, 1981

    Telegram from Washington embassy to Foreign Office, Subject: Evron -- the President

    The Israelis were concerned and disappointed by the administration’s initial response to the raid, which consisted of a freeze on the shipment of F-16 jets to Israel until a legal review was conducted. The Israeli ambassador to Washington conveyed this sentiment to President Reagan in a meeting on 11 June 1980 in this telegram.

  • June 12, 1981

    Memo fron Walter J. Stoessel Jr to the President "Subject: U.S. strategy for UN Security Councul Meeting on the Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Facility"

    This document outlines Haig's proposed political strategy, which was approved by Reagan on 12 June, and was constructed around the notion of red lines: Washington would harshly condemn Israel but would also “draw the line on punishment” by Israel.

  • June 15, 1981

    Memo from Richard V Allen to the U.S. President, Subject: Political strategy for responding to Israeli attack

    National Security Advisor Richard V. Allen informed Reagan that the administration was “not required to make a legal determination on whether Israel violated U.S. law” and commented that the issue of the raid was “to be treated as a political rather than a legal question.”

  • June 15, 1981

    Memo from Walter J. Stoessel, Subject: Political Strategy for Responding to Israeli attack

    Following Lewis’ cable, and the realization that the raid should have been at least somewhat anticipated, the administration opted to develop a more restrained, sober approach towards Israel, constructing what was termed a “political strategy for responding to Israeli attack”.

  • July, 1981

    HSWP CC Department for Foreign Affairs Memorandum on Hungarian-Iraqi relations

    This memorandum summarizes Iraqi-Hungarian relations since 1958, including the fact that Iraq is Hungary's largest trading partner in the developing world.

  • July 06, 1981

    Information from Gen. D. Stoyanov on Visit of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IGUR) Delegation in Bulgaria

  • September 15, 1981

    Memorandum for the president from Alexander M. Haig, "Subject: Secretary Haig's Evening Report"

    Instructions for the U.S. delegation to the IAEA's annual General Conference (GC) which told them to anticipate a “severe attack” against Israel by objecting “vigorously [to] suspension of technical aid.” Later on, this instruction would change, and the delegation would be instructed to leave the building should the Israeli credentials be rejected.

  • October, 1981

    Meeting between Saddam Hussein and His Senior Advisors Following the Israeli Attack on Osirak

    Saddam Hussein discusses the Israeli air strike against the Iraqi reactor at Osirak, explaining why the attack was expected and his reasons for pursuing nuclear weapons development.

  • October 01, 1981

    Saddam and Senior Iraqi Officials Discussing the Conflict with Iran, Iraqi Targets and Plans, a Recent Attack on the Osirak Reactor, and Various Foreign Countries

    Meeting of top Iraqi officials to discuss the ongoing war with Iran and Israeli air strikes.

  • October 16, 1981

    Ministry for State Security, 'On Activities of Iraqi Intelligence Organs'

    Report from the KGB that Iraqi intelligence are using foreign embassies to "to register, monitor, and possibly neutralize" Iraqi communists and other oppositional groups abroad.

  • 1982

    Saddam Hussein Meeting with His Cabinet to Discuss the 1982 Budget

    Transcript of an audio file containing a meeting between Saddam Hussein and the Cabinet to discuss the 1982 budget. They discuss the requirements of the various ministries and the need for financial austerity. They discuss the implications for various sectors--health, education, services, agriculture, and others. They discuss defense expenditures as well. Inflation and food prices are also mentioned. Saddam discusses the patriotism of the Iraqi people.

  • January 08, 1982

    Memorandum for the President; Secretary Weinberger's Weekly Report

    In a memorandum for the president from January 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger expressed his criticism of Israel’s Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon and his tendency of “going public whenever it suits him”.

  • May 27, 1982

    Memorandum, Minister Saraiva Guerreiro, Information for the President of Brazil, 'Protection to Brazilians. Mendes Junior Workers Detained by Iraqi Authorities'

    Memo to President Figueiredo dealing with the arrest and inadequate treatment applied to three employees of Mendes Jr., a Brazilian company operating in civil construction projects in Iraq, and efforts—mostly frustrated—by Brazilian diplomats to resolve the issue.