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Documents

February 25, 1965

Memorandum of a Conversation between Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, and Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic, on 25 February 1965, 12:30-14:30

The conversation is focused on the future development of GDR-Egyptian relations. Ulbricht talks about the agitation that his visit to Egypt caused in West Germany. He also asks Nasser if official diplomatic recognition of the GDR would be possible. Nasser asks for economic support for other newly independent African states. Nasser and Ulbricht also consider general questions of agriculture and the transition to a socialist economy.

February 28, 1965

Memorandum of the Second Official Conversation between Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, and Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic, on 28 February 1965, 18:00-19:40

The conversation is about the joint statement on issues of economic and cultural cooperation that will be signed by Ulbricht and Nasser. They talk about the opening of an Egyptian consulate general in Berlin and consider questions of agriculture.

July 18, 1967

Memorandum of a Meeting between Houari Boumédiène, Abd al-Rahman Arif, Leonid I. Brezhnev, and Alexei Kosygin

Arif and Boumedienne talked to Brezhnev and Kossygin about the Six-Day War and discussed with them the possibilities for the Arab countries. The first possibility is to negotiate with the US and Israel and the second, to continue fighting, regardless of the cost. The Algerian representatives favored the second option, suggesting that otherwise an overthrow of the progressive Arab governments would be likely. Brezhnev and Kossygin argued, however, that a political solution would be more appropriate and that the main goal at the present time should be to strengthen the armies of Syria, Jordan and the UAR, and to support these countries in every respect.

June 15, 1954

Memorandum of a conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Egypt D.S. Solod and Egyptian Prime Minister G. Nasser

In a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Solod, President Nasser discusses Egypt's lack of sufficient arms to fight the British and discusses attempts to negotiate for the sale of arms from other European countries.

May 21, 1955

Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Egypt D.S. Solod and the Egyptian Prime Minister G. Nasser

President Nasser discusses with Soviet Ambassador Solod possible relations with communist China and his fear of conflict with Israel. Nasser then turns to the economic and political relations between the USSR and Egypt

August 9, 1955

Memorandum of a conversation between the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt D.S. Solod and the Egyptian Prime Minister G. Nasser

President Nasser discusses Western interference in the Arab world and describes Egypt as an island surrounded by imperialist waves. Despite this, he claims Egypt will remain independent and neutral.

August 22, 1955

Memorandum of Conversation between the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt D.S. Solod and the director of the Prime Minister’s office, A. Sabri

President Nasser criticizes the Israeli attack at the Gaza strip which involves Egyptian soldiers. He requests immediate military aid from the Soviet Union in case of future incidents by Israeli or British forces.

September 15, 1955

Memorandum of Conversation between the Soviet Ambassador in Egypt D.S. Solod and Egypt’s Prime Minister G. Nasser

President Nasser discusses a Soviet-Egyptian arms deal and claims he is pleased with the agreement. However, he worries that Britain will no longer supply arms to Egypt as a result of this agreement.

August 15, 1956

Ministry for State Security, Main Department II, ‘Egypt’

The economic relations between the GDR and the Republic of Egypt are presented, starting with the trade agreement signed on May 7, 1953, and the exchange of consular representation. Political relations between the countries were hindered, according to the report, by pressure from the FRG on Egypt and the question of whether recognizing the GDR meant creating a deeper split between the FRG and the GDR. The report also mentions problems in meeting the export and import plans set forth in the trade agreement, including unpunctuality on the side of the GDR’s trade missions. The report states that Nasser enjoys great popularity in his country as a result of his position towards the West, social politics within the country, cooperation with other Arab countries and improvements in the industrial sector. This is followed by a detailed description of Egypt’s political situation and a proposition to extend political and economic cooperation while trying to reduce the influence of the West. Finally, the report recommends continued rejection of Israel's demands for compensation.

June 20, 1967

On Soviet Policy following the Israeli Aggression in the Middle East

Polish document describing the speech given by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This documents is a translation of the version the Soviet leadership sent to the United Polish Workers’ Party for the information of the Polish leadership.

Pagination