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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • November 03, 1962

    Notes of Conversation between A.I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro

    Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Alexeev reports on the conversation between Mikoyan and Fidel Castro. The Cuban leader expresses his disappointment that the Cuban leadership was not consulted on the issue of withdrawing Soviet weapons from Cuba and on the Cuban Missile Crisis in general, and emphasizes the negative impact it has had and confusion it has caused on the Cuban people.

  • November 04, 1962

    Soviet Report on Conversation with US Congressional Staff

    Report on the relief in Washington after the height of the crisis had passed and the possibility of the US pledging not to invade Cuba, provide ports and other government facilities to Cuban emigres or training Cuban emigres on US territory. The report also highlighted the American reluctance on the normalization of economic relations and the Guantanamo base.

  • November 04, 1962

    Meeting of the Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba with Mikoyan in the Presidential Palace

    Minutes of the meeting between Anastas Mikoyan, Fidel Castro, and other members of the Secretariat of the ORI in the Old Presidential Palace. The purpose of this meeting is to resolve differences between the Cuban and Soviet governments in order to protect Marxist principles. Among other things, they discuss economic sanctions against Cuba, military intervention by other Latin American countries, the importance of the Cuban revolution to Marxism, and Cuba's relationship with the United States.

  • November 05, 1962

    Gromyko Cable to Kuznetsov and Zorin in New York

    Gromyko cable to Kuznetsov and Zorin in New York regarding preparation for International Red Cross' inspection of the Soviet ship "Amata", the number of observers on each vessel, division of the inspection cost, the duration of IRC inspection, and Soviet acceptance to let IRC observers inspect Soviet ships bound for Cuba.

  • November 07, 1962

    Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 5:30 p.m., Wednesday

    Pinto describes the current situation in Cuba from the perspective of the Brazilian Embassy in Havana. He says, "The country continues entirely mobilized for the defense. The attitude of the Government seems to be more cautious. Habituated for years of the threat and with the blockade in front of Havana, the revolutionary government is plainly conscious that the danger has not passed and can reemerge at any moment."

  • November 07, 1962

    Report from the Swiss Ambassador to Cuba (Stadelhofer) to the Division of Political Affairs, Swiss Foreign Ministry, About the Transfer of the Remains of Major Anderson

    The Swiss Ambassador to Cuba (Stadelhofer) describes the difficulties he has faced in overcoming the misunderstandings between the Cuban, U.S. and Swiss governments in attempting to return the coffin and remains of Major Anderson.

  • November 08, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'A Brief Report of a Cuban Military Intelligence Official’s Talk'

    According to military intelligence, the situation between US and Cuba has "calmed down". There are fewer fly-overs and the American Navy has backed away from Cuban territory.

  • November 08, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 8 November 1962

    Jelen reports on the talks regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis, especially the issues coming from the Cuban side of the talks.

  • November 08, 1962

    Telegram from Chilean Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Ruiz Solar)

    Ruiz Solar discusses in a telegram his opinions on the failed attempts of "Brazilian mediation" of the Cuban crisis.

  • November 08, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koca Popovic speaks with Ernesto “Che” Guevara about the Cuban Missile Crisis - the U.S. blockade, the fighting determination of the Cubans, the American imperium, and Latin American governments.

  • November 09, 1962

    Cable from the Military Attache of the Chinese Embassy in Iraq, 'Mercenaries Used by United States to Invade Cuba'

    The Chinese Embassy in Iraq passes on information from the Cuban Embassy about forces prepared by the CIA for an invasion of Cuba, claiming they included armed anti-Castro exiles of the Cuban Revolutionary Council as well as a separate group of "special agents committed to sabotage and subversion operations."

  • November 09, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 9 November 1962

    Jelen reports on several points of public opinion regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis situation.

  • November 09, 1962

    Danish Newspaper Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Pelegria Torras

    As the first journalist in Cuba since the outbreak of the Cuban crisis, Petersen is received by 1st Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Pelegria Torras, for an interview. They discuss the differences between socialism and capitalism; Cuban-Scandanavian relations; Cuban sovereignty; and Cuba's refusal to submit to international inspections.

  • November 10, 1962

    Soviet Report on the Opinion of Assistant on Latin American Affairs to the US Secretary of State Goodwin on the US-Cuba Relation After the Crisis

    Report on a private conversation in which Assistant on Latin American Affairs to the US Secretary of State Goodwin said that the US had originally planned to invade Cuba in January 1963, but then accelerated the preparation process during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He also stated that Kennedy wanted to take advantage of the Sino-Indian conflict because the group of neutral states including India would not be able to come out in Cuba's defense. Goodwin predicted that the US would not improve relations with Cuba until the Castro government was overthrown.

  • November 10, 1962

    Telegram-Letter from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 10-13 November 1962

    In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

  • November 10, 1962

    Soviet Report on the Cuban Missile Crisis Based on Intelligence Materials

    Summary of intelligence sources reporting that the US had been preparing for an invasion of Cuba and Kennedy only used the installation of missiles as a pretext to carry out aggressive actions. The US carried out the blockade also to warn the Soviet Union against signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR and to strengthen the position of the Democratic Party before the election. According to the report, other capitalist countries agreed that it was only the flexible policy of the USSR that prevented the outbreak of war.

  • November 12, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'A Report of the Conversation with the Deputy Editor of Noticias de Hoy, Raúl Valdes Vivo'

    A report of a conversation from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba detailing the situation different Latin American countries face in regards to US-Cuba relations, especially in terms of the US economic and naval blockade.

  • November 12, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 12 November 1962

    Jelen reports on his conversation with Raul Valdes Vivo, who is the editor-in-chief of Hoy [Today] during the absence of Blas Roca.

  • November 12, 1962

    Hungarian Socialist Workers Party First Secretary János Kádár’s Account of His Visit to Moscow to the HSWP Central Committee

    János Kádár presents on his diplomatic trip to Moscow to the Hungarian Central Committee. Kádár first places the Cuban Missile Crisis in context. This includes describing the success of the Cuban revolution, US aggression towards Cuba, and the Cuban-Soviet military and defense agreement, which ultimately spawned the US’s unilateral military mobilization. Kádár then describes the Soviet Union’s strategy to achieve two goals: protect the Cuban revolution and preserve peace. He notes that Cuba and the Soviet Union disagree about how the crisis was resolved, but asks the congress of workers to show complete support of Soviet actions and successes.

  • November 14, 1962

    Memorandum of Large-Group Meeting of FRG Chancellor Adenauer and US President Kennedy, Washington

    A record of the large group meeting between U.S. President Kennedy, the F.R.G. Chancellor Adenauer and others in which they discuss the results of the Cuban Missile Crisis, that the situation as a whole is still ongoing, and what needs to be done to restore security to the situation.