The Foreign Ministry of Denmark informed Danish Ambassador in Beijing of the notice it got from the North Korean Embassy and requested a confirmation of the appointment.

This cable summarizes Danish media coverage of illegal North Korean smuggling in Denmark and other Scandinavian countries. It focuses especially on press theories about the way in which the North Korean Embassies used illicitly gained funds.

This cable discusses Danish press coverage of the North Korean diplomats who were expelled from the four Scandinavian countries for trafficking in cigarettes, liquor and drugs. It also reports on press coverage of the diplomats sent to Denmark to replace those who were expelled.

A summary of the North Korean smuggling scandal in Scandinavia produced by the US intelligence community.

The CIA reports that Norway and Denmark have expelled North Korean diplomats for smuggling alcohol and tobacco.

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

Defense Minister Scholten writes to other NATO Defense Ministers to clarify the position of the Netherlands on TNF modernization. He focuses on issues related to the size of the modernization program, which in its current state he fears is too large, and also the possibility of separating the issues of making a decision on modernization and then implementing it. The British Defense Secretary then writes to refute each of his concerns on the wider issue of TNF modernization. An addendum focuses more specifically on the issues relating to the Netherlands.