Brazilian nationalism has often posed a challenge to US official precepts on the way the world should work and these estimates convey the deep Brasilia-Washington gap over nuclear policy during the 1980s. The SNIEs from 1983 and the 1985 update emphasize Brazil’s quest for technological-industrial autonomy which in nuclear terms meant developing an indigenous program to master the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In seeking those objectives, Brazil did not want to face any constraints, and its leaders were unresponsive to U.S. or other pressures for safeguards on nuclear facilities.

Notes on a visit by the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) to Bulgaria in October 1983. The delegation included Namibian politician Sam Nujoma, who discussed the struggle for Namibian independence from South Africa.

Some reflections on the outcome of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Ottawa. The Italian government praised the NATO resolution to keep the INF at a minimum level of deterrence, while critiquing the Soviet refusal to compromise.

José Eduardo dos Santos was the president of Angola.

Protocol on Cuba's technical assistance to Angola.

A letter from Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu to Helmut Kohl. Ceausescu makes some suggestions to ease the Geneva negotiations: the Warsaw Pact could accept “not taking into account the UK and French missiles”: the German government could “postpone the deployment [of the Intermediate missiles] to the end of 1984 or the beginning of 1985”; or the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries should organize a conference “to discuss the issue of the Intermediate Range Missiles”.

Cooperative agreement for the two intelligence agencies to work together to combat anti-Soviet Chinese propaganda.

This November 1983 RAND Report examines the dynamics of political leadership and prospects for leadership stability in post-Tito Yugoslavia. It analyzes the evolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) since the late 1960s and the enhanced role of its constituent republican and provincial LCY organizations. It traces the devolution of power within the LCY that resulted in decentralized leadership authority and decision-making based on interregional consensus. It recommends shifting appraisals of the Yugoslav leadership from the federal to the republican/provincial level. (The full May 2013 version of the Report and a second declassified release of the abridged version are referenced as Related Documents.)

This November 1983 RAND Report examines the dynamics of political leadership and prospects for leadership stability in post-Tito Yugoslavia. It analyzes the evolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) since the late 1960s and the enhanced role of its constituent republican and provincial LCY organizations. It traces the devolution of power within the LCY that resulted in decentralized leadership authority and decision-making based on interregional consensus. It recommends shifting appraisals of the Yugoslav leadership from the federal to the republican/provincial level. (The full May 2013 version of the Report and a first declassified release of the abridged version are referenced as Related Documents.)

The diplomatic relations between North Korea and Ethiopia is the subject of this telegram. The quick responsive stance of both Koreas to Ethiopia's needs is noted.

This report describes conversations with Comrade Kryuchkov, coving a multitude of subjects, but delving briefly into the problem of "prevention of a surprise nuclear attack" (RYAN). Kryuchkov responded that this issue is being continually worked on, but no central decisions had been made as of yet.

This memo to Prime Minister Bettino Craxi argues against the merging of the INF and START negotiations proposed by the Finnish government and backed by Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau. The memo suggests that the proposal could jeopardize the Geneva talks and harm European interests.

A memo to Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi from his Diplomatic Counselor Antonio Badini. Badini warns against the latest Soviet proposals. He suggests that agreeing to them without making any concessions regarding the deployment of American missiles would be tantamount to the realization of a long term goal of the Soviet Union, i.e. the decoupling between the Western European and the American defense system. […] He writes that the Soviet proposals “can be taken as a possible basis for an agreement is surprising. We can only hope that this fact does not imply that, from a political and psychological standpoint, the process of Finlandization of Europe is far more advanced than we believed thus far.”

Argentinian President Bignone informs Figueiredo of the Argentine capacity to enrich uranium.

In his answer to Argentinian President Bignone, Brazilian President João Batista Figueiredo expresses satisfaction for the result achieved by the neighbor country.

East German representatives proposed the formation of a permanent consultation group of socialist countries to coordinate international policy and propaganda.

Italian Ambassador to Washington, Rinaldo Petrignani, volunteers his views on the interruption of the INF negotiations, and their possible relaunch. He states that Italy's firm and coherent position vis-à-vis the missile debate has improved its standing internationally, and highlights the crucial importance of maintaining strong transatlantic relations.

This report is part of a wide documentation prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the meeting of the Atlantic Council in Brussels in December 1983. A central theme is the installation of the INF in Western Europe and the consequent interruption of the INF treaty negotiations in Geneva by the USSR.