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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • June 20, 1967

    On Soviet Policy following the Israeli Aggression in the Middle East

    Polish document describing the speech given by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This documents is a translation of the version the Soviet leadership sent to the United Polish Workers’ Party for the information of the Polish leadership.

  • June 20, 1967

    On Soviet Policy following the Israeli Aggression in the Middle East

    East German Document describing the speech by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This German translation of Brezhnev's speech was circulated to the SED leadership.

  • June 24, 1967

    Record of Conversation between Polish Politburo member Zenon Kliszko and Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev, Moscow

    Brevhnev describes discussions he's had with North Vietnamese leaders, who only want the U.S. bombings to end in order to open negotiations. He also discusses the outcome of the Arab-Israeli war at the UN General Assembly; even though the assembly condemned Israel, the Arabs are shaken by defeat. The only hope for the Arabs is the support of the USSR. He has also warned Fidel Castro not to push things too far.

  • July 04, 1967

    A Report from the Mexican Embassy in Havana, 4 July 1967

    A visit of Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin from 26-30 June 1967 prompts this report from the Mexican Embassy in Havanna to the Secretary of Foreign Relations in Mexico City. They discuss: the position assumed by the Cuban Government and Communist Party in relation to Latin America, the Middle East and Vietnam, the internal administration of Cuba and the political operation in Cuba.

  • July 08, 1967

    Memorandum of Conversation between comrade Enver Hoxha and a Delegation of Chinese Red Guards

    Enver Hoxha announces that China's Red Guards have "risen to defend the Communist Party, Chairman Mao Zedong, and socialist China."

  • July 12, 1967

    Kosygin’s Report on Trip to Cuba to Meeting of Communist Party First Secretaries, Budapest, Hungary, 12 July 1967

    Meeting minutes from a conference of the Communist and Workers’ parties and chiefs of governments of the socialist countries on the situation in the Middle East (held in Budapest, 11-12 July 1967). Kosygin first reports on conversations with Charles De Gaulle in Paris and with Lyndon Johnson in Glassboro.

  • July 18, 1967

    Minutes of HSWP Politburo meeting held on 18 July 1967

    The Polish Political Committee makes recommendations to hold talks in Moscow aimed at "harmonizing positions on this policy of the Communist Party of China" based upon a proposal from the International Department.

  • July 29, 1967

    Letter from the Chairman of the KGB Andropov to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the CSSR Kudrna

    Appointment of Soviet officials for discussion of the procedure for joint border monitoring of trains and passengers crossing the Soviet-Czechoslovak border.

  • August 02, 1967

    Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceaușescu and Reza Radmanesh, President of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party, Bucharest

    Nicolae Ceaușescu and Reza Radmanesh, President of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party, met in Bucharest. Radmanesh discussed the work and goals of the Tudeh Party and how Iran's recent improved interaction with socialist countries was allowing the activity of the party to increase.

  • August 03, 1967

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.279, TOP SECRET, August 3, 1967

    A. Lazar and G. Chubotarenko from the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang discuss the purge of Pak Geum-cheol from the Korean Workers' Party.

  • August 14, 1967

    Intelligence Note 669 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Tests of Soviet Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)'

    Soviet tests of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) attracted the interest of the US intelligence community because of the unique challenges it posed to defenses. At that point, August 1967, the US had no means to detect a FOBs attack but INR noted that a satellite detection system would be operational during 1970. This was a reference to the secret Defense Support Program (DSP), which would use infrared technology to detect missile launches and reduce any surprise advantage from the FOBs. The Soviets recognized this and later retired their twenty or so ICBMs with FOBs capabilities in 1983.

  • August 18, 1967

    Chinese Activity in Syria, Political Report No. 4\67

    Report noted that China was making efforts to increase its influence in Syria. Nevertheless, the author of the document concluded that Syria was too dependent on Soviet aid and therefore would not become a Chinese satellite.

  • September 13, 1967

    European Commission to the Council of Ministers on the Russian Draft of Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    This memo to the Council of Ministers from the Euratom Commission examines the Russian draft of Article III of the NPT. It draws attention to the gradual convergence of Russian and American positions on the control clauses of the Treaty.

  • September 30, 1967

    Memorandum of Conversation between Albanian Council of Ministers Chairman Mehmet Shehu and Mao Zedong

    A record of a meeting between Albanian Council of Ministers Chairman Mehmet Shehu and Mao Zedong. Each tells stories of the formation of the Communist cause in their respective countries, and of internal enemies of the Albanian cause, especially Koci Xoxe.

  • October 05, 1967

    Aide-Memoire to Commissioner Martino by Robert Schaetzel, 'Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty'

    This memorandum to Commissioner Martino from Ambassador Schaetzel accepts the Soviet Draft Article III as he believes it will permit non-nuclear Euratom countries to negotiate collectively with the IAEA and permit a satisfactory verification concept.

  • October 09, 1967

    Note on the American Aide-Memoire on Article III of the Non-Proliferatoin Treaty

    This note describes an American memo detailing the Soviet project to create an Article III in the Nonproliferation Treaty Note.

  • October 09, 1967

    CSSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. No. 026.235/67-3, 'Information about Most Recent Measures against the Activities of the Representative Office of the Chinese People’s Republic'

    Account of measures taken in response to provocative activities of the CPR (threats, propaganda, restrictions on freedom of movement, etc) and objectives in pursuing these responses.

  • October 20, 1967

    Note on a Conversation with the Acting Ambassador of the People’s Republic of Poland, Comrade Pudisz, on 9 October 1967 between 1000 and 1130 hours in the Polish Embassy

    A short note on North Korea's foreign economic relations with China and the USSR, as well as anti-Korean sentiment in China.

  • November 02, 1967

    Report from the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow on Soviet foreign policy on the crisis in the Middle East in 1967

    This report by the Hungarian embassy in Moscow states that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States wants to escalate tensions over the crisis in the Middle East and may be able to find a resolution.

  • November 09, 1967

    Polish Record of Meeting of Soviet-bloc leaders (and Tito) in Moscow

    Soviet bloc leaders discuss current UN resolutions being devised to deal with the Middle East crisis and unmask U.S. imperialism at work. They talk about the US's desire to forces Nasser out. They also discuss internal Israeli politics, with dovish president Eshkol pitted against hawkish Defense Minister Dayan. They agree that this may be the best chance to make the Arabs realize that a political solution, not a military one, is necessary to solve the Middle East crisis. Tito pushes for a common resolution of all socialist countries, not just the USSR.