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Documents

December 13, 1982

Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President Bush and Pakistani President Zia, December 8, 1982, 3:45 p.m.

Bush and Zia discuss the Soviet war in Afghanistan, China's relations with Pakistan and the US, the status of Taiwan, and the Pakistani nuclear program.

August 14, 1979

Cable from the American Embassy Islamabad to the Secretary of State, 'Letter from President Zia ul-Haq to President Carter'

This document is a telegram between the Pakastani president Muhammad Zia and Jimmy Carter. In it, Zia protests at the recent characterization of Pakistan's nuclear program in Western media.

August 23, 1987

Embassy Islamabad Telegram 17754 to the Secretary of State, 'Pervez Case-GOP Regulation on Procurement Activities'

During the Armacost-Zia talks, the Pakistanis tell US officials that they will confidentially share any new procurement regulations with them.

July 30, 1987

Embassy Islamabad Telegram 16052 to the Department of State, 'Pervez Nuclear Arrest Case - July 23 Statement by MFA Spokesman Gives Greater Emphasis to Conspiracy'

Only a few weeks after Pervez’s arrest, Under Secretary of State Armacost traveled to Pakistan for wide ranging discussions with General Zia, but with a special focus on nuclear procurement and the uranium enrichment program.

August 5, 1987

Embassy Islamabad Telegram 16556 to Department of State, 'Under Secretary Armacost Meeting with Zia'

Zia argued that Washington was trying to “get one Pakistani in order to hang the entire government.”

May 29, 1986

Embassy Islamabad Cable 11791 to Department of State, 'Nuclear: Solarz Conversation with GOP'

The year after Congress passed the Solarz amendment in August 1985, Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-CA) traveled to Pakistan, a country that would become a major test case for the amendment which cut off U.S. foreign aid to recipients. Solarz confronted General Zia and other top officials with his perception, based on U.S. intelligence, that Pakistan’s Kahuta plant was enriching weapons-grade enriched uranium. The Pakistanis strenuously denied the charge.

June 16, 1986

Kenneth Adelman, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 'Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Programs and US Security Assistance'

A letter from the United States Control and Disarmament Agency assessing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and US security assistance. Three main issues and possible courses of actions are discussed; they include President Reagan’s “red lines,” certification of Pakistani nuclear activity and convincing Congress to continue aid to Pakistan after September 1987.

November 19, 1982

Henry S. Rowen, National Intelligence Council, to DDCI [Deputy Director of Central Intelligence McMahon], 19 November 1982, with attached memorandum from National Intelligence Council staffer [name excised], 'Pakistan'

Despite the concerns about sharing the ALR-69 radar warning receiver with Pakistan for fear of it falling into Chinese hands, CIA officials argue that failure to meet Pakistani demands would lead to a “serious blow to U.S. worldwide nonproliferation efforts.”

November 8, 1982

'Pakistan-US: Demarche on F-16 Equipment,' 11/8/82, with Memo from McMahon to Carlucci, 'Risk Assessment of the Sale of AN/ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver to Pakistan,'1 1/8/82, and Excerpt from Natl Intel Est on Pakistan

With delivery of U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers imminent, Pakistan threatens to refuse delivery unless the U.S. agrees to include the ALR-69 radar warning receiver for the aircraft. CIA analysts have concerns that including this sensitive radar technology in the delivery of the F-16s would enable China, a close military ally of Pakistan, to obtain and study the device.

October 17, 1982

US Embassy Pakistan Cable 15696 to State Department, 'Pakistan Nuclear Issue: Meeting with General Zia'

The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan reports to the State Department on a meeting between Ambassador General Vernon Walters and President Zia. Walters returned to Islamabad to warn Pakistani officials that U.S. aid was in “grave jeopardy” after a link between the Pakistani program and Chinese technology was discovered. A U.S. military aid package, which included F-16 fighter-bombers, was also discussed.

Pagination