This document discusses potential political repercussions of the Soviet Union's lease of a nuclear submarine to India vis-a-vis Pakistan and the USSR's global status.

Letter from Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev asking him to personally intervene on behalf of a project to create an atomic submarine in India.

Letter from Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev asking him to personally intervene on behalf of a project to create an atomic submarine in India.

This document considers the political consequences of carrying through with the Soviet Union's promise to provide India with an Atomic submarine for scientific purposes.

This concept paper addresses the need to base decisions about the nature of military cooperation on the Soviet Union’s long term goal of ending the arms race and moving toward disarmament. It also details how this decision-making should look in specific developing countries in which the Soviet Union has an interest.

Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi meet to discuss various issues. Begin by noting the effect of Western radio propaganda within both India and Soviet Union. Gorbachev notes the "voices" of Western radio stations broadcasting in the Soviet Union, aiming to undermine perestroika. After touching on economic initiatives in India, Gandhi singles out, among problems in India, the "weakening of public morals." Blames this problem on the "onslaught of the Western--and first and foremost, American-- mass media." Both sides criticize militarism at base of US foreign policy, and US emphasis on rolling back communism. Conversation concludes with analysis of Afghanistan situation; Gorbachev explains measure USSR is taking to solidify Afghan government, and Gandhi recommends caution when dealing with tribal factor in Afghanistan. Both sides speak on Pakistan's reaction to situation.

G.M. Malenkov speaks with representatives of the Indian Communist Party, including Dange, Ghosh, and Rao. The ICP delegation asks for Soviet advice on party organization and composition. Malenkov responds, warning the ICP to take care not to come off as a Soviet puppet. Malenkov's main suggestion is to determine a firm party line, and publish a singular and clear program for the party, so as to unite disputing factions.

Delegation representing the Indian Communist Party, including Rao, Ghosh, and Dange, discusses the internal disagreements within the ICP following the party's Second Congress, stemming largely over the question of armed struggle. Also touches on how the ICP should react to foreign policy issues, including US involvement in the Korean War.

Andrei Zhdanov instructs Shripad Amrit Dange on the Soviet Union's suggestions for the formation of an Indian Communist Party, following India's 1947 Partition.

Meeting in Moscow between Stalin and Indian Communist Party representatives C. Rajeswara Rao, S. A. Dange, A. K. Ghosh, and [M. Basava] Punnaiah. Stalin responded to a series of prepared questions from the representatives.