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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • September 22, 1983

    Letter by the Chairman of the SPD, Brandt, to the General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU, Andropov

    Brandt's letter to Secretary Andropov on the counterbalancing missiles with Western Europe. Brandt suggests Andropov taking steps towards fulfilling the ideals of the Geneva Conference.

  • September 28, 1983

    Hungarian Embassy in India, Ciphered Telegram, 28 September 1983. Subject: Indian views about the Korean Workers’ Party.

    Indian-North Korean relations are the subject of this telegram, with attention paid to the Indian Communist Party's views on the North Korean Worker's Party. The cult of personality, autarkic economic policy and Juche ideology provide many points of misgiving from the point of view of the Indians.

  • October, 1983

    Evolution of the deployment of Soviet intermediate missiles

    An exhaustive memo on the deployment of the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces from 1977 to 1983.

  • October, 1983

    Memorandum comparing the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces and the Anglo – French forces capable of reaching the Soviet Union.

    A comparison between the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces and the Anglo – French system capable of reaching the Soviet Union. The memo uses data to demonstrate that the Soviet INF outnumbered by far NATO nuclear forces.

  • October, 1983

    Memorandum on Geneva INF negotiations and East-West dialogue, with particular focus on Italian-Soviet relations.

    A memo about the relationship between Italy and the Soviet Union during the Geneva negotiations. It suggests some steps that Italy should undertake to keep alive the East-West dialogue and to preserve Italian economic interests.

  • October 03, 1983

    V. Chebrikov, 'On Measures to Improve Preventive Work Conducted by the State Security Service'

    Reports from the Committee for States Security (KGB) of the USSR discuss how agents should go about preventative work and educating workers on socialist ideology.

  • October 03, 1983

    V. Chebrikov, 'Order of the Chairman of the State Security Committee of the USSR, Moscow, regarding Measures To Improve The Preventive Work Conducted By The State Security Services'

  • October 03, 1983

    Ministry of State Security (Stasi), 'Notes on Statements made by Comrade Colonel General Kryuchkov'

    These notes describe statements made by Colonel General Kryuchkov which outline the current state of Soviet institutions and intelligence networks in various regions, including Western Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the United States.

  • October 03, 1983

    Letter of the Collegium of the KGB of the USSR, 'Regarding Measures to Improve the Preventive Work conducted by the State Security Services'

  • October 14, 1983

    Telex from the East German Embassy in Romania to Bucharest, 14 October 1983

    Summary of Romanian position on the Euromissiles Crisis presented at October 1983 summit and also shared with the United States via a letter from Nicolae Ceauşescu to President Ronald Reagan.The Ceauşescu – Reagan letter underscored that: (1) Romania did not approve of the Soviet missile deployments; (2) noted that Romania would only participate in defense operations, and specified that it would carefully consider the nature of the call for assistance by fellow alliance members before sending its troops outside of Romanian territory; (3) stressed that the Romanian Armed Forces were fully under national control, giving several specific details on how this was guaranteed; and (4) explicitly noted that Romania did not and would not ever host nuclear missiles on its territory, whether from the Soviet Union or the United States.

  • October 20, 1983

    Protocol of the extraordinary meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Defense from the Warsaw Treaty member states

    The Warsaw Treaty Member States' Committee of Ministers for Defense discussed the situation resulting from the deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles in some Western European countries. Some general military planning was proposed in response.

  • October 20, 1983

    Statement by CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, at the extraordinary session of the Committee of Defense Ministers of Warsaw Treaty Member States on 20 October 1983 [in Berlin]

    CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov make a statement to Warsaw Treaty member states addressing the decision by the US and NATO to deploy new American medium-range missiles in Europe. He appeals for improvement of the Unified Forces.

  • October 21, 1983

    Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 93-83, 'Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints'

    Brazilian nationalism has often posed a challenge to US official precepts on the way the world should work and these estimates convey the deep Brasilia-Washington gap over nuclear policy during the 1980s. The SNIEs from 1983 and the 1985 update emphasize Brazil’s quest for technological-industrial autonomy which in nuclear terms meant developing an indigenous program to master the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In seeking those objectives, Brazil did not want to face any constraints, and its leaders were unresponsive to U.S. or other pressures for safeguards on nuclear facilities.

  • October 22, 1983

    South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) President Sam Nujoma's visit to Bulgaria, October 1983

    Notes on a visit by the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) to Bulgaria in October 1983. The delegation included Namibian politician Sam Nujoma, who discussed the struggle for Namibian independence from South Africa.

  • October 28, 1983

    Memorandum on the Ottawa meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group

    Some reflections on the outcome of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Ottawa. The Italian government praised the NATO resolution to keep the INF at a minimum level of deterrence, while critiquing the Soviet refusal to compromise.

  • October 28, 1983

    José Eduardo dos Santos to Fidel Castro

    José Eduardo dos Santos was the president of Angola.

  • October 28, 1983

    Agreement between Cuba and Angola, 'Acuerdo Especial sobre las Condiciones Generales para la Realización de la Colaboración Económica y Científico-Técnica entre el Gobierno de la República de Cuba y el Gobierno de la República Popular de Angola'

    Protocol on Cuba's technical assistance to Angola.

  • November, 1983

    Translation of a letter from Nicolae Ceausescu to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl about Euromissiles

    A letter from Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu to Helmut Kohl. Ceausescu makes some suggestions to ease the Geneva negotiations: the Warsaw Pact could accept “not taking into account the UK and French missiles”: the German government could “postpone the deployment [of the Intermediate missiles] to the end of 1984 or the beginning of 1985”; or the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries should organize a conference “to discuss the issue of the Intermediate Range Missiles”.

  • November, 1983

    Plan of Cooperation of the1st Main Directorate of the USSR KGB and the 1st Directorate of the CSSR FMVD in Work Against China for the period 1984-1988

    Cooperative agreement for the two intelligence agencies to work together to combat anti-Soviet Chinese propaganda.

  • November, 1983

    A. Ross Johnson, 'Political Leadership in Yugoslavia: Evolution of the League of Communists' [Abridged Version; Declassified March 6, 2003]

    This November 1983 RAND Report examines the dynamics of political leadership and prospects for leadership stability in post-Tito Yugoslavia. It analyzes the evolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) since the late 1960s and the enhanced role of its constituent republican and provincial LCY organizations. It traces the devolution of power within the LCY that resulted in decentralized leadership authority and decision-making based on interregional consensus. It recommends shifting appraisals of the Yugoslav leadership from the federal to the republican/provincial level. (The full May 2013 version of the Report and a second declassified release of the abridged version are referenced as Related Documents.)