The memoir of Trần Quang Cơ (1927-2015), former member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), brings to light the intense diplomacy among great powers and regional players over the continued conflicts in Indochina after the unification of Vietnam as well as the bitter disagreements within the Vietnamese leadership over the country’s political priorities during the period of 1975-1993.

Cơ put together his memories and thoughts on “many sensitive developments” in Vietnamese foreign relations that he believed had been “intentionally or unintentionally” forgotten (rơi rụng) in the state-endorsed history “to ‘smooth over’ (tròn trĩnh) the historical record.”  Completed in Vietnamese in 2001 (updated in 2003) and informally circulated on the internet, Merle Pribbenow’s English-translation makes this valuable historical source available to wider audiences.

In response to this perceived growing threat against the regime, on 2 December 1980 the Vietnamese Communist Party Politburo issued Resolution 31-NQ/TW on maintaining internal political security and law and order in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, with a specific focus on increasing the power and the responsibilities of Vietnam’s Public Security and Police forces, which were subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. 

A speech given by Party Politburo Member Le Duc Tho during a three-day conference of the Ministry’s top Public Security officers along with the Directors of Public Security of all of the nation’s provinces and major cities, where the attendees received instructions on three new Ministry of Interior Party resolutions - one on “the struggle against Chinese spies”, one on “the struggle against American spies”, and one on  “the struggle against the enemy’s ideological attacks.” At the time of the speech, Le Duc Tho was viewed as Vietnam’s second most powerful leader, second only to Party General Secretary Le Duan. 

Le Duc Tho commented that while recruiting Americans would be easy, requiring only “money, women, and drinking and carousing”, recruiting Chinese would require a careful process of political education of the target

Trần Quốc Hoàn reviews cases against foreign and domestic spies in the Vietnam Wars.

The COSVN Party Current Affairs Committee report on steps to be taken against the United States.

The Vietnamese Politburo updates COSVN (the communist command in South Vietnam) on the progress of plans for a four-party conference with the US. It discusses the upcoming inauguration of President Nixon and the Vietnamese negotiation strategy.

The Vietnamese Politburo updates COSVN (the communist command in South Vietnam) on the progress of plans for a four-party conference with the US.

Lengthy briefing for the Central Committee on the status of North Vietnamese diplomatic efforts during the first eight months of 1968 and future plans.

The Vietnamese Politburo informs COSVN (the communist command in South Vietnam) of developments in the United States domestic politics which have impacted President Johnson's strategy in Vietnam. It also discusses goals for the upcoming diplomatic contacts with the US.

The Vietnamese Politburo informs COSVN (the communist command in South Vietnam) of developments in the war following the 1968 Tet Offensive.