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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • September 27, 1950

    Telegram from Matveyev (Razuvayev V.N.) to Stalin

    Matveyev describes the state of the Korean People’s Army, particularly the severe status of troops in Seoul and Busan after having encountered American air and ground forces. Matveyev also reports on a meeting between several Soviet and Korean foreign ministers in which Kim Il Sung assumed the tasks of both Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Defense Minister and ordered the deployment of troops northward. Matveyev also outlines the steps he plans to take as a Soviet envoy in aiding the desperate Korean army.

  • September 27, 1950

    Telegram from Feng Xi (Stalin) to Matveyev (Razuvayev V.N.) and T.F. Shtykov

    Stalin blames the recent success of the UN forces in Seoul on the inefficiency of the KPA’s Frontline Command and Soviet military advisors, as well erroneous use of tank tactics and overall combat strategy. Stalin provides a detailed list instructing military advisors, and especially Vasilyev, how to delpoy and manage Korean troops around Seoul.

  • September 28, 1950

    Telegram, from Gromyko to Stalin, Transmitting Letter from Kim Il Sung to Stalin

    Kim Il Sung expresses his gratitude. In his telegram Gromyko informs Stalin of other letters from Kim Il Sung concerning the training of 120 Korean pilots in the Soviet Union, the supply of cars to the DPRK, the four advisors to North Korea's Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the wages of the air force cadets of the People's Army who are training in the Soviet Union.

  • September 28, 1950

    Ciphered Telegram from Gromyko to Vyshisnky in New York

    Gromyko asks Vyshinsky to get Tsarapkin to inform American intermediary Lancaster that Malik has agreed to the meeting. Malik must hear out the Americans and if it seems that they're willing to work towards a peaceful resolution, tell Lancaster that any questions that the Americans had during this discussion will be answered in the next meeting.

  • September 29, 1950

    Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Ni Zhiliang

    China approves of Kim Il Sung's request to build warehouses and factories in China and Korea and agrees to recruit Korean drivers for him in the northeast.

  • September 29, 1950

    Telegram from Shtykov to Gromyko and Stalin

    Shtykov gives an insider’s report of a meeting with Kim Il Sung and Pak Heon-yeong, in which they discussed the current desperate state of the KPA, possible advancement of the US forces over the 38th parallel and the extent of the enemy’s knowledge of Soviet Union deliveries to North Korea. Kim asks for advice concerning the appeal for military aid that the Political Council of the Worker’s Party of Korea plans to send to Stalin. Shytkov comments on the nervousness and desperation of the Korean officials.

  • September 29, 1950

    Ciphered Telegram from DPRK leader Kim Il Sung and South Korean Communist Leader Pak Heon-yeong to Stalin (via Shtykov)

    Telegram from Kim Il Sung and Pak Heon-yeong telling Stalin of the losses they have incurred following American air and ground attacks in South Korea and of their general lack of supplies and trained personnel.

  • September 30, 1950

    Draft Telegram from Chanfu (Bulganin) to Matveyev (Razuvayev)

    A response to Matveyev’s previous telegram approving the consolidation of power (as Supreme Commander in Chief and Defense Minister) to Kim Il Sung, the formation of six divisions, transport of ammunitions and fuel. Bulganin also unofficially advocates Kim’s plans to request aid from China.

  • September 30, 1950

    Ciphered Telegram, from Kim Il Sung and Pak Heon-Yeong to Stalin (via Shtykov)

    Telegram from Kim Il Sung and Pak Heon-yeong telling Stalin of the losses they have incurred following American air and ground attacks in South Korea and of their general lack of supplies and trained personnel.

  • September 30, 1950

    Memorandum from Gromyko to Stalin, 30 September 1950, with draft cable from Gromyko to Shtykov

    A message from Gromyko to Stalin relaying the assessment of Shtykov that it would be prudent for the Soviet Union to withdraw some nonessential embassy personnel and specialists from North Korea. Gromyko advises that withdrawals should be considered only in consultation with North Korea and the appropriate Soviet ministeries.

  • September 30, 1950

    Ciphered Telegram, Shtykov to Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Instantsia (Stalin)

    Telegram from Shtykov to Gromyko and Stalin reporting the dire circumstances into which the North Koreans had fallen in the wake of the Incheon landings. Mentioned is a correspondence between the North Koreans and Mao which hinted at possible Chinese aid.

  • October 01, 1950

    Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Kim Il Sung

    China advises Kim Il Sung to have the North Korean armies retreat north of the 38th parallel as quickly as possible after the First Front Army was cut off by the opposing side.

  • October 01, 1950

    Ciphered Telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai (via Roshchin)

    Telegram from Stalin to Mao and Zhou Enlai asking that they consider moving 5-6 divisions of Chinese volunteers to the China-DPRK border in order to give the North Koreans cover under which to reorganize their troops. Stalin explicitly states that he will not mention this idea to the North Koreans.

  • October 01, 1950

    Telegram from Feng Xi (Stalin) to Soviet Officials in Pyongyang, 1 October 1950

    Stalin cables his chief political and military representatives in Pyongyang in response to messages relating the increasingly dire situation in Korea as North Korean forces were driven back across the 38th parallel. Stalin demands that they establish defenses along the 38th parallel to prevent further American advance and even go on the offensive by organizing “guerrilla warfare” in the south behind enemy lines.

  • October 02, 1950

    Telegram from Chanfu (Bulganin) to Matveyev (Razuvayev)

    Bulganin stresses to Razuvayev the importance of the withdrawal of the Korean troops “by all means” toward the north, in order to rescue the Soviet cadres.

  • October 02, 1950

    Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Ni Zhiliang

    Zhou Enlai notifies Ambassador Ni Zhiliang about the estimated arrival of Pak Il-u and advises Kim Il Sung to order the troops that were cut off by the opposing side and have no way to retreat to persist in guerrilla actions where they are.

  • October 02, 1950

    Cable, from Chan-Fu to Matveev

    Cable stating that orders to retreat by any means possible (in groups, or individually) must be given out immediately to the remaining soldiers and commanders in the South.

  • October 03, 1950

    Ciphered Telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Filippov (Stalin)

    Telegram to Stalin from the Soviet Army General Staff on combats with the US.

  • October 04, 1950

    Cable, Zhou Enlai to Gao Gang, He Jinnian, and Ni Zhiliang

    Zhou Enlai gives instructions on the mobilization of Korean drivers in the northeast.

  • October 04, 1950

    Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Ni Zhiliang

    Zhou Enlai instructs the Chinese military officer observation group not to go south of the 38th parallel, but to split into two groups and examine the situations of different areas of Korea.