Report describing China's subversive actions against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan.

Report explains the previously waning influence of Soviet officers on the Polish military, discussing their housing, decreasing size and role in the Polish armed forces.

Karmal describes threats against the Soviet-backed Afghan government from Pakistan, Iran, the US, China, and Egypt.

Honecker and Karmal discuss East German support for Afghanistan, as well as threats against Afghanistan, especially from West German and Pakistan.

An assessment was made of a mutual exchange of vacationers for the next five years. Both sides exchanges experience about this problem area and discussed prospects for an exchange between 1982 and 1985.

Memo to President Figueiredo dealing with the arrest and inadequate treatment applied to three employees of Mendes Jr., a Brazilian company operating in civil construction projects in Iraq, and efforts—mostly frustrated—by Brazilian diplomats to resolve the issue.

A planned update of the Special National Intelligence Estimate 31-32/81 concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear program was continuing and new evidence suggested a “significant” Chinese role in the design of the weapons. Despite this new evidence, CIA estimates suggest that the required amount of fissile material for weapons production would not be available as early as had been predicted, and that a Pakistani nuclear test was not imminent.

Discusses issues related to upholding Sino-Soviet relations, to maintaining an active foreign policy with socialist and capitalist countries, and touching on issues related to various socialist countries at the time.

Record of conversation between Mikhail S. Kapitsa, the head of the First Far Eastern Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and D. Yondon, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Mongolian People's Republic. They discuss foreign relations with China, Japan and North Korea. They also discuss the current situation in Vietnam, India and Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

A summary of U.S. State Department cable traffic regarding Pakistan’s nuclear efforts in 1981-1982. While the Reagan administration was inclined to give Pakistan some leeway in light of their support for anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology from abroad was still something that the administration was against. Evidence that Pakistan had made efforts, some successful, to acquire specific technology that suggested a nuclear test was being prepared raised a red flag in the U.S. government

This massively excised report indicates the Agency’s strong views about releasing its knowledge of India’s nuclear weapons activities, even when the information is decades old. That many of the pages are classified “Top Secret Umbra” suggests that some of the information draws on communications intelligence intercepts, another highly sensitive matter.

With proliferation becoming a “greater threat to US interests over the next five years,” intelligence analysts believed that the “disruptive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater threat to the United States.” While the estimators saw “low potential” for terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons, the likelihood of terrorist/extortionist hoaxes was on the upswing. Significant portions of the NIE are excised, especially the estimate of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and its impact in the Middle East. Nevertheless, much information remains on the countries of greatest concern: Iraq and Libya in the Near East, India and Pakistan in South Asia, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, and the Republic of South Africa, as well as those of lesser concern: Iran, Egypt, Taiwan and the two Koreas.

The KGB of Ukraine provides a report to Shcherbitsky about the success of the agent "Michael," a US citizen, who has been providing the with information on US technology for thermal protection in missiles which the USSR intends to use in the development of its own missiles.

A report to the State Department from Ambassador General Vernon Walters on his meeting with President Zia, where he confronted the Pakistani President with “incontrovertible evidence” that his country had “transferred designs and specifications for nuclear weapons components to purchasing agents in several countries for the purpose of having these nuclear weapons components fabricated for Pakistan” despite promises not to do so. Zia denied the charge, and Walter later commented, “either he really does not know or is the most superb and patriotic liar I have ever met.”

After Ambassador General Vernon Walters’ second day meeting with President Zia, the Pakistani leader verbally acknowledged U.S. evidence that Pakistan sought nuclear weapons components from abroad despite promises not to do so. However, Zia refused to put this in writing, and in a letter to President Reagan claimed the U.S. intelligence was a “total fabrication,” likely in an effort to save face.

Short summary of a conversation between the Hungarian ambassador to Moscow and Oleg Rakhmanin on China and its possible attempts to split the Eastern bloc countries, especially its warming relations with East Germany.

This memorandum comments on the report of the Hungarian ambassador to Iraq and states that Iraq’s weakening status might negatively affect Hungary, but that Hungary’s ordinary and “special” trade relations had increased.

A source claims that a former employee of the Iranian secret service is cooperating with the United States and is "active in West Berlin."