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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • November 30, 1972

    Telegram from the Romanian Embassy in Vienna to Deputy Minister Nicolae Ecobescu and Vice President of the State Committee for Nuclear Energy Ion Udrea

    The Canadian Embassy in Beijing contacted the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the need to continue the IAEA inspections in Taiwan.

  • December 15, 1972

    Proposal from Deputy Minister Nicolae Ecobescu to Minister of Foreign Affairs George Macovescu, 'Control by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Taiwan'

    Summary of conflicts over the IAEA inspection of Taiwan and the government of the People's Republic of China.

  • January 06, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061.005, Urgent

    The telegram comments on several changes and challenges to North Korea's 6 year plan (1971-76). Romanian sources report that Pyongyang set unrealistic goals and production quotas on North Korea's heavy industry that is burdened by the deficit of raw materials. The telegram also points out North Korea's growing foreign trade with capitalist nations, while export quotas to socialist countries have only been partially fulfilled. The author points to lagging in many of North Korea's industrial sectors and comments that Pyongyang's economic goals will require massive financial efforts over the short-term.

  • January 16, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.061.009

    Lazar describes setbacks in inter-Korean cooperation following South Korea's hostile attitude towards North Korea. The author obvserves that DPRK is irked by President Park's growing cult of personality home and abroad.

  • February 07, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 061.041

    Based on Yugoslavian sources, a Romanian diplomat reports that Kim Yeong-ju may have met Henry Kissinger and Lee Hu-rak in Paris for discussions on U.S.-DPRK and inter-Korean relations respectively.

  • February 13, 1973

    Telegram from Beijing to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 059.139

    Gavrilescu speculates the possibilities that DPRK Foreign Minister Heo Dam meets Kissinger as well as that the inter-Korean conflict is raised as a major issue in Sino-American negotiations.

  • February 19, 1973

    Telegram from Istanbul to Bucharest, No. 037032

    The document comments on South Korea's unwillingness to cooperate with North Korea in any of the framework established under the 1972 joint declaration. While South Korea refuses closer economic and political ties with North Korea, Pyongyang has made the removal of the US troops a major prerequisite, further stalling cooperation.

  • March 01, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061072

    The document discusses the political strategies of the two Koreas' and their respective visions of unification. The author notes that North Korea is reaching out to the world to shore up support for Pyongyang's vision.

  • March 05, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.074, Urgent, SECRET

    Lazar describes an incident along the DMZ, where North Korean infiltrators shot South Korean troops.

  • March 09, 1973

    Telegram from Bucharest to Peking, Ulaanbaatar, New Delhi, Islamabad, Djakarta, Tokyo, No. 02/01476

    Lazar notes the contrasting approaches of the two Koreas towards inter-Korean cooperation and discusses the China-US dialogue surrounding US troop withdrawal from South Korea.

  • March 09, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061077

    Lazar reports on the tense 3rd meeting of the South-North Coordination Committee but expects the meeting to conclude with a reaffirmation of inter-Korean cooperation.

  • March 17, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061084

    Lazar discusses the stalling inter-Korean negotiations and blames the overly cautious attitude of the South and the ‘all or nothing’ strategy of the North. He also notes that the North Koreans are buying time until the US disengages from the peninsula to ensure a position of superiority.

  • March 21, 1973

    Telegram from Bucharest to Pyongyang, SECRET, No. 02/01810

    Romanian officials describe disagreements between the South and North Korean delegations during the second session of the South-North Coordination Committee (SNCC).

  • March 22, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.087, Urgent, SECRET

    Popa reports on North Korean actions at the second North-South Coordination Committee to eliminate military confrontation and test Seoul's loyalty towards the cause of unification.

  • March 31, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.087, Urgent, SECRET

    Popa discusses active North Korean attempts to eliminate military confrontation in the North-South Coordination Committee and points to South Korean engagement in duplicitous actions by both suing for peace and preparing for war.

  • April 02, 1973

    Telegram from Beirut, No.015.088, Urgent, SECRET

    Romanian diplomat M. Levente reports on North Korea’s motivations and strategies for entering into a dialogue with South Korea.

  • April 04, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.113, Urgent, SECRET

    KWP Centeral Committee member Kim Yeongnam explains to the Romanian representative that the DPRK proposed changes in the North-South Coordination Committee meeting to ease tensions and transform the armistice into a peace treaty. Kim blames the South Korean hawks and separatists who abide by the interests of the US and Japan for the lack of progress. Despite the impasse, the North Koreans look to the internal dissent against Park Chung Hee in South Korea as a sign of support for Pyongyang.

  • April 11, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.119, Urgent, SECRET

    Conversation between Romanian and Soviet representatives reveals that North Koreans are slowly withdrawing from direct contacts with South Korea. Instead, Pyongyang is seeking external support for its position. Meanwhile, North Korea is now looking at China with increased suspicion after Zhou Enlai noted that Beijing was not interested in the withdrawal of US troops from Asia. On another note, North Korea asks the Soviets to forbid South Koreans to enter the Soviet Union for the University Olympics held there.

  • April 12, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang, SECRET, No.061.121, Urgent

    A Romanian diplomat reports on the second session of the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly. The meeting focused on increasing the state budget to accomplish the 6-year plan with particular focus on heavy industry, machinery, raw material extraction, and energy production. The meeting also noted the need to increase the standard of living for the North Korean people. Nonetheless, no mention was made on collaborating with the outside world for economic and technological cooperation.

  • April 23, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.150, Urgent, SECRET

    The Romanians expect tensions to rise in inter-Korean relations after North Korea is accused of sending a group of spies to South Korea. Pyongyang is unable to convincingly deny its direct role in sending the spies and is called duplicitous by Seoul. The report suggests that recent events have acted as fodder for the argument on why US troops should stay on the Korean Peninsula