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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • June 19, 1962

    Fifth Official Meeting Between the Delegation of the Albanian Labor Party and the Delegation of the Chinese Communist Party

    Albanian leaders Hysni Kapo and Ramiz Alia meet with a Chinese delegation to discuss industrialization in Communist countries, specificallyAlbania's five-year plan. The Albanians complain about being excluded from international meetings of the socialist countries. The Chinese update the Albanians on their position of supporting Jiang Jieshi over the "Two Chinas" objective of the United States and their relations with other countries throughout Asia, while encouraging the Albanians to reach out to the Muslim nations of Africa.

  • September 04, 1962

    Research Memorandum RSB-152 from Roger Hilsman to the Secretary, 'Soviet Tactics in Talks on the Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons'

    Before the words “nuclear nonproliferation” entered official discourse, the term “non-diffusion” (or “non-dissemination”) of nuclear weapons was used routinely. In part stemming from the negotiations over Berlin, during 1962-1963 the Kennedy administration held talks with allies and adversaries on the possibility of a non-diffusion agreement which included Germany. In light of a recent Soviet proposal, INR veteran Soviet expert Sonnenfeldt explained why Moscow had moved away from earlier proposals singling out West Germany and was focusing on the general applicability of a non-diffusion agreement.

  • October 18, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962

    Drozniak forwards a report from US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs [Edwin M.] Martin. Martin says that the Americans are well-informed of the military situation in Cuba, that Cuba does not possess nuclear weapons (nor will they be likely to because the USSR did not give such weapons to China, so why would they give them to Cuba?), that the level of the Cuban economy is twenty-five percent lower than the period before Fidel Castro came to power and Cuba is much more economically dependent on the USSR, and finally that any military invasion or complete blockade of Cuba would be considered an act of war by the USSR.

  • October 20, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak)

    Drozniak compiles information he has collected from US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler and US Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E. Thompson on the rising Cuban situation and US-USSR relations.

  • October 22, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA

    Dobrynin sends the results of a meeting where Rusk invites him to his home and asks him to deliver a message to Khrushchev and text of JFK’s message to be transmitted over TASS.

  • October 23, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation, Federal Republic of Germany Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Dean Acheson, Special Envoy of US President Kennedy, Bonn, West Germany

    A conversation between Federal Chancellor Adenauer with the Special Adviser of the U.S. President, Acheson. They discuss plans to destabilize the Cuban regime by domestic unrest, how the missile bases in Cuba should be destroyed, Russian soldiers stationed in Cuba and the lasting impact of the Bay of Pigs landing.

  • October 24, 1962

    Letter from Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy

    Khrushchev expresses outrage at Kennedy’s establishment of quarantine in Cuba.

  • October 24, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA

    Dobrynin relays the results of a meeting with R. Kennedy during which R. Kennedy is outraged at the “deception” of the Soviet Union by putting long-range missiles in Cuba.

  • October 25, 1962

    Political Letter from Ambassador Max Troendle to Secretary General Pierre Micheli

    A political letter from Ambassador Max Troendle to Secretary General Pierre Micheli describing aspects of the Soviet position on the Cuban crisis and how "It seems that on Cuba, the Soviets want to avoid meeting the American challenge, that they want to negotiate, talk, and not to face a showdown."

  • October 26, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation, West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder and Soviet Ambassador Andrei Smirnov, Bonn

    A discussion between Federal Minister Schröder and Soviet Ambassador Smirnow [Smirnov] in which Smirnov presents to the minister a statement of the Soviet Government concerning the aggressive acts the United States had committed against the Republic of Cuba. In this statement the Soviet Government was explaining its view on the blockade the United States had imposed on Cuba. It also commented on the other aggressive steps President Kennedy intended to take against Cuba as announced on 22 October.

  • October 28, 1962

    Telegram from USSR Foreign Ministry to Soviet diplomats in Washington, Havana, and New York

    The US consul informed the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the procedures of the quarantine.

  • October 28, 1962

    Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 2 p.m., Sunday

    Campos discusses agreements that are being made between Kennedy and Khrushchev regarding the immediate dismantling of the missile bases in Cuba, international inspections of Cuba, and an abandonment of the demand for reciprocity in Turkey.

  • October 28, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 2 p.m., Sunday

    Campos discusses the brief alleviation in tensions between the United States and Soviet Union over the Cuban issue due to a temporary accord for a limited-diversion of the Soviet ships.

  • October 29, 1962

    Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 1:30 p.m., Monday

    Secretary of State Dean Rusk tells Brazilian officials about letters that have been sent between Kennedy and Khrushchev discussing missile bases in both Cuba and Turkey.

  • October 29, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 29 October 1962

    Jelen relays information on several recent diplomatic actions of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • October 29, 1962

    Record of Conversation between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and UN Secretary General U Thant

    Kuznetsov’s record of a conversation with U Thant discussing the dismantling of Russian weapons and the American quarantine.

  • October 31, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington, 31 October 1962

    Arthur Schlesinger, advisor to President Kennedy, confirms Drozniak's previous telegram report that " In [Schlesinger's] opinion, the assessment of the Soviet installation of the missiles in Cuba as the attempt to strengthen the [world] position of the USSR before a possible confrontation over Berlin, ended up prevailing within the US administration."

  • October 31, 1962

    Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to Cuba A. I. Alekseev

    Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko cables the Soviet Embassy in Havana that the Soviet leadership had decided to allow UNSG U Thant and his representatives to visit Soviet launchers sites in Cuba and verify that the launchers are being dismantled.

  • October 31, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'Views on Khrushchev's Compromise with the United States on Cuba'

    The Chinese Embassy shares their opinion on Khrushchev's reconciliation with Kennedy after the Cuban Missile Crisis. They believe: Khrushchev’s activities "amounted to a bowl of cold water, poured right over the Cuban people"; because of Khrushchev, those who sit on the fence have now leaned rightward; American imperialists will, under the banner of the UN, create troubles for Cuba; and Khrushchev exhausted his words to exculpate Kennedy, which invariably stemmed from the concern to arrange a Cuba deal as a starting point, with the ultimate goal to push for reconciliations to be reached on other questions.

  • November 01, 1962

    Coded telegram from Soviet official Georgy Zhukov

    Zhukov relays the message that John F. Kennedy sent, via Salinger, that the President needed proof that the weapons in Cuba were dismantled.