Kohl and Major review ideas about the establishment of a European pillar in NATO and French plans for new security structures in Europe.

Mazowiecki and CIA Director W. Webster discussed relaxing COCOM restrictions and Gorbachev’s response to both Lithuanian independence and German reunification.

Over two days of meetings, Bush and Mazowiecki discuss German reunification, the future of relations with the Soviet Union/Russia, and NATO.

The document discusses the Soviet position on German unification in six separate parts. The first deals with confusion over Gorbachev's better than expected consent to unification. Second are the potential domestic and foreign policy reasons the USSR consented so readily to unification, followed by the third part which outlines potential Soviet benefits from the process. The fourth section discusses the autonomy of the new German government, which is backed up with the fifth section discussing public sentiment. The final portion discusses the fine line for both the Soviet Union and the West between being overbearing on Germany's new independence and not helping enough.

The document outlines other countries' reactions to the prospect of German Reunification. The fears of France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg are cataloged. In addition, Western allies such as the United States, United Kingdom, and France are marked as being hopeful for the upcoming reunion of the two states.

In light of Kohl & Gorbachev's joint statement (June 13, 1989), the Head of the Department for Western and Northern Europe of the Political Section of the Austrian Foreign Ministry discusses German reunification, the Berlin Question, and Detente. The report discusses the resistant attitudes of the West, with the exception of the US, towards German reunification.

In a conversation recorded by Chernyaev, Gorbachev candidly discusses the political situation in East and West Germany, the weakness of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), and the Soviet strategy for managing German reunification.

In this extraordinary conversation, Solidarity’s leader fears the collapse of the Wall would distract West Germany’s attention - and money - to the GDR, at the time when Poland, the trail-blazer to the post-communist era in Eastern Europe, desperately needed both. "Events are moving too fast," Walesa said, and only hours later, the Wall fell, and Kohl had to cut his Poland visit short to scramble back to Berlin, thus proving Walesa’s fear correct.

Telephone conversation between President George H. W. Bush and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the situation in Germany.

Telephone conversation between President George H. W. Bush and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the situation in Germany.