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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • May 25, 1975

    Rajya Sabha Q&A on Chinese Nuclear Tests

    Transcript of questions and answers between members of the Rajya Sabha and the Prime Minister and Minister of Atomic Affairs on the evidence, frequency, and course of action regarding Chinese nuclear missile tests.

  • July 02, 1975

    Letter, L. N. Ray, High Commissioner of India, Wellington, 'French Nuclear Test'

    France conducted a nuclear test on the South Pacific atoll which New Zealand criticized.

  • October 12, 1976

    Intelligence Community Staff, Director of Performance Evaluation and Improvement, to Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, 'Nuclear Proliferation and the Intelligence Community'

    As this report indicates, the recommendations made in the 1974 post-mortem of the Indian nuclear test failure had little impact. The authors identified a basic disconnect between “national level users”—-the top policymakers-—and those who “set analytical and collection priorities in the intelligence community.” The latter were not sure how high a priority that the policymakers had given to nuclear proliferation intelligence. Moreover, a study for the Defense Department produced by MIT chemistry professor (and future DCI) John Deutch questioned whether the intelligence community “is adequately focused and tasked on proliferation matters.” This would be a recurring problem for the CIA and other intelligence agencies.

  • June 27, 1977

    Telegram from A. Madhavan, Joint Secretary (AMS)

    Argentina and Brazil engaged in different nuclear policies: Argentina has gone for the heavy water reactor, while Brazil has gone for light water reactor

  • October 24, 1977

    Telegram from K. V. Rajan, First Secretary (Pol), 'Agha Shahi’s meeting with [Cyrus] Vance'

    Reported comments by Agha Shahi’s on relations with the United States, India, and nuclear weapons.

  • July 31, 1978

    Prime Minister Morarji Desai's Testimony on the Decision to not Pursue Further Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

    Transcript of Prime Minister Shri Morarji Desai's testimony before Rajya Sabha on the decision to no longer conduct peaceful nuclear explosions and to focus on more peaceful purposes.

  • August 17, 1978

    Prime Minister, Morarji Desai's Statement on the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    Transcript of Prime Minister Shri Morarji R. Desai's speech to the Rajya Sabha on the reasoning behind India's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the United States

  • December 21, 1978

    Rajya Sabha Q&A on the Nuclear Explosion at Pokhran in 1974

    Transcript of questions and answers between members of the Rajya Sabha and the Prime Minister, Shri Morarji Desai, on whether the Pokhran atomic explosion in 1974 was used for peaceful purposes and how it affects India's standing with other nuclear powers.

  • December, 1979

    Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2013 Release]

    This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2013 release (which is currently under appeal) includes some information from a “Secret Test by Others” (Pakistan, India) and the map on page 12 that had not been released before.

  • December, 1979

    Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2004 Release]

    This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2004 version, in some instances, contains more information through page 10 than the 2013 version.

  • April 09, 1981

    Special Assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al, 'Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation'

    Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.

  • June 25, 1981

    Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'India-Pakistani Views on a Nuclear Weapons Option and Potential Repercussions'

    A U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research report offers an overview of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs, and speculates how the development of a weapon in one country could strain relations with Washington and lead to a regional nuclear arms race. India is less likely to take preventive action against Pakistan because of the risk of “antagonizing China,” the report suggests.

  • November 27, 1981

    Telegram No.: MEX/104/1/81, Secretary Haig’s Visit to Mexico (November 23-24)

    The US ratified additional protocol I to the Treaty of Tlateloco for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

  • January 26, 1982

    Report, Permanent Mission of Hungary to the International Organizations in Vienna to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Report on a conversation with Indian Ambassador Dalal. Topics discussed include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, India and Pakistan's nuclear programs, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the upcoming election of a new Executive Director.

  • July, 1982

    Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Assessment,'India’s Nuclear Program: Energy and Weapons'

    This massively excised report indicates the Agency’s strong views about releasing its knowledge of India’s nuclear weapons activities, even when the information is decades old. That many of the pages are classified “Top Secret Umbra” suggests that some of the information draws on communications intelligence intercepts, another highly sensitive matter.

  • July, 1982

    National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-4-82, 'Nuclear Proliferation Trends Through 1987'

    With proliferation becoming a “greater threat to US interests over the next five years,” intelligence analysts believed that the “disruptive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater threat to the United States.” While the estimators saw “low potential” for terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons, the likelihood of terrorist/extortionist hoaxes was on the upswing. Significant portions of the NIE are excised, especially the estimate of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and its impact in the Middle East. Nevertheless, much information remains on the countries of greatest concern: Iraq and Libya in the Near East, India and Pakistan in South Asia, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, and the Republic of South Africa, as well as those of lesser concern: Iran, Egypt, Taiwan and the two Koreas.

  • December, 1982

    Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States'

    This CIA report on India, “India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States,” has comparatively few excisions. It discusses in some detail Indian efforts to support its nuclear power and nuclear weapons development program by circumventing international controls through purchases of sensitive technology on “gray markets.” The report depicts a “growing crisis in the Indian civil nuclear program,” which combined with meeting nuclear weapons development goals, was forcing India to expand imports of nuclear-related supplies. The purchasing activities posed a “direct challenge to longstanding US efforts to work with other supplier nations … for tighter export controls.”

  • February 17, 1984

    Hugh Montgomery, director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, to Ambassador Ronald Spiers, Enclosing 'India-Pakistan: Pressures for Nuclear Proliferation,' Report 778-AR

    A memorandum from Hugh Montgomery, The Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department to Ambassador Ronald Spiers discussing Indian and Pakistani nuclear proliferation. The Director details tensions between Pakistan and India, potential actions by India to stop a Pakistani nuclear program, and the influence of outside actors such as the USSR, China, and the United States.

  • August 13, 1985

    Ciphered Telegram No. 214, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Information on the current status of both Pakistan and India's nuclear programs. The opinion of Indian Vice President Venkataraman is that Pakistan is lying about having already completed an atomic bomb.

  • August 13, 1985

    Ciphered Telegram No. 213, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Report on the status of the Indian nuclear program from Soviet sources. India may be preparing for an atomic bomb test.