The Department of State shares with the CIA several documents, including a record of conversation between Anthony Eden and a Soviet diplomat in London on February 2, 1955; a record of conversation between Ambassador Hayter and Molotov on February 4; a translation of Molotov's statement made to Hayter; and comments made by Humphrey Trevelyan. 

In this meeting between members of the Policy Planning Staff's board of consultants, the participants discussed their policy preferences towards European nuclear arrangements.
Recognizing “bitter” French and Soviet objections to a collective nuclear force, the consultants believed that over time it might be possible to “get both the force and the agreement.”

Summary of past negotiations with the Soviet Union for cultural exchanges which include the Baltic States. The State Department wants to avoid the Soviets using these exchanges to erode the US policy of not recognizing Soviet control of the Baltics.

Predictions about the next four years in the Soviet Union's evolving political and cultural landscape, including that internal protests against perestroika will dominate the focus of Soviet leadership, that perestroika and its attendant backlash will in turn redistribute funds away from military spending, and that ultimately, these and other conflicts and pressures will promulgate the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Montgomery and Stalin discuss the possibility for future UK-USSR cooperation and ongoing US-UK relations.

A State Department assessment of Pakistan’s security situation, its nuclear program and the future of Pakistani planning. A range of subjects are covered in depth including, Pakistan’s perception of its security situation, major foreign policy dilemmas such as India and Afghanistan, the development of a “nuclear options” and American non-proliferation responses.

The U.S. Departments of Defense and State offer instructions about how to respond to the Northern Limit Line Dispute, including measures to restrain South Korea.

During a discussion with the Canadian embassy counselor, U.S. country desk director David Schneider opined that Indian was unlikely to test a device in the “near future” but he wanted Ottawa’s prognosis. Schneider was also interested in whether the Soviets, with their close relationship with India, might be able to use their influence to “deter” a test. If India tested, the U.S. could respond with a “strong statement,” but whether “punitive” measures would be taken would depend on whether the test “violated existing agreements.” In October 1970, the State Department had cautioned the Indians that a “peaceful nuclear explosion” was indistinguishable from a weapons test and that the test of a nuclear device would be incompatible with U.S.-Indian nuclear assistance agreements.

Discussion of a British list of countries that were actual or potential manufacturers of inverters. The U.S. does not want to approach any "nuclear threshold states" yet because some might not cooperate or might inform Pakistan. Also discusses strategies for approaching the Soviet Union and China in the future.