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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • January 25, 1995

    Meeting between Saddam Hussein and Political Advisors Regarding Hostilities with Israel, Iraqi Defense Capabilities, and Iraqi-Syrian Relations

    Saddam and political advisors discuss hostilities with Israel, Iraqi defense capabilities, and Iraqi-Syrian relations. American position as well as the position of many Arab nations are also discussed.

  • February 15, 1995

    Memorandum for Kenneth C. Brill from Andrew D. Sens, 'Memorandum of Conversation of the President's Expanded Meeting with Chancellor Kohl of Germany'

    Kohl and Clinton have a wide ranging discussion on NATO expansion, crises in the Balkans, Chechnya and Northern Africa, relations with Europe, and other subjects.

  • March 02, 1995

    Cable, U.S. Embassy Bucharest to the Secretary of State, 'EUR Assistant Secretary A/S Holbrooke's Meeting with President Iliescu'

    Richard Holbrooke and Romanian President Ion Iliescu discuss US-Romania relations and the possibilities for NATO enlargement.

  • May 10, 1995

    Summary Report on One-on-One Meeting between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, May 10, 1995, 10:10 a.m.-1:19 p.m., St. Catherine's Hall, the Kremlin

    Yeltsin and Clinton discuss arms control agreements such as START II, the nuclear aspirations of Iran and North Korea, NATO expansion, and other subjects.

  • July, 1995

    Memorandum for the President [William J. Clinton] from Anthony Lake, 'European Attitudes toward NATO Enlargement'

    Anthony Lake reviews the various policy positions of European countries toward NATO and EU enlargement. Although careful to note the different views held by states such as Germany and the UK, Lake concludes that "our European allies support NATO enlargement."

  • December 10, 1995

    State Department Telegram 28705 to US Embassy in India, 'Arrange Wisner-Varma Meeting on Testing Issue'

    Telegram instructing the Charges d'Affairs to arrange an urgent meeting between the United States Ambassador to India and the Indian Prime Minister's Pricipal Secretary to discuss American concerns that India will launch a nuclear test. The State Department was ready for a demarche to the Indian government to express “grave concerns” about the possibility of a test.

  • December 11, 1995

    State Department Telegram 285472 to US Embassy in Tokyo, 'ACDA Director Hollum’s Meeting with Japanese Officials'

    Talking points for Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Hollum from the State Department. Hollum was instructed to “urge” the Japanese to convey their concern to the government of India and “strong opposition [to] any such tests.” The State Department did not want to make any public statements about the situation because that “would be counterproductive,” that is, it would tip the U.S.’s hand Japan to tell Tokyo to voice its concerns over the possible Indian Nuclear Test to New Delhi.

  • December 11, 1995

    Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Memorandum by Robert S. Rochlin, 'Implications of an Indian Nuclear Weapons Test'

    Memo from senior scientist at the ACDA, Robert S. Rochlin, discussing the possible serious political and diplomatic consequences of India launching a nuclear test. In the event that Roa had made a decision to test, the United States did not have enough a“leverage” to encourage a policy reversal or to prevent a regional arms race; Washington would need to organize a “concerted intervention by all the major states.”

  • December 12, 1995

    Email, ITAIN Division Reports to Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, CTB, Nuke, 'Indian Nuclear Update'

    Email from ITAIN Division to Reports to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee regarding the state of India's nuclear reactors. Directed to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the message provides a glimmer of the intelligence watch over the Indian nuclear test site. At least two sites were under observation, one where the mysterious cables had been rearranged, and the other where there was much “personnel activity.” The meaning of the acronym "ITAIN" is presently unknown.

  • December 15, 1995

    Draft State Department Telegram to US Embassy Beijing, 'Possible Indian Nuclear Test'

    The State Department writes to Islamabad urging Pakistan to not react if in fact India chooses to launch a nuclear test. On 15 December the New York Times published a story by Tim Weiner, under the headline “US Suspects India Prepares to Conduct Nuclear Test.” While some Indian journalists and policy experts were convinced that the story was a US government plant, Weiner had simply used due diligence in pursuing a lead from a non-government expert on nuclear proliferation issues. Worried that the story would exacerbate regional tensions by encouraging Pakistan to “act in a manner that jeopardizes our nonproliferation efforts in South Asia,” the Department wanted to enlist the Chinese to encourage the Pakistanis to “exercise restraint in response to these reports.”

  • December 15, 1995

    Talking Points, State Department, South Asian Regional Affairs, 'Additional Testimony and Q’s and A’s for Congressional Briefing'

    State Department talking points for analyzing the issue of a potential Indian Nuclear Test. These talking points review the state of play after Ambassador Wisner’s demarche to the Indian Foreign Ministry. Recognizing Prime Minister Rao’s cautiousness, US government officials did not believe that he had made a decision to test, but they were aware that he was under great pressure to do so. Therefore, the U.S. government was working with allies, encouraging them “to urge India not to test.” Parallel discussions were taking place with the Pakistanis over the production of enriched uranium over above the 3 to five 5 percent level that could be used to fuel nuclear reactors. The Pakistanis were denying that they were producing highly enriched uranium but intelligence reports suggested that they were contemplating such action or had already begun the process.

  • 1996

    Excerpts from Recollections by the Former Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Aleksandr Kapto

    Aleksandr Kapto reflects on the Soviet Union's normalization of relations with South Korea, and the consequential fallout in relations between North Korea and the USSR. According to Kapto, North Korea threatened to develop nuclear weapons and withdraw from the NPT as a result of Soviet-South Korean rapprochement.

  • January 19, 1996

    State Department Telegram 008785 to US Embassy India, 'CTBT Letter from the President: India-Specific Talking Points'

    A State Department telegram outlining talking points on why supporting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was in India's best interest. As it became evident that Rao was not going to make a decision to test, President Clinton resumed pressure for Indian support for the CTBT by signing off on a letter to Rao about the test ban. The State Department sent the Embassy talking points about the value of Indian support for the CTBT for Ambassador Wisner to use when delivering the Clinton letter.

  • February 12, 1996

    Cable from Brazilian Embassy in Washington to Foreign Ministry, 'Brazil-United States. Brazilian space program. Visit of the chairman of CTA to Brazil.'

    This document describes the Computer Technology Associates’ (CTA) interest in investing in Brazil's space sector. In a scheduled visit to Brasília, Tom Velez, CEO at CTA, would discuss his company’s interest in producing 20 communication satellites using Brazilian technology and construction of the proper infrastructures to launch these satellites from CLA.

  • February 28, 1996

    Cable from Brazilian Foreign Ministry to Embassy in Washington, 'Brazil-United States. Visit of the Secretary of State. Non-proliferation.'

    This cable reports the visit of the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Brazil. Issues related to non-proliferation dominated the meeting. Christopher emphasized the importance of Brazil strengthening its commitments to non-proliferation norms by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Brazilian officials expected to improve the dialogue with the US administration after Brazil’s adherence to the MTCR.

  • March 25, 1996

    Cable from Brazilian Embassy in Washington to Foreign Ministry

    This document reports the visit of Kenneth Fisher, Lockheed’s representative, to Brasília. During the meeting, Fisher argued that in order for Lockheed to start its operations in Brazil, the company required Brazilian adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime and the consent of the American government.

  • June 20, 1996

    Letter, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Proposed South Africa-United States Military Committee'

    Details of the impending US Department of Defense visit to South Africa.

  • June 24, 1996

    Letter, J. P. du Preez, Regarding US Department of Defense Visit to South Africa

    Memo from Mr. Du Preez to Mr. Minty displaying dissapointment that the Department of Foreign Affairs wasn't consulted on the impending trip U.S. visit.

  • August 12, 1996

    US Embassy in New Delhi Telegram 9250 to State Department, 'Ambassador’s Meeting with Opposition Leader'

    Report on US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner's meeting with Indian Opposition Leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and halting any nuclear test. The Ambassador found the meeting unproductive. The CTBT was central to the discussion but it was evident that Vajpayee was not interested and his “body language” indicated that he was inclined to favor a nuclear test. During one point in the discussion, Vajpayee asked, “What if we start underground tests?” According to the embassy’s message, “we interpret his question about testing as indicating that [he] and the BJP would favor a test” and would not be persuaded by U.S. arguments—“reason”—to forego one.

  • June 26, 1997

    Cable from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington to Foreign Ministry, 'Outer space. Expansion of the international market for spatial services. Brazilian insertion. Entrepreneurial interest. CLA. ECCO. Considerations.'

    Brazilian diplomat Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima recommends that the Brazilian government should proceed to make the Brazilian space market more attractive for foreign investments. Among Flecha de Lima’s suggestions is the creation of a set of norms to regulate commercial activities at the Alcântara Launch Center.