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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • November 25, 1950

    CC CPSU decision with approved directives to Foreign Minister Vyshinsky and to Soviet Ambassador in Washington

    Soviet responses to the American installation of Japanese servicemen in Korea.

  • November 28, 1950

    Letter from General MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea

    General MacArthur reports from Tokyo on developments in Korea, stating that the Chinese military support to North Korea was increasing.

  • November 29, 1950

    Telegram from Shtykov to the USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

    Telegram from the Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK to the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR about Sino-Korean talks about the trip of chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK to China.

  • November 30, 1950

    Prince Talal in Beirut

    Short report regarding details of Prince Talal's visit to Beirut.

  • November 30, 1950

    Jordanian Activities in Lebanon

  • December 01, 1950

    Ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

    Congratulatory telegram from Stalin to Mao for Chinese operational successes against U.S. forces.

  • December 02, 1950

    Communist Demonstration in Aleppo

  • December 02, 1950

    Political Activities in Aleppo

  • December 02, 1950

    Lebanese Newspapers and Dr. Rowaiha

  • December 02, 1950

    List of the Foreigners in Lebanon

  • December 03, 1950

    Communist Activities in Aleppo

  • December 03, 1950

    Political Activities in Aleppo

  • December 03, 1950

    Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Wu Xiuquan and Qiao Guanhua

    Zhou Enlai gives instructions on how the Chinese side should respond when confronted with questions of whether China should back down in regards to the North Korean issue and the Taiwan issue. In particular, he emphasizes that the Chinese side should focus on blaming American imperialism for the invasions of North Korea and Taiwan and maintaining that China's involvement in these issues is essential.

  • December 04, 1950

    Memorandum of Conversation Between the Chinese Ambassador to the USSR and Gromyko

    Their discussion involves the idea of a definite Soviet victory in Korea, the failure of US soldiers and President Truman, the internal politics of the US; internal politics of China, the progress of the decision about Germany among the Soviets as well as other Western powers.

  • December 05, 1950

    VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved orders to Vyshinsky in New York and Roshchin in Beijing with message for Zhou Enlai

    Memorandums from the VKP(b) CC to Vyshinsky and Roshchin regarding the Soviet and PRC stances on discussions in the UN General Assembly and Security Council on the Chinese intervention in Korea.

  • December 07, 1950

    VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message to Vyshinsky in New York

    Message to Vyshinsky that U.S. proposals for a ceasefire should not be accepted as they are negotiating from a position of weakness after several defeats.

  • December 07, 1950

    Ciphered telegram, Gromyko to Roshchin Transmitting Message from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai

    Message from Stalin to Zhou Enlai agreeing with Chinese conditions for a ceasefire and advising that the Chinese limit negotiations on a ceasefire until Seoul is liberated.

  • December 07, 1950

    Ciphered telegram from Roshchin conveying message from Zhou Enlai to Soviet Government

    A telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Moscow, informing the Soviet leadership of the terms under which the Chinese will consider an armistice on the Korean Peninsula.

  • December 08, 1950

    Letter from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and Chen Yun

    Zhou Enlai reports on Soviet replies to telegrams from the Chinese side.

  • December 08, 1950

    Telegram from the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to Wu Xiuquan and Qiao Guanhua

    The CCP Central Committee gives instructions to the Chinese representatives to the UN on how to reply to confrontation over the Korean issue. The Chinese representatives are to express willingness to end military action as well as desire to know the UN and the U.S.'s positions on the conditions for an armistice.