José Eduardo dos Santos was the president of Angola; General Konstantin Kurochkin was the head of the Soviet Military Mission in Angola; General Polo Cintra Frías was the head of the Cuban Military Mission in Angola.

General Konstantin Kurochkin was the head of the Soviet Military Mission in Angola; General Polo Cintra Frías was the head of the Cuban Military Mission in Angola. Conversation held in the car after leaving a meeting with Angolan president José Eduardo dos Santos.

Seeking “constructive engagement” with the apartheid regime, the Reagan administration wanted the South Africans to keep a lid on their nuclear weapons program. The NIE’s top-secret status was compatible with one of the elements of the 1984 estimate: that any revelations that broke the regime’s “calculated ambiguity” about its nuclear status would put Washington in an “awkward position” by “fir[ing] the drive” for the sanctions and disinvestment campaigns which the administration was trying to avoid. Analyzing the motives for the nuclear program, the CIA found it “irrelevant” to any threat that the regime was likely to face.A key issue was whether South Africa had a nuclear arsenal. On that problem, the NIE dovetailed with the view taken by NIE-4-82: South Africa “probably has the capability to produce nuclear weapons on short notice.” That was accurate, but U.S. intelligence may not have known that the regime’s leaders had already decided to build a stockpile of 7 weapons, with six weapons assembled during the 1980s.

General Polo Cintra Frías was the head of the Cuban Military Mission in Angola; General Konstantin Kurochkin was the head of the Soviet Military Mission in Angola.

Report on a meeting with O. B. Rakhmanin in which they discuss the Soviet Union's policy toward China and the upcoming Interkit meeting.

Conversation between US and Angolan officials about the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola.

General Konstantin Kurochkin was the head of the Soviet Military Mission in Angola; General Polo Cintra Frías was the head of the Cuban Military Mission in Angola.

Discussion with M. L. Titarenko, a Soviet delegate at an Interkit meeting, on Sino-Soviet relations.

Summary of annual Interkit meeting to coordinate Soviet bloc analysis of and policy toward China.

Report by a Polish intelligence agent on the International Literary Center (ILC) in Paris which lists the types of Polish people who were given anti-Communist books at the store (number of engineers, architects, intellectuals, etc.)

Memo from the head of the South African Military Intelligence Service to the head of the South African Defence Force on security concerning South African personnel, families, documents, information and projects in Israel.

List of propaganda measures to be carried out by the Moldavian Academy of Sciences and various institutions in order to counter Romanian nationalist propaganda.

The Moldavian Academy of Sciences reports on its decisions to counteract Romanian propaganda which contained "interpretations of a nationalist spirit appear, [as well as] misrepresentations of a series of key-problems tied to the history of Romania, to Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations, to the falsification of the so-called 'Bessarabian question,' to the history of the liberation of Romania by the Soviet Army, etc."

Both parties discuss the detection of and preparation for a surprise nuclear rocket attack by the USA on socialist countries, the intentions of the main hostile countries- the USA, other NATO countries, the People’s Republic of China- and cooperation to fight ideological diversion from hostile countries and emigrant populations. The two also agree to economic, tourism and cultural exchanges.

This analysis focuses on the state of European security cooperation, discussing both common defense and coordination of military production. It criticizes the lack of unity, complexity of the current configuration, and its negative impact on transatlantic relations.

A description of measures taken by the military leadership of FMNL to improve the organized struggle in Central America, in terms of creating opportunities for large-scale operations intended to lead to the ultimate defeat of the enemy – the government-supported army of El Salvador. The information was compiled based on sources of the Vietnamese Embassy in Havana, and with the cooperation of the Cuban comrades. According to the document, a decision was made to regroup military units from small squads to battalions and brigades. Following this course, the partisan movements earned considerable success in 1984, but their actions easy to trace due to the size of the new formations. As a result the Front’s combat units, hospitals and supply bases suffered severe blows. The situation at hand required that FMNL reassess its strategy and make important changes in accord with the anticipated victory of the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua and that of Reagan in the US. The document states that FMNL’s leadership switched its strategic and tactical line and reverted to armed struggle conducted by small mobile squads. This change aided the suppression of the government armed forces’ offensive.

A catalog of indicators of NATO preparation for nuclear war that were monitored by Warsaw Pact intelligence services under Project RYaN. The activity is divided into the following areas: political and military, activities of intelligence services, civil defense, and economic.

Letter from Cuban leader Fidel Castro the President of the International Olympic Committee Juan Antonio Samaranch on the 1988 Seoul Olympics

Conversation between US and Angolan officials about the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola.

Letter from Juan Antonio Samaranch, President of the International Olympic Committee, to Cuban leader Fidel Castro on the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul