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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • May 04, 1973

    Telegram from the First Directorate to Moscow, Budapest, Prague, Warsaw, Berlin, Tirana, Belgrade, Sofia, Beijing, Ulan Bator, Hanoi, Pyongyang, Havana, Analysis Division, No.01/04595

    A Romanian diplomat reports that socialist countries around the world have given their support to North Korea's demands to abolish the UN Commission for the Unification and Reconstruction of Korea. In addition, many socialist nations supported an end to all foreign intervention on the DPRK.

  • May 05, 1973

    Telegram from the First Directorate to Washington, DC, No.01/04493

    North Korea asks Romania to forward a letter to the president of the US Senate, Spiro T. Agnew, and separately, the Speaker of the House, Carl Albert. The letter, adopted by the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly, will request the US to withdraw its forces from the Korean Peninsula, terminate military aid to South Korea, and dismantle the UN Commission for the Unification and Reconstruction of Korea.

  • May 14, 1973

    Telegram from Beijing, No.059.484, Urgent, SECRET

    Pyongyang forwards ideas for exchange of commerce, people and goods between North and South Korea. These include bringing surplus labor in the South to work in North Korea, jointly creating irrigation system using North Korean expertise, etc. However, South Korea remains distrustful of the motives of North Korea.

  • June 07, 1973

    Telegram from Washington, DC, No.084.504, Urgent, SECRET

    Romanian official in the US warns Bucharest that relaying the letter from the DPRK to US public officials in the manner requested by Pyongyang may damage Romanian relations with the US. The official recommends a more normal procedure recommended to him by US officials and suggests convincing the North Koreans to follow a different method of sending its message to US congress.

  • June 07, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 061.224

    Popa notes the rift between the two Koreas since the North-South joint declaration in 1972 as Seoul considers North Korea's attempts to join organizations where South Korea is already a member as a means to undermine its authority.

  • June 16, 1973

    Telegram to Pyongyang from First Directorate, SECRET, No. 01/08463, Flash

    Romanian officials relay the message from UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim regarding permanent observers from the DPRK to the UN. The telegram notes that Waldheim will offer his support to the North Korean observers and that obtaining visas to the US will not be difficult.

  • June 16, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.238, Urgent, SECRET

    Romanian officials report on the third session of the North-South Coordination Committee (NSCC) in Seoul. Due to differences in each side's ideas on cross-border cooperation and the organization of NSCC, the meeting ended without notable accomplishments. Both sides blame each other for espousing two separate Koreas.

  • June 19, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang , No.061.240, Urgent, SECRET

    The North Koreans follow Romanian advice and allow the submission of their letter to Congress through the US State Department.

  • June 25, 1973

    Telegram from Beijing, No.059.658, Urgent, SECRET

    Romanian official comments on statements made by Premier Zhou Enlai that appeared on China's Renmin Ribao. The official notes that Zhou does not condition Sino-American relations on US withdrawal from South Korea, Taiwan and South Vietnam. In fact, the official comments how Taiwan is overlooked and withdrawal of US troops from Korea is characterized as a request from Kim Il Sung.

  • June 26, 1973

    Telegram from Washington, DC, No.084.605, Urgent, SECRET

    Romanian officials in Washington report that they submitted the letter from the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly, intended for the US congress, to the US State Department. The US official in contact with the Romanians described North Korea's attitudes towards the joint accession of the two Koreas to the UN as unrealistic.

  • June 29, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.253, Urgent, SECRET

    North Korean officials blame pressure from Japan and the US as reasons why South Korean representatives are not receptive to the North's proposals in the North-South Coordination Committee meetings. The official believes that Seoul is attempting to slow down negotiations with Pyongyang because South Korea is unstable. Pyongyang worries that Seoul's plan for joint accession to the US will enshrine the division on the peninsula.

  • July 31, 1973

    Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 091.722, Normal

    Romanians note that the Chinese are worried about the possible vacuum left behind on the Korean Peninsula if the US withdraws from South Korea. The telegram notes that the Chinese will not oppose continued US presence in South Korea even after the dissolution of the UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

  • August, 1973

    Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note, No. 01/010123/73, Secret

    Romanian official reports on the progress of the 6 year plan and the intensive industrial and agricultural projects taking place around North Korea. Alongside improvements in the living standards of the Korean people, the report also notes Pyongyang's efforts to strengthen the military capabilities of the state. The document also mentions rise in food price since 1971, North Korea's support for revolutionary movements in Asia and North Korea's plans for the ascension of a single Korean state to the UN.

  • August, 1973

    Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note, No. 01/010124/73, Secret

    The document outlines Romania's position regarding the issue of unification of the Korean Peninsula. After a summary of inter-Korean negotiations thus far, the report concludes that the two Koreas are moving very slowly because both sides are attempting to gain advantage over the other. Nonetheless, Romania declares its firm support of the DPRK.

  • August 29, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.360, Urgent, SECRET

    The document mentions a forthcoming North Korean condemnation of Kim Dae-jung's abduction in Tokyo by KCIA agents. The author states that the declaration will ask Lee Hu-rak to be removed from co-presidency of the North-South Coordination Committee. Pyongyang seeks Romanian support in publicizing the North Korean position.

  • October 27, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang, SECRET, No.061482, Urgent

    Popa notes Kim Yeong-nam's concern regarding interference of the USSR and USA in the Yom Kippur/October War as a source of a wider conflict, contrary to the optimism expressed by the North Korean leadership.

  • October 30, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang, SECRET, No.061487, Urgent

    Soviet officials note their dissatisfaction towards the state of relations between the USSR and the DPRK. According to the Soviets, the exchange of delegations between the two countries is at an all time low, but they expect their relationship to improve in the next year. A similar "tenuous" relationship is observed between the PRC and the DPRK.

  • November 03, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 061.497

    Following the end of the inter-Korean dialogue, Zhivkov observes increased antagonism in the rhetoric of the North Koreans regarding unification paralleling the increasing tension between the two Koreas.

  • November 15, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061.465, Urgent

    The document describes several gatherings of Korean People's Army corps in Pyongyang where military leaders presented a report underlying the necessity of increasing the level of technical and combat preparedness of the army. The author observes how the rhetoric of driving out "American imperialists" and unifying the peninsula had reappeared in North Korea.

  • November 26, 1973

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 61.530

    The telegram highlights the new South Korean effort to normalize relations with China and the USSR. Both Soviet and Chinese officials reject the overture from South Korea.