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August 1, 1961

Summary of Comments by N. S. Khrushchev concerning the Question of the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty with the German Democratic Republic

Khrushchev remembers the signing of peace agreement with Japan and the exclusion of the Soviet Union from it. He criticizes the politics of Adenauer and warns about the destructive effects of potential world war. Khrushchev suggests signing the peace agreement to avoid the possibility of a nuclear war against the US and its allies

July 5, 1961

Record of a Conversation between N. S. Khrushchev and Chen Yi, Deputy Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China

Chen asks Khrushchev to go over the pressing international issues and he presents the USSR's stances on the situation in Laos, South Korea, and Cuba. Khrushchev also raises problems in GDR and difficulties in negotiations with Western powers with regards to the German question. Khrushchev also mentions Soviet plans to launch a spaceship and resume nuclear testing. The two leaders also discuss the challenges of agricultural development.

July 2, 1961

Record of a Conversation [between] N. S. Khrushchev and F. Roberts, British Ambassador in the USSR concerning the Signing of a Peace Treaty with the Two German States

The two parties discuss the national exhibitions in Moscow and London, and opportunities for trade between England and the Soviet Union. Khrushchev puts forth his intentions to sign the peace agreement with Germany as soon as possible and to declare Berlin a free city. Roberts is worried that the peace agreement will limit the rights of Western nations in Western Germany and Western Berlin.

April 24, 1961

Record of a Conversation between N. S. Khrushchev and FRG Ambassador in the USSR H. Kroll about the State of Soviet-German Relations and Questions of the Signing of a Peace Treaty with Germany

Kroll remarks that trade between the USSR and Western Germany is improving and that he hopes they can continue to trade on good terms. The two discuss the Soviet exhibition in FRG, and Kroll suggests to Khrushchev that the USSR should try and reach an agreement with the GDR soon. Khrushchev also mentions that he will not prevent West German citizens (with FRG passports) to enter FRG from Soviet-controlled Berlin, since population control is too difficult. However, he does mention the possibility of building a wall and quickly says that it would be "impossible".

August 3, 1961

Khrushchev's Speech at the Opening of the Meeting of Moscow Conference, 3-5 August 1961

Khrushchev makes the opening statement to the secretaries of the CC's of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries at a conference in Moscow. The purpose of the conference is to discuss the preparation and conclusion of a German peace treaty.

January 18, 1961

Letter from Ulbricht to Khrushchev

Ulbricht writes to Khrushchev regarding proposals for a peace treaty/ non-aggression pact to resolve the West Berlin issue. He also discusses further plans for economic development in the GDR to "catch up" with West Germany.

September 28, 1961

Letter from Khrushchev to Ulbricht Regarding the Situation in Berlin

Khrushchev response to Ulbricht's 15 September letter regarding the closing of the border between east and west Berlin. He notes that since the Western powers were tending toward negotiation rather than confrontation over the crisis, "such steps which could exacerbate the situation, especially in Berlin, should be avoided."

August 3, 1961

Walter Ulbricht's Speech at the Moscow Conference, 3-5 August 1961

Ulbricht speaks at the Moscow Conference of Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries for the Exchange of Opinions on Questions Concerning the Preparation and Conclusion of a German Peace Treaty.

October 23, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 60

Protocol 60 details the first meeting of the Communist Party during the crisis. As Khrushchev is awaiting the announcement by President Kennedy of the discovery of missiles in Cuba, he and some of his colleagues briefly considered using tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a US airborne assault. But, at the suggestion of Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky, the Kremlin postponed its consideration of a nuclear response pending details of Kennedy’s speech.The Kremlin wasted no time in taking steps to reduce the risks of confrontation. It ordered some ships that were still in the Mediterranean to turn around. The Aleksandrovsk, the ship carrying the nuclear warheads for the IRBMs (the R-14s), was ordered to keep sailing, however, because it was close enough to Cuban shores to dock before the blockade went into effect.

July 1, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 39

Protocol 39 gives some evidence that Khrushchev was thinking about more than just Cuba. Khrushchev discussed the importance of getting the US to stop flying over the ships heading to Cuba. After discussing the timetable for sending the missiles to Cuba, Khrushchev led his colleagues in a re-examination of the Soviet Union’s policy on West Berlin. Berlin had not been a topic of discussion for months.

Pagination