Memorandum from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency suggests that the prospects for dissuading a Pakistani nuclear test were dimming and suggests possible U.S. responses should detonate a device.

Reagan writes to South African Prime Minister R. F. "Pik" Botha regarding his meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, Pieter W. Botha (no relation). Reagan expresses hope that relations between the two countries will be more cooperative in the future, and states that although the Nambia issue has complicated that relationship, it "can also be an opportunity to help stem the growth of Soviet influence in the region."

This NSC memo examines some of the legal aspects of the raid. It states that the administration should determine “[W]hether a substantial violation has occurred”, as this would reflect on the delivery of Israel’s F-16 jets.

Indian diplomats speculated at the time that the suspension of the delivery of the F-16 jets was potentially a U.S. gesture of goodwill toward Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, aimed at appeasing him and keeping the embryonic peace process with Israel alive.

ACDA Director-Designate Eugene Rostow explains his pro-Israel stance, and argues that Israel should be given an exemption from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.

The Israelis were concerned and disappointed by the administration’s initial response to the raid, which consisted of a freeze on the shipment of F-16 jets to Israel until a legal review was conducted. The Israeli ambassador to Washington conveyed this sentiment to President Reagan in a meeting on 11 June 1980 in this telegram.

This document outlines Haig's proposed political strategy, which was approved by Reagan on 12 June, and was constructed around the notion of red lines: Washington would harshly condemn Israel but would also “draw the line on punishment” by Israel.

National Security Advisor Richard V. Allen informed Reagan that the administration was “not required to make a legal determination on whether Israel violated U.S. law” and commented that the issue of the raid was “to be treated as a political rather than a legal question.”

Following Lewis’ cable, and the realization that the raid should have been at least somewhat anticipated, the administration opted to develop a more restrained, sober approach towards Israel, constructing what was termed a “political strategy for responding to Israeli attack”.

This report by the Hungarian Embassy in Egypt describes the Egyptian government's surprise at the Israeli bombing of the Osirak nuclear site in Iraq in 1981 and concludes that peace in the region must come through international cooperation and conferences.

Memorandum from Max Hugel to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of National Security. The document details the conflict between several high military officials. It also mentions several places where Soviet military servicemen are incorporated into the Polish army.

Memorandum highlighting recent developments in countries of Central Latin America. The information has been received from the Nicaraguan Ambassador to Bulgaria, after a visit to Budapest where he has met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua. The document summarizes political developments that have taken place in the following countries: El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.

Discussion of conversation between Brezhnev and Kania regarding the counterrevolution and other matters.

A U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research report offers an overview of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs, and speculates how the development of a weapon in one country could strain relations with Washington and lead to a regional nuclear arms race. India is less likely to take preventive action against Pakistan because of the risk of “antagonizing China,” the report suggests.

The Chinese Communist Party assesses the legacy and shortcomings of Mao Zedong, criticizes the Cultural Revolution, and calls for Party unity going forward.

Translation of an agenda from the meeting of Polish National Defense Committee of June 19, 1981 involving the Ministry of Internal Affairs, National Defense, and the Defense Industry Commission.

This memorandum summarizes Iraqi-Hungarian relations since 1958, including the fact that Iraq is Hungary's largest trading partner in the developing world.

Report discusses contingency plans for implementing martial law, but only in relation to the possibility of extremist resistance from organizations such as Solidarnosc (Solidarity) and KOR (Workers Defense Committee).

This document reveals much disagreement between Soviet policy makers. Cheremnykh, Chief Military Adviser Mayorov, and N. A. Nur, Karmal’s deputy disagree over the responsbility to the armed forces.