This 1972 RAND Report, prepared for the Department of State, describes possible alternative domestic and international “futures” and presents a framework for formation of U.S. policy toward post-Tito Yugoslavia. It includes appendices assessing Yugoslav developments and reviewing the history of U.S.-Yugoslav relations.

During his visit to the United States, Tito stressed that relations between states should be based on equality and independence. Regarding the possibility of dialogue between the US and the DPRK, Yugoslavia could help with a low level trilateral dialogue.

Yugoslavia accepted a proposal for a second non-alignment conference, but was "not to keen" on it. Further details of Tito's tours through Bolivia, Mexico and the United States.

Kennan reports on a conversation with Tito where they discussed the upcoming Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned States.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry summarizes (predominantly) Western leaders' statements about the Bandung Conference. Secretary Dulles expressed great satisfaction with the "useful and good conference," especially its role in "checking China," while Great Britain expressed strong disapproval of China's behavior at the conference and France was "shocked" that Algeria was discussed. Israel and Australia expressed regret that they were excluded from the conference.

To the other delegates, Mao discusses their shared goal of defeating imperialism, primarily through peaceful methods. He stresses widespread Marxist reeducation of the Chinese people and increased Chinese industrial and agricultural production as means for improvement. Mao also reminds them that socialist nations must be firmly united under the leadership of the Soviet Union to fight colonialism and imperialism, and while the communes are necessary to organize locally, the party remains the core administrative unite of communized peoples.

Brazilian President João Goulart emphasizes that the possibility of an adequate solution (to the Cuban Missile Crisis) could be increased if there were measures to suspend the quarantine (blockade) immediately, followed by corresponding and effective stoppage of weapons shipment to Cuba as well as determining obligations to prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons and the installation of bases. In his opinion the danger of war could increase significantly and worries of Brazil would grow as far as its own security was concerned, if such bases were installed in Cuba or any other part of LA. He also brought to the attention the proposal of Brazil in the UN for the denuclearization of Latin America.

A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry about a meeting with Brazilian President João Goulart. Barišić says Goulart considers that everything must be done to prevent the beginning of war, because war would bring unpredictable catastrophe and it would be hard to extinguish it if war operations start. Goulart also shares his opinion that negotiations are necessary, and that Cuba must be prevented from becoming an atomic base for it could be the constant cause of war dangers.

A report on a meeting between the ambassador of Yugoslavia [Boško Vidaković] with President [Osvaldo] Dorticós to discuss American planes making low-level flights over Cuba and, according to information received recently (at the time), the American attack being imminent.

The Soviet leadership discusses the state of Soviet foreign policy after the Hungarian crisis and Khrushchev’s visit to the US. Molotov criticizes Khrushchev for recklessness in foreign policy direction. Soviet inroads in the Middle East and the Third World are analyzed. The effects of the crises in Eastern Europe are placed in the context of the struggle against US imperialism.