Letter from R. F. "Pik" Botha to Alexander Haig, noting that the United States and South Africa have parallel goals in Namibia: the establishment of an independent state without a Marxist-socialist government. Lays out a list of qualities that the South African government wants to see in the new Namibian state.

Marshal Dmitri Ustinov was the Soviet minister of defense; Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov was the chief of the Soviet General Staff.

Memo about Yasser Arafat's meeting with Palestinian students.

In a speech delivered at a meeting of the KGB, Andropov discusses the results of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, the state of Soviet intelligence work, and suggests areas of improvement in KGB intelligence work in light of heightened international tensions.

Translated report oversees contingency plans for the declaration of martial law. It covers plans for public information, diplomatic relations, and the military.

Report details protocol for various government agencies (military, political, diplomatic, economic, and state security) to address state security during the implementation of martial law.

This is a document containing talking points for Secretary of State Alexander Haig's meeting with Deng Xiaoping. Topics addressed in the document include: Chinese exportation of uranium and heavy water to South Africa and Argentina; the intention to suspend the prohibition of arm sales to China; greater nuclear and security cooperation; the increase in Chinese arm sales to countries dependent on the Soviet Union; and the desire to open a new consulate in Shenyang.

Willy Brandt's letter is about the establishment of the Nicaragua solidarity committee, which took place in Madrid in 1981. Brandt states the importance of the new rule of law in Nicaragua and concerns on Socialist International's involvement in the country.

The Politburo discusses the internal economic situation within the Soviet Union, the situation in Afghanistan (in particular the group "Parcham" and Karmal), relations with the US, and the treatment of Jews in the USSR.

On 7 June 1981, the day of the Osirak raid, a policy paper composed by the ‘Senior Interagency Group on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Cooperation’ (SIG) was submitted to the NSC. The discussion paper crowned the administration’s nonproliferation efforts as a “key foreign policy objective” and called to revise the 1978 NNPA.

After the raid Israel initiated a PR campaign, explaining its reasoning behind the attack. Following this campaign, the second causality of the raid, in addition to Iraq’s reactor, was the credibility of the IAEA. And its officials staged their own counter campaign.

While starting to construct the political strategy of response to the raid, the administration came face to face with what U.S. ambassador to Israel, Sam Lewis called in his cable to Washington a “gap” in the administration’s “institutional memory”, as assessments regarding Israel’s intention to launch a strike were not passed on from the Carter administration.

The NSC’s Raymond Tanter recommended a “middle course of action,” one which would distance Washington from the strike “while avoiding extreme measures designed to punish Israel.”

NSC staffer Douglas J. Feith took the internal debate on the legitimacy of the raid a step further, stating that “no rebuke of Israel’s raid against Iraq should be issued without an equally emphatic rebuke of Iraq.” Feith’s argument was based on the fact that Iraq had continuously refused to acknowledge Israel’s existence and was officially at war with it.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who maintained close ties with the Israeli diplomats, told the Israeli ambassador in a phone conversation on 9 June 1981 that Israel’s action in Baghdad caused a serious complication for the U.S., reiterating that “President Reagan thinks the same”.

Chief of Staff of Israel Defense Forces, General Rafael Eitan writes to South African Minister of Defence Magnus Malan shortly after Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. In this candid letter, Eitan states that Israel’s “iron determination” would not “allow these crazy Arabs to possess nuclear weapons," adding that "anyone who tries to say that the nuclear reactor in Iraq was only for research purposes is wicked, cynical and oil, not human blood, flows in his veins."

Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim thanks China for its growing involvement in international affairs.

The Israeli embassy in Washington learned from Haig as well as from another contact that Secretary of Defense Weinberger supports a tough approach to Israel, including a a UNSC resolution that would demand Israel to open the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona for inspection and a call for Israel to join the NPT.

Hugel alerts the recipients of the memorandum that confidential sources reveal increased militarization in Poland to enforce the party line and are one step closer to martial law.

The Israeli embassy in Washington learned from Haig as well as from another contact that Secretary of Defense Weinberger supports a tough approach to Israel, including a UNSC resolution that would demand Israel to open the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona for inspection and a call for Israel to join the NPT.