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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • October 11, 1962

    Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 58

    Protocol 58 provides insight into what was occupying the mind of Khrushchev at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The theme of the meeting was centered around the Sino-Indian conflict, questions surrounding the McMahon line, and the future of Tibet. With the focus on China and India, it is reasonable to assume that the crisis caught Khrushchev by surprise.

  • October 12, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation between Chinese Ambassador to Cuba Shen Jian and Member of the Cuban Integrated Revolutionary Organizations Emilio Aragonés

    Shen Jian and Emilio Aragonés discussed the Sino-Indian border disputes, in which both questioned the attitude of the USSR toward India. The other talking points include the attitude of the socialist world toward Yugoslavia and the revolutionary movements in Latin America.

  • October 14, 1962

    Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 59

    Protocol 59 further details the focus of the Soviet Union just before the Cuban Missile Crisis. Khrushchev was so confident that his plan with Cuba would go unhindered that he spent his efforts on resolving the Sino-Indian border conflict, thinking the matter with missiles was done.

  • October 20, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, 'Minutes of the Conversation Between the Chinese Ambassador Ding Guoyu and Pakistan’s Foreign Affairs Secretary on the Sino-Indian Border Clash'

    The two discussed Pakistan's view toward the Sino-Indian conflict. Pakistan sympathized with China and thought that India "deserved to be taught a lesson". Islamabad regarded Nehru as a liar who was ostensibly neutral, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist but in fact signed secret treaties with the US. Both Chinese and Pakistani representatives agreed to strive to resolve peacefully the border issue between Beijing and Islamabad.

  • October 22, 1962

    Soviet Memorandum on the Sino-Indian Border Issue

    The Soviet Union outlines its stance toward the ongoing Sino-Indian border war, including its policy of selling arms to India.

  • October 22, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation between Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu and Soviet Ambassador Stepan Chervonenko

    Stepan Chervonenko and Zhang Hanfu discuss the ongoing border dispute between India and China, and Chervonenko presents a Soviet memorandum outlining the USSR's stance toward the war.

  • October 23, 1962

    Meeting of Dumitru Gheorghiu, Romanian Ambassador to Beijing, at the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry Discussing the Over-Flight of Chinese Territory by the Aircraft Transporting Members of the Romanian Delegation Led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej

    The Romanian Ambassador to China and Yu Zhan, the director of the USSR and East European Directorate, discuss an incident involving a flight by members of a Romanian delegation led by Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej over Chinese territory. The USSR Ambassador, Comrade S. V. Chervonenko, was also present.

  • October 24, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Instructions on Issuing a Statement to Support Cuba'

    A plan from the Chinese Foreign Ministry office to distribute a postition statement to various press outlets regarding the situation of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • October 24, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation between Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu and Chargé d’Affaires Counselor from the Embassy of North Korea in China Jeong Pung-gye

    Zhang informed Jeong Pung-gye of the details of the fighting along the Sino-Indian border as well as expressed support for Cuba regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • October 25, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Memorandum from the Soviet Union on the Sino-Indian Border Dispute and the Sale of Aircrafts to India'

    The Chinese Foreign Ministry informed all of its embassies and Charge d’Affaires about the Soviet Memorandum on the Sino-Indian Dispute and emphasized the necessity to make clear that India was the invader, not China.

  • October 26, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Explanation to Burma about the Line of Actual Control'

    The Chinese Foreign Ministry claims that India is "reoccupying" territories and has crossed the Line of Actual Control.

  • October 26, 1962

    Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad

    Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad. The encounter took place a day after the Soviet leadership had dramatically modified its policy on the Sino-Indian dispute (in an October 25 article in Pravda), suddenly taking a pro-China position, evidently due to the danger of global war breaking out as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, then peaking. While taking pains to welcome the Pravda article as helpful in correcting misunderstandings among Indian Communists, the CPI leader acknowledged that the party secretariat had concluded that "this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India," pushing the Indian Government toward the West, and he pleaded with the Soviets to influence China to resolve the border dispute "without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself."

  • October 27, 1962

    The Editorial Department of Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], 'More on Nehru's Philosophy in the Light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question'

  • October 28, 1962

    The Chinese Foreign Ministry forwards a Letter from Premier Zhou Enlai to Ne Win

    The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends Zhou Enlai's letter to Ne Win on the Sino-Indian border dispute to the Chinese Embassy in Burma.

  • October 28, 1962

    Letter from Premier Zhou Enlai to His Excellency Ne Win

    Zhou Enlai writes to Ne Win in order to clarify China's positions on the Line of Actual Control and the Sino-Indian border dispute.

  • October 30, 1962

    Chinese Embassy in Cuba, A Report on a Conversation with Two Deputy Department Heads of Cuban General Staff

    Two department heads of the Cuban general staff (revolutionary education and film departments) spoke with the military attache to the Chinese embassy in Cuba. They discussed morale of the Cuban troops, relations with other socialist countries and the American airplane shot down over Cuba.

  • October 31, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'A Cuban Leader Talked about the Situation'

    A report from a conversation with Joaquín Ordoqui. Two major topics are discussed. First: The Brazilian president, Joâo Goulart, sent his aide, Gen. Albino da Silva to Cuba, indicating that the Brazilian government is willing to mediate in the hopes of solving the Cuban problem, that the US is also willing to maintain relations with Cuba, and that [the Brazilian government] wants Cuba to return to the Organization of American States. And second: When negotiating with [UN Secretary-General] U Thant, we made Cuba's position crystal clear. Fidel [Castro] told him [U Thant] that an inspection, regardless of its form, would not be approved [by Cuban leaders], nor would it be approved by the Cuban people.

  • October 31, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'Cuban Foreign Ministry Officials Talked about the Situation'

    A conversation between Huang Wenyou, Head of Socialist Country Division of the Cuban Foreign Ministry José Fuxá and Cecilio Martinez (previously the first secretary of the Embassy in China) in which they discuss Cuba-Chinese relations of support and negotiations.

  • October 31, 1962

    Cable from Li Jusheng, 'Report on Handing over the Letter of the Premier to Sukarno'

    Li Jusheng reported to the Chinese Foreign Ministry on his conversation with Indonesian Assistant to First Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs Su-wei-duo. The exchange concerned efforts from Indonesia and Egypt to find an acceptable solution to the Sino-Indian conflict, several points from the Chinese proposal that was unclear to Indonesia, a remarkable absence of demands for the Western and Central sectors in Nehru's letter to Nasser, and the importance of not letting this dispute hinder the preparation for the next Asian-African Conference

  • October 31, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'Views on Khrushchev's Compromise with the United States on Cuba'

    The Chinese Embassy shares their opinion on Khrushchev's reconciliation with Kennedy after the Cuban Missile Crisis. They believe: Khrushchev’s activities "amounted to a bowl of cold water, poured right over the Cuban people"; because of Khrushchev, those who sit on the fence have now leaned rightward; American imperialists will, under the banner of the UN, create troubles for Cuba; and Khrushchev exhausted his words to exculpate Kennedy, which invariably stemmed from the concern to arrange a Cuba deal as a starting point, with the ultimate goal to push for reconciliations to be reached on other questions.